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Abstract  
This thesis examines the changing patterns of news consumption by young 
adults in the United Kingdom, aged 16 to 34 years old, and the editorial 
responses to this by leading television news broadcasters. It begins with a 
comprehensive review of the most recent literature on incidental news 
exposure, personalisation, echo chambers and filter bubbles; combining this 
with analyses of key reports by industry and governmental sources. It proposes 
a new taxonomy of news consumption behaviours, and a new visual taxonomy 
of news using the RGB (red, green, blue) colour spectrum. Senior editors at 
ITV News, Channel 4 News, 5 News and Sky News were interviewed to 
provide insights into current digital strategies. The broadcasters’ feedback to a 
questionnaire were studied for empirical evidence on audience behaviour, 
editorial decision making, and positioning within the aforementioned conceptual 
frameworks. This thesis concludes with a negation of the view that emerging 
news consumption patterns are problematic for political engagement. Instead it 
finds bold solutions within the industry’s best practices and the literature for 
how broadcasters could reform their organisational structures to better serve 
young adult audiences. 
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1.0 Research Rationale 
Young adults in the United Kingdom aged 16-34 years old rapidly are 
abandoning traditional sources of news. They are buying fewer newspapers 
(Cairncross, 2019, pp.25-27) and watching less news on linear broadcast 
television (Ofcom, 2018, pp.24-29). Instead, they are migrating online, in 
particular to social media platforms using smart mobile devices (Reuters 
Institute, 2018, p.63). Many observers (Buckingham, 1996; Norris, 2001; Kim, 
Chen & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013; Lee, Kim & Koh, 2016) fear an apparent 
downward trend in news consumption among this demographic poses a 
challenge for political engagement and democracy.  
There is particular concern about emerging methods of news consumption, 
namely ‘incidental news exposure’ (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017), the process of 
coming across news unintentionally, while doing something else online. Another 
concern is about ‘information overload’ (Lee, Kim & Koh, 2016), resulting in 
some young people choosing to avoid news, altogether.  
Meanwhile, news organisations worry about their loss of hegemony and the 
concomitant commercial threat posed to their industry, as more people get their 
news vicariously via news aggregators, rather than going directly to news 
brands. Ofcom found:  
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‘This frequent scrolling through news content meant they [social media 
users] were less likely to actively seek out content (on TV, radio or 
online) as they always felt up to date’. (Ofcom, 2019b, p.27). 
Additionally, greater reliance on digital platforms means news content 
increasingly is personalised and/or curated by algorithms, not by human 
journalists, thereby allegedly creating ‘filter bubbles’ (Pariser, 2011), where the 
range of stories young consumers likely encounter is reduced; giving rise to 
‘information cocoons’ (Sunstein, 2009) or ‘echo chambers’, where the content 
to which they are exposed reinforces previously held political opinions. 
1.0.1 Social context 
There is a large volume of noise around this subject in the public arena, not 
least because the media loves talking about itself, and older people are wont to 
decry the behaviour of younger generations. But there also is a popular anti-
technology trope running through the national culture, evidenced as far back as 
nineteenth century Luddites, who smashed textile factory machines that 
threatened their livelihoods (HL Deb 27 February 1812; Edgerton, 2011). 
Presently, this anti-technology mood is manifested by those whose livelihoods 
are entangled in ‘old media’ — journalists, publishers, advertisers, regulators, 
politicians — against the new technology companies responsible for the rapid 
changes in the delivery of information. Also, it is being reinforced in the culture 
via continuous news stories about the ‘threats’ posed by the Internet and social 
media. Stories ranging from online child sex abuse, cyber bullying, cyber fraud, 
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and so on. Such news stories could be summarised with the headline: 
‘Technology has changed; it’s bad, and it’s coming to get you.’ 
Clearly, nobody could deny some underlying threats exist. They pre-date the 
Internet and have now migrated online. But the decisions of editors readily to 
select these stories, and the style, tone and hysteria surrounding this reportage 
serves the same functional purpose as a sledgehammer in the hands of a 
Luddite machine-wrecker. 
An exemplar of this was the widespread reporting of a study conducted by The 
Happiness Research Institute (2015) on mental health and its relationship to 
the use of social media. The headline in TheJournal.ie (2016) announced: ‘It's 
official — Facebook makes you miserable’. While the Independent (2016) 
wrote: ‘Facebook makes you unhappy and makes jealous people particularly 
sad’. Both newspapers reported accurately the findings of the study on 1,095 
Danish Facebook users. My point is there was an unmistakeable glee 
detectable in the reporting of these stories, by those with a vested interest in 
preventing further encroachment of the new technology. 
So, it is against this backdrop of powerful, political, cultural and commercial 
interest groups with the ability to influence an already anti-technology pre-
disposition in the populace, that I embark upon this research.  
1.0.2 Theoretical context 
I have conducted a comprehensive review of the literature and industry reports 
to gain a clearer picture of the current state of news consumption among those 
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aged 16-34. Given the rapidity of change of the media landscape and the 
narrow age group under consideration, the focus has been on research 
produced in the past decade.  
Studies have been conducted across many mature economies in the western 
world, including the USA, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, but surprisingly few in 
the UK. Most take the form of case studies and qualitative research, such as 
interviewing groups of young people about their media consumption. Fewer 
adopt an empirical, metadata-driven approach, interrogating data from visits to 
online platforms to analyse audience behaviour, without subjective input.  
There is a wealth of quantitative data on audience consumption patterns 
produced by industry sources, notably the UK media regulator Ofcom and the 
Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, in whom much reliance has been 
placed. 
These sources explore mostly the demand side of news, i.e., the behaviour of 
consumers and the consequences of that behaviour on those consumers and 
society, at large. While this is a critical backdrop, my main area of interest is the 
supply side of news, namely the actions of — and effects upon — producers 
and distributors of news. There is less research on the supply side; that which 
there is includes examinations of public service broadcasters adapting to 
changing political and commercial climes. 
An area where more contemporary research is required is how digital and 
social media platforms affect the style and substance of news content. This is a 
key area of exploration in this thesis. McLuhan (1964, pp.7-23) wrote: ‘the 
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medium is the message’, meaning the platform was more important than the 
content it contained, and the platform shaped the content. If that was true at the 
arrival of broadcast television in the 1950s — of which McLuhan wrote — is it 
true also for the impact of digital platforms on the now ‘old media’ of TV? 
It is worth noting there is a dichotomy, on the supply side, between news 
producers and news distributors, wherein the latter group merely facilitates 
search for, or aggregation of, content belonging to the former group. This 
research is more concerned with the actions of producers than the actions of 
distributors. 
1.0.3 Methodology of field research 
I approached the UK’s five major national television news broadcasters — BBC 
News, ITV News, Channel 4 News, 5 News and Sky News — to procure their 
input on how audiences aged 16-34 are consuming news on digital and social 
media platforms, and what have been their strategic editorial responses to that. 
All but BBC News agreed to participate, and nominated either their Editors or 
Heads of Digital to respond to a written questionnaire and participate in several 
telephone interviews. All provided in-house audience data and were generous 
with their time. Whilst, of course, all had digital strategies, the questions 
focussed on the degree to which they had editorial strategies specifically to 
appeal to 16-34s. Had they discerned sub-genres within news, or styles of 
storytelling that appeal disproportionately to younger demographic groups? 
What is the pattern of news consumption, and to what extent is this different 
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from that of older adults? Also understanding platform-specific strategies, 
cross-media approaches, audience segmentation and content marketing. 
These interviews were supplemented by an extensive review and analysis of 
the four participants’ news output on digital platforms, studying methods of 
journalistic storytelling, headline writing, the use of graphics and videographic 
imagery.  
1.0.4 Perspective 
I have a personal background as a practitioner of news broadcasting, which is 
relevant to disclose, as this likely gave me some perspectives about how the 
participants practise their business. 
I have worked for thirty years in the television industry. I was a local television 
news reporter for ITV in Bristol and London; a World News Anchor for CNN 
International, and a member of the Westminster Lobby, reporting politics for 
network BBC News. I was Founder and Chief Executive Officer of two satellite 
television channels, The Baby Channel and Simply TV, and since 2008, I have 
worked as a consultant on digital content strategy for the CEOs of Hearst 
Magazines, the London Evening Standard and the Independent newspaper. 
This background in television news, channel management and digital strategy 
presented some risk of subjectivity, however my belief was this was outweighed 
by the benefits of industry knowledge, accompanied by a journalistic and 
academic devotion to fairness. 
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1.1 Structure of thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. This chapter, Chapter One, introduces 
the research rationale, the social context and the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter Two outlines the demographic and psychographic data on the segment 
of the UK population aged 16-34 years old.  Chapter Three analyses the most 
recent industry data on how 16-34s consume news, i.e., which media devices, 
platforms and channels do they use, especially where this is different to other 
age groups.  
Chapter Four reviews the literature on how social media impacts news 
consumption, in particular, examining research on incidental news exposure, 
information overload, engagement with content and the ‘Digital Divide’ (Norris, 
2001). Chapter Five continues the literature review, focussing on filter bubbles, 
echo chambers and personalisation of content.  
Having laid out the factual and intellectual framework, Chapter Six lays out the 
findings from my field research, questioning four leading UK television news 
broadcasters on how their organisations have responded to changing habits of 
young adults. 
Chapter Seven is my conclusion, based on the findings from the literature, 
industry data and field research. This includes an exposition on the implications 
of my analysis, including a discussion of what current trends in digital 
technology and editorial strategy might mean for news broadcasters’ strategies, 
going forward. It ends with recommendations for areas of further research. 
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Chapter Eight contains Appendices, mainly copies of the Participant 
Information Sheet, and the (blank) Consent Form and Questionnaire used on 
the research subjects. The completed questionnaires are omitted, as only the 
statements, data and quotes included in the body of the thesis have been 
cleared by the participants for publication. 
The final section is a list of References of works cited. 
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Chapter 2 
Demographics and psychographics of 16-34 year old news 
consumers 
2.0 UK adults aged 16-34 years old 
The age cohort of sixteen to thirty-four year olds (‘16-34’) is one used habitually 
by advertisers and media owners, who — for commercial and marketing 
reasons — divide the population into demographic groups, by age. Whereas 
life-stage can be a useful metric, the big broadcasters focus specifically on age, 
as I will do throughout this thesis. The 16-34 group comprises 16.1 million 
people, some 24.5 per cent of the UK population (Table 2.1), and its behaviour 
towards news media portends future behaviours of the nation as a whole.  
There is a near two-decade age gap between the youngest and oldest 
members of this cohort. Moreover, due to teenage pregnancies, I calculate 
approximately 66,000 of the cohort are the grown-up children of other members 
of the same cohort; for example, the 18-year old child of a 34-year old mother. 
This number is based on extrapolations from raw data provided by the Office 
for National Statistics (‘ONS’), (Appendix, 8.3).  
So, it is sometimes helpful to sub-divide the group into those aged 16-24 (44 
per cent) and those aged 25-34 (56 per cent). Presently, this sub-division 
corresponds with ‘Generation Z’ and ‘Generation Y’, respectively. Whilst these 
are marketing terms that are not strictly defined, in popular culture, Generation 
Z is said to include those born after the mid 1990s, whilst Generation Y — also 
known as ‘millennials’ — are those born between 1980 and 1995, (Williams, 
2015).  
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An interesting characteristic of 16-34s is they are the only age cohort where 
males outnumber females; 50.7 per cent are male, whereas for the population 
as a whole, aged up to 89 years, males comprise just 49.5 per cent (Table 2.1). 
More precisely, males of every age from 0 to 29 years outnumber females of 
the same age. This is significant because females outnumber males for every 
age group from 33 to 89 years (Office for National Statistics, 2018, Figure 3). 
While this demographic quirk is a side note to this research, Childwise (2017) 
found evidence older teenage boys and girls have different levels of interest in 
news and current affairs (Figure 3.4), so it is plausible 16-34s, as a cohort, 
exhibit more male-leaning news consumption tendencies than older age 
groups. 
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Table 2.1. ONS: Population pyramid for UK, mid-2018 (extract) 
Age Population % all ages Male % Male Female % Female
0-89 65,851,526 100.0% 32,606,716 49.5% 33,244,810 50.5%
0-15 12,624,179 19.2% 6,469,022 51.2% 6,155,157 48.8%
16-24 7,141,092 10.8% 3,669,496 51.4% 3,471,596 48.6%
25-34 8,990,532 13.7% 4,516,789 50.2% 4,473,743 49.8%
16-34 16,131,624 24.5% 8,186,285 50.7% 7,945,339 49.3%
35-89 37,095,723 56.3% 17,951,409 48.4% 19,144,314 51.6%
16 702,583 1.1% 360,771 51.3% 341,812 48.7%
17 724,823 1.1% 371,195 51.2% 353,628 48.8%
18 746,996 1.1% 384,777 51.5% 362,219 48.5%
19 782,115 1.2% 401,688 51.4% 380,427 48.6%
20 800,053 1.2% 411,122 51.4% 388,931 48.6%
21 828,759 1.3% 426,309 51.4% 402,450 48.6%
22 838,020 1.3% 432,658 51.6% 405,362 48.4%
23 844,591 1.3% 433,554 51.3% 411,037 48.7%
24 873,152 1.3% 447,422 51.2% 425,730 48.8%
25 878,510 1.3% 447,101 50.9% 431,409 49.1%
26 907,985 1.4% 457,870 50.4% 450,115 49.6%
27 927,145 1.4% 470,965 50.8% 456,180 49.2%
28 910,610 1.4% 462,696 50.8% 447,914 49.2%
29 902,925 1.4% 454,070 50.3% 448,855 49.7%
30 911,139 1.4% 455,376 50.0% 455,763 50.0%
31 888,406 1.3% 439,884 49.5% 448,522 50.5%
32 895,720 1.4% 448,165 50.0% 447,555 50.0%
33 894,949 1.4% 447,012 49.9% 447,937 50.1%
34 873,143 1.3% 433,650 49.7% 439,493 50.3%
Source: Office for National Statistics, National Records of Scotland, Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency – Population Estimates. Data for those aged 90+ has been excluded. Percentages 
separately calculated by Leon Hawthorne. 
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2.1 Digital Natives in an age of participation 
Generation Z has grown up entirely in the digital era. Its members are all 
‘Digital Natives’ (Prensky, 2001), with no experience of life before the Internet 
and social media. They contrast with older generations, who Prensky labels 
‘Digital Immigrants’, who have learned to use these new technologies, but 
doing so is not their first impulse.  
Prensky (2001, p.2) wrote:  
‘As Digital Immigrants learn — like all immigrants, some better than 
others — to adapt to their environment, they always retain, to some 
degree, their ‘accent’, that is, their foot in the past. The ‘digital immigrant 
accent’ can be seen in such things as turning to the Internet for 
information second, rather than first… Today’s older folk were 
‘socialised' differently from their kids, and are now in the process of 
learning a new language’. 
So, it is a natural, first instinct of Generation Z to use mobile telephones for all 
forms of content. Older people act differently because they think differently, 
because they were socialised to use the prevailing media technologies of their 
times. 
Members of the cohort aged 25-34 are in Generation Y. They will have residual 
memories of technology before the digital age. Someone aged 34 years old in 
2020 was born in 1986. By the time, they had completed high school in 2004, 
Apple Inc. had not yet launched the iPhone (July 2007); Facebook was not yet 
open to the public (September 2006); Twitter was still on the drawing board 
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(until July 2006), and YouTube had not yet launched officially (until November 
2005). The third generation of mobile broadband telephony (3G) had only just 
arrived in the United Kingdom in 2003, so most Britons at that time were living 
in the era of ‘Web 1.0’, one of passive consumption of content via slow and 
unreliable Internet connections. All this means older members of the 16-34 
cohort grew up with totally different experiences of media than younger 
members of the cohort. 
It was only with the arrival of social media in 2005-2007 that Britain entered the 
era of ‘Web 2.0’, differentiated by users’ ability to interact with online content. 
Sun Microsystems CEO, Scott McNealy defined the impending new era as an 
‘age of participation’. On 24 June 2005, he told CNET:  
‘We believe we're moving out of the Ice Age, the Iron Age, the Industrial 
Age, the Information Age, to the participation age. You get on the Net 
and you do stuff. You IM (instant message), you blog, you take pictures, 
you publish, you podcast, you transact, you distance learn, you 
telemedicine. You are participating on the Internet, not just viewing stuff’. 
(CNET, 2005). 
McNealy’s prediction of greater user participation was prophetic and it is vital to 
an understanding of news consumption today, as well as to understanding 
overlapping trends in marketing. In the book, ‘Marketing 3.0’, the authors argue 
technology is central to this shift in culture:  
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‘New wave technology is technology that enables connectivity and 
interactivity of individuals and groups. The technology allows individuals 
to express themselves and collaborate with others… In the age of 
participation, people create news, ideas and entertainment as well as 
consume them’. (Kotler, Kartajaya & Setiawan, 2010, pp.6-7). 
Technology is a determining factor in behaviours and attitudes towards media 
among each new generation. Just as Johannes Gutenberg’s printing press 
catalysed the Protestant Reformation (Howard, 2006), so too did broadband 
Internet and smartphones create a cultural revolution affecting all media 
consumption, today.   
Most 16-34s grew up in the ‘age of participation’ and are thus reluctant to be 
passive recipients of content. Participation can take many forms, but at the 
simplest level, the new mindset means the idea of sitting silently for half an 
hour, being lectured at by a middle aged man in a suit (Figure 3.1) jars with 
everything this generation has learned from the Internet. Why sit, when you can 
walk? Why watch it on a TV at home, when you can watch it a smartphone? 
Why listen silently when you can share your thoughts with the world? Why 
watch half a dozen stories, in which you have no interest, when you can jump 
directly to the story you want to watch? Herein lay the deficiencies of analogue 
media — TV, radio and print — which 16-34s can circumvent by using the 
Internet, in general, and social media, in particular.  
They do it for entertainment, for movies, for games, for finding sexual partners, 
so there is no obvious reason why news would be any different. News is just 
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another genre of content: ‘vying for the attention of the user with other online 
activities’ (Ofcom 2019b, p.27). Whilst it is argued news performs a vital 
democratic function, which other genres of content do not, it is still a media 
form, not immune from the technological and commercial forces affecting the 
distribution of all media, nor immune from the psychographic factors affecting 
consumption. 
2.2 News psychographics of 16-34s 
Every age demographic will have tendencies that differentiate it from other age 
groups. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism examined the degree to 
which the psychographics — that is, the attitudes, ideas and opinions — of 
Generations Y and Z manifest in their actions towards news (Reuters Institute, 
2019). It identified four key ‘moments’ when young people consume news. 
These range from: the rare ‘Dedicated’ times when they are deeply 
introspective and knowledge-seeking; ‘Updated’, where quick and efficient 
summaries are sought; ‘Time-filler’, where news is used to fill a void while doing 
other things, to ‘Intercepted’ moments, when users observe an interruptive 
news alert, flashing on their phone (Text Box 2.1).   
These ‘moments’ represent a sliding scale of attention, engagement and 
exposure to news. Many would not be possible without permanent connectivity 
to high speed Internet, and the geo-spatial ubiquity of mobile phones. Today, 
16-34s have choices that were not available in the pre-digital age, so it is not 
surprising they would have different behaviours and attitudes to news 
consumption than their parents’ generation. 
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Text Box 2.1. Reuters Institute: Four typical key moments for younger 
groups 
Dedicated:  
Finding time to focus on the news, like a novel or a TV series. 
Less common; suits evenings or weekends. 
Mindset: more introspective; deepening understanding.
Updated:  
Getting the key news updates you need efficiently. 
Suits mornings; preparing for the day. 
Mindset: more something I feel I need to do.
Time-filler:  
Not about the news per se; something to do while doing something else. 
Constant: on the train, break, when time to fill. 
Mindset: more something I do to distract/amuse.
Intercepted:  
A notification or message intercepts what was being done. 
Can happen anytime and anywhere. 
Mindset: passive recipient.
Source: Reuters Digital News Report 2019. Reuters Institute. p.55.
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While Reuters Institute offered four ‘moments’, Ofcom offered three ‘journeys’ 
for news consumption: ‘habitual’, ‘goal-driven' and ‘incidental’. Habitual 
consumption is ‘accessing news content, usually through one source, regularly, 
as part of a routine’ (Figure 2.1). Ofcom found this to be the least likely model 
for younger viewers, and more typical of their parents and grandparents, who 
were inclined to gather around the television set at six o’clock to get their 
habitual fix of the evening news (Ofcom, 2019b, pp.26-27). 
Figure 2.1 Ofcom: Three typical news journeys 
From Figure 2.1, Ofcom’s ‘goal-driven’ consumption involves ‘actively looking 
for news content to either fact-check, hear about breaking news or extra 
information around a topic’. This type of consumption is associated with using a 
search engine like Google, and selecting from the various news sources it 
presents.  
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And the final class of journey, ‘incidental consumption’ involves: ‘accidentally 
coming across news while doing something else, usually through social media, 
word of mouth or notification’ (Ibid.). Here, the user does not choose the news 
subject or news provider; instead a story is thrust at him or her via a ‘push 
notification’, likely from a news aggregator or social media feed. Ofcom 
explained:  
‘At these times, people generally had a different mindset. They were on 
these platforms to be entertained or to catch up with friends, rather than 
actively to seek news’. (Ofcom, 2019b, p.27).  
Another analysis of news consumption was offered by Lee, Kim and Koh 
(2016), who, while examining online users’ responses to a perceived glut of 
news information, identified three ‘patterns’ of news consumption they termed 
‘news avoidance’, ‘selective exposure’, and ‘willingness to pay for news’.  
‘News avoidance’ is the response to a feeling of fatigue arising from the sheer 
volume of news content available across multiple platforms and channels. 
Some consumers switch off — literally and metaphorically — to minimise their 
exposure to news. Lee, Kim and Koh (2016, p.7) found people with little 
interest in the news practised news avoidance; however the trait was also 
associated with being male, young and highly educated. Ironically, they found 
even those with high levels of interest in the news practised news avoidance, 
once they had reached a point of ‘news information overload’.  
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The researchers wrote:  
‘Many participants felt avoiding news would be the most convenient and 
comfortable way to handle abundant news information, instead of 
making a proactive decision about what news to consume and how 
much to consume’. (Lee, Kim & Koh, 2016, p.9). 
At the other extreme of the news engagement spectrum, the ‘willingness to pay 
for news’ applied to:  
‘…those who identified quality news sources [who] might be willing to 
pay the cost and use those sources consistently as a way to deal with 
the problem of information overload’. (Ibid., 4).  
And in between these two categories is ‘selective exposure’. While the authors 
conceded all consumption is selective, they concluded ‘selective exposure’ is a 
purposeful response to limit news consumption, both by quantity and quality. 
These three sets of ‘moments’, ‘journeys’ and ‘patterns’ offered by Reuters 
Institute, Ofcom, and Lee, Kim and Koh (2016) describe overlapping 
behaviours and mindsets. Table 2.2 is my attempt to merge and simplify these 
terms, and create a new taxonomy of news consumption. It is clear the ten 
separate original terms describe a continuum, from the most purposeful efforts 
to acquire and consume news, to the least. I reduce the overall list from ten to 
four new terms: Diligent, Customary, Promiscuous and Disconnected. 
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For the new taxonomy of news consumption in Table 2.2, the following rationale 
and definitions are applied: 
1. Diligent: the characteristic of going to great lengths to find time to consume 
news and stay informed about current affairs. This describes the most avid 
pattern of news consumption, directly echoing the Reuters Institute 
‘dedicated’ term, and overlapping with ‘willingness to pay’, ‘selective 
exposure’ and ‘goal driven’.  
2. Customary: the characteristic of consuming news as a matter of routine, 
perhaps at scheduled times, such as reading a newspaper during the 
morning commute to work, or tuning in to a radio news programme over 
breakfast. Customary consumption is done by force of habit, or inertia. For 
many young people, it will be a tradition inherited from their parents, and 
likely will be practised more often among affluent and educated 
households. However, Customary consumption does not represent deep 
engagement with, or enthusiasm for, the content. It simply is a custom; 
done for no good reason other than because it has been done before. 
Subscribing to a newspaper counts as Customary consumption, so this 
category overlaps with ‘willingness to pay’, ‘selective exposure’, ‘habitual’, 
as well as ‘updating’ and ‘time-filler’.  
3. Promiscuous: the characteristic of consumers getting news wherever they 
can, whenever it suits them, without any sense of loyalty to a news brand, 
or any huge effort being applied to get the news. It is a ‘take it or leave it’ 
casual approach to news, and to those who provide it. As with ‘incidental 
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exposure’, this involves stumbling across news accidentally while doing 
something else, albeit after this initial exposure, consumers may choose to 
engage deeper and metamorphose into Diligent consumption. Promiscuous 
consumption applies equally to digital and analog media. It describes the 
behaviour of a TV viewer, who after watching a favoured game show, 
cannot be bothered to switch channels when the evening news comes on, 
or a passenger in the back seat of a taxi, forced to listen to the taxi-driver’s 
choice of radio phone-in show. This category overlaps with ‘incidental’, 
‘time-fillers’ and ‘intercepted’. 
4. Disconnected: this is analogous with Lee, Kim and Koh’s ‘news 
avoidance’. It is the characteristic of going out of one’s way to be 
disconnected from the prevailing news agenda. While it is impossible to 
avoid news altogether — accidentally, or by word of mouth — this 
behaviour is the least engaged, and thus the polar opposite of ‘Diligent’. In 
May 2020, in Week 6 of the UK’s COVID-19 pandemic crisis, Ofcom found 
94 per cent of the UK population, with Internet access, had consumed 
information about the crisis ‘at least once a day’ (Ofcom, 2020). The 
residual 6 per cent were the most Disconnected from COVID-19 news.
It is important to point out these four terms are more accurately used to 
describe instances of — or motivations for — behaviour, rather than to describe 
people or audience personas. Whilst it might be shorthand to say: ‘John is a 
Promiscuous consumer’, it would be more accurate to say: ‘the particular 
behaviour of John on that day, at that time, about that subject displayed 
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Promiscuous consumption’. This is because consumers are complex beings 
and they practise multiple types of consumption, simultaneously. The person 
who is avoiding all news about COVID-19 is expressing ‘Disconnected’ 
behaviour. But on another topic, within the same hour, they may well read a 
magazine article (‘Customary’) or search Google for information about 
mortgage interest rates (‘Diligent’).  
Instead of Diligent, Customary, Promiscuous and Disconnected being distinct 
types of people, these are character traits that all viewers have — like the 
industrious Dr Jekyll and the violent Mr Hyde — and depending on the 
circumstance, and the story, one trait will be more dominant than the others. 
2.3 Summary 
The age cohort ‘16-34’ contains 16.1 million people, comprising a quarter of the 
UK's population. Sometimes it is helpful to split the cohort into those aged 
16-24 (‘Generation Z’) and those aged 25-34 ('Generation Y’ or ‘millennials’). 
These age groups have been chosen, rather than life-stages, because they are 
used widely by broadcasters and advertisers. 
Members of this age cohort are all ‘Digital Natives’ (Prensky, 2001), who have 
lived most of their adult lives in an era of digital technology, such as broadband 
Internet, smartphones and social media. Unlike older generations, they are 
completely at ease with this technology; it is their natural first choice to use 
these for consuming content. 
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Around 2005, Britain entered the era of ‘Web 2.0’, differentiated by users’ ability 
to interact with online content. This heralded an ‘age of participation’ (CNET, 
2005); changing how people could create and consume content; transforming 
the attitudes, ideas and opinions of 16-34s towards media. 
Contrasting various journeys, moments and patterns of news consumption in 
the literature, I have created a new taxonomy of news consumption (Table 2.2), 
identifying four news consumption behaviours, ranging from the most engaged 
to the least engaged: Diligent, Customary, Promiscuous and Disconnected. 
Critically, these are behaviours all people manifest, sometimes simultaneously, 
but there is evidence 16-34s increasingly are moving towards more 
Promiscuous and less Customary consumption (Ofcom, 2018, pp.24-29). 
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Chapter 3  
How do 16-34s get their news? 
3.0 A definition of news 
When considering a case of alleged hard core pornography in 1964, members 
of the United States Supreme Court failed to agree a definition of pornography. 
Famously, Justice Potter Stewart wrote: ‘I know it when I see it’ (Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 1964, para. 197). Likely, a definition of ‘news’ may prove 
equally nebulous, but one would be helpful to an examination of patterns of 
news consumption.  
Echoing the sentiment from the bench, a former editor of mine once told me:  
‘News is whatever the editor says is news’.  
But if a definition of news is subjective, any analysis of what people say about 
news may be misleading, because they are using different definitions. And if 
news is defined only by editors, there may be a disconnect between what 
editors publish and what audiences choose to consume. In Chapter 7, I 
contend the latter is the core of the problem that is the topic of this thesis. 
Significantly, the Ofcom Broadcasting Code (Ofcom, 2019c) does not define 
news, despite including a whole section — Section 5 — devoted to regulating 
it. However, the Code defines a sub-category of news, for which there are 
special impartiality requirements on broadcasters, as:  
‘…matters of major political or industrial controversy and major matters 
relating to current public policy’. (Ofcom, 2019c, para 5.11). 
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A video of a skateboarding bulldog (BBC News, 2015), or a story about where 
a royal bride procured her wedding dress (BBC News, 2011) may not 
universally be perceived as news, although these are examples of stories that 
ran on primetime BBC newscasts. If a sixteen year old saw one of these stories 
on Instagram, it is unlikely they would say they had consumed news. 
(Sveningsson, 2015). 
Sveningsson (2015) conducted research in Sweden on young people who 
consumed most of their news on social media. She found they underestimated 
the volume of news they consumed, implying a dissociation between their 
perception of news and the digital means by which they had acquired it. In plain 
terms, if they saw it on TV, or in a form labelled as ‘news’, they were more likely 
to define it as ‘news’, whereas if they saw it on Instagram:  
‘…the participants did not regard social media news as ‘real news’’. 
(Ibid.,1). 
In his seminal work ‘Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man’, Marshall 
McLuhan wrote: ‘the medium is the message’ (McLuhan, 1964, pp.7-23), 
referring to the primacy of media platforms over the content they carry. Based 
on Sveningsson (2015), the medium is not only the message, the medium 
determines also how consumers define the genre of the message. 
Barnhurst and Wartella (1998, pp.281-284) and Costera Meijer (2007) found 
young people do not necessarily differentiate news from other forms of 
entertainment and information; reinforcing the point 16-34s may consume what 
others define as ‘news’ without being aware of this: 
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‘…young people experience news as just one genre out of many in the 
never-ending flow of television images’. (Costera Meijer, 2007, p.99). 
Returning to the contention editors define what is news, feminist writers have 
identified a ‘gendered nature of journalism’ (Van Zoonen, 1998, p.36), 
suggesting male and female editors define news differently and have different 
priorities within news.  
‘Female and male journalists perceive journalism differently; that is, they 
consider different topics, angles, sources and ethics to be important. For 
example, so called ‘masculine’ journalism focuses on politics, crime, 
finance, education and upbringing, while ‘feminine’ journalism involves 
human interest, consumer news, culture and social policy’. (Everbach & 
Flournoy, 2007, p.53). 
Drawing a distinction between (a) a definition of news and (b) what types of 
stories are included in the news is — for practical journalists — redundant. On 
any given day, news is definable as (let us say) the Top Ten stories of the day. 
Story #11 does not make it into the bulletin. My former editor would say: ‘It is 
not news’, meaning it is not important enough. The fact the substance of Story 
#11 might be classifiable under a theoretical definition of news does not make 
any difference in the real world, if the story is never published.  
In a practical sense, news is whatever the editor includes in his or her 
publication. Van Zoonen (1998) and Everbach and Flournoy (2007) imply male 
editors exclude stories which female editors would include; therefore it is 
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obligatory a definition of news takes into account the perspectives and agendas 
of that group of people who become editors. 
The form of storytelling also has an impact on the consumers’ perception of 
content as ‘news’. Coleman, Morrison and Anthony (2011) found the public 
were very interested in news that was amusing, such as celebrity gossip. At the 
same time they felt social pressure to acknowledge such ‘guilty’ pleasures were 
not ‘real news’; news was something defined by elites, and delivered to 
ordinary people as manna from Heaven. 
‘Acceptance of this dichotomy between ‘real’ and ‘popular news’ is 
based upon a moral perspective that news only becomes News when it 
is spoken about in certain ways, connected to remote and formidable 
institutions… In short, there was what people thought of as newsworthy 
and what they thought of as permissible material for the sacred space of 
News’. (Coleman, Morrison & Anthony, 2011, p.41). 
The standard form of UK, prime-time, terrestrial television newscasts is a white, 
middle aged, middle class man, wearing a suit, sitting behind a desk, with 
colourful graphics over his shoulder (Figure 3.1). If one removed this style, or 
used the style for other programming genres, likely it would confuse the public 
perception of the category of content being consumed. 
For example, ‘The Daily Show with Trevor Noah’ (Comedy Central, 2020) 
employs the same storytelling techniques as a traditional television newscast. 
The subjects covered match those on news networks, yet its presenter is a 
young, black comedian who interlaces commentary on current events with 
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humour. So, is it ‘news’? Arguably, the 16-34s who watch the show on YouTube 
do not care. They may have become non-binary on genre issues. 
Figure 3.1. UK’s main public service broadcasters’ lead news anchors 
Whether a particular story is ‘news’ is a daily subject of debate in newsrooms. 
In my experience, the sub-conscious algorithm used by journalists to define 
news combines a number of factors: 
(i) Is the information new?  
‘News' must contain information that is new, or at least, newly revealed. The 
former Washington Post publisher, Philip L. Graham, was attributed with 
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saying: journalism is the ‘first rough draft of history’ (Shafer, 2010). 
Historians write about the past, which we call ‘history’. Journalists write 
about the same class of events in the present, which we call ‘news’. 
Therefore, one definition of news is: history minus time. However, this 
definition is deficient because news could only be defined with the benefit of 
hindsight. It requires a definition of ‘history’, which would be a circuitous 
route, and one beyond the scope of this thesis. 
(ii) Is the information in the public interest? 
Ofcom’s definition (above) (Ofcom, 2019c, para 5.11) of a sub-category of 
news refers to political or industrial controversy; issues that are about public 
policy and matters up for debate or discussion. These are matters centred 
around laws, the exercise of political or commercial power, and actions 
taken by public bodies. This could be labelled ‘serious news’. 
(iii) Is the information interesting to the public? 
This is a vexatious category because the public is interested in subjects 
that do not fall within the definition of ‘in the public interest’. Paul Dacre, the 
former editor of the Daily Mail, commented on the distinction:  
‘I don’t agree with the Guardian’s decision to publish Snowden [The 
Guardian, 2013]… But I also passionately believe the Guardian must 
have the freedom to carry such stories.  The sadness is that Alan 
[Rusbridger, then editor of the Guardian] cannot see that the Sun should 
have the freedom to write about the love lives of celebrities and 
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footballers, who are of such interest to their readers. In order to act in 
the public interest, they need to interest the public’. (Press Gazette, 
2018). 
Dacre’s argument was newspapers need to make a profit, which they do by 
publishing stories that are ‘interesting to the public’, which — in many cases — 
are stories the Guardian might not define as ‘in the public interest’. But by 
doing so, they gain commercial viability and a large audience, which enables 
them to publish other stories that are ‘in the public interest’, made more 
impactful because of the large audience they reach.  
Dacre criticised:  
‘…the emergence of the Metropolitan Echo Chamber… [whose] 
inhabitants increasingly haven’t a clue what real people in Britain, 
outside the M25, are thinking’. (Press Gazette, 2018). 
This was not merely a clash of cultures, or the old debate between ‘hard news 
and its antithesis, soft news’ (Tuchman, 1978, p.113). Dacre’s dispute with the 
‘Metropolitan Echo Chamber’ was they were denying his type of journalism was 
even classifiable as ‘news’, or ‘worthwhile news’. He was pointing to the same 
intellectual snobbery and social deference to which Coleman, Morrison and 
Anthony (2011) referred in their distinction between ‘real news’ and ‘popular 
news’. And it was the same dichotomy, which Sveningsson (2015) discovered 
in the minds of young social media users, between interesting information on 
Instagram and ‘real news’, which — by inference — must be boring, must be 
about politics (Text Box 3.2), and must be classified as ‘news’ by an elite. 
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Pulling together these threads, Figure 3.2 is my attempt to create a new visual 
taxonomy of news, using what physicists call the ‘RGB spectrum’. Sir Isaac 
Newton demonstrated if one shines beams of the three primary colours of light 
onto a white surface, the colours magenta, cyan, yellow and white are 
produced in the overlapping areas (Newton, 1730). So, projecting my three 
primary attributes of news — where red represents the ‘new’, green is 
‘interesting to the public’ and blue is ‘in the public interest’ — I postulate the 
following: 
Figure 3.2. A new visual taxonomy of news using the RGB spectrum 
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Where something is ‘new’ (red) and ‘interesting to the public’ (green), this can 
be termed ‘tabloid news’ (yellow). This would include stories about the love 
lives of celebrities, to which Dacre referred (Press Gazette, 2018). 
Where something is ‘new’ (red) and ‘in the public interest’ (blue), this can be 
termed ‘serious news’ (magenta). This would include matters of political or 
industrial controversy, in the Broadcasting Code (Ofcom, 2019c, para 5.11). 
Where something is ‘new’ (red) and ‘in the public interest’ (blue) and ‘interesting 
to the public’ (green), this can be termed a ‘splash’ (white). This is the most 
sought-after category of news by journalists, as it includes matters of political 
controversy that also are of huge interest to the public. For example, the Daily 
Telegraph’s reporting in 2009 of a scandal over expenses paid to Members of 
Parliament (The Daily Telegraph, 2009). 
Things that are only new (red only), but are neither ‘interesting to the 
public’ (green) nor ‘in the public interest’ (blue) can be categorised as ‘trivial 
information’, which may be of interest to narrow audiences, such as one’s 
immediate family and friends. This is the kind of information used to fill up 
personal social media pages, which might include photographs of what one 
had for dinner, or where one went at the weekend. 
Where events do not overlap with ‘new’ (red), they are in the past; these 
include ‘old serious news’ (blue, only) and ‘old tabloid news’ (green, only).  
The cyan coloured area is matters ‘in the public interest’ (blue) that are also 
‘interesting to the public’ (green), but are no longer ‘new’ (red); this is history. 
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3.1 A definition of social media 
The Cambridge Dictionary defines ‘social media’ as: 
‘Websites and computer programs that allow people to communicate 
and share information on the internet using a computer or mobile 
phone’.  
And it defines ‘social networking site’ as:  
‘A website that is designed to help people communicate and share 
information, photographs, etc., with a group’. 
There appears little distinction between these two definitions. The terms often 
are used interchangeably. However, there is a subtle difference. ‘Social media’ 
refers to a technology platform used by media creators to transmit their works 
to audiences in order to facilitate a dialogue. Whereas social networking sites 
(‘SNS’) are platforms, through which users create a community in order to 
communicate with other users. Essentially, social media is about the media 
engaging with an audience, whereas SNS is about the ‘people formerly known 
as the audience’ (Rosen, 2006) engaging with each other.  
In 2008, Facebook founder, Mark Zuckerberg offered a definition that could 
apply to all SNS:  
‘Facebook is about helping people share information and share 
themselves’. (Paczkowski, 2008).  
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Whilst tech entrepreneur, Michael Cohn, offered a clarification:  
‘Social media is the use of web-based and mobile technologies to turn 
communication into an interactive dialogue. Social networking, on the 
other hand, is a social structure with people who are joined by a 
common interest’. (Cohn, 2011). 
So, social media and social networks overlap and reinforce one another. There 
is a ‘chicken and egg’ symbiotic relationship between them. Content is 
published on social media and it is circulated and modified via social networks, 
and vice versa. Invariably, the platform is the same for both — Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, etc., — but there is nuance between the two functions.  
The two phenomena demonstrate the evolution of engagement with media, 
brought about by the digital revolution. Historically, ‘old media’ manifested as a 
monologue. A small elite of journalists had the information. They proceeded 
beneficently to disseminate this to the audience, at fixed times and in fixed 
formats throughout the day. The audience received the news, largely passively. 
Shouting at the television or throwing a newspaper into the bin were the 
principal methods of interacting with the content.  
But the era of Web 2.0, with the launch of social media platforms in the UK — 
like Facebook in 2006 — permitted users to communicate more effectively with 
news makers. The audience could respond immediately — by clicking ‘like’, 
‘dislike’, ‘thumbs up’, ‘vote for / against’ — as well as sharing more expansive 
comments. Social media represented the opening of a return path, through 
which news editors could — if they chose — enter a dialogue with the 
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audience; it offered the opportunity for audience participation, co-creation of 
content and for the audience to influence the choice of stories covered. 
To this day, this opportunity has not been fulfilled by major UK news 
broadcasters. Most senior journalists have been groomed in a professional 
culture of doing the news in one way — preparing and serving a fully made 
meal to a hungry audience, at dinner time. The idea they would let the children 
run riot in the kitchen, and make their own meals, is totally anathema to many. 
But this is exactly what social media allows.  
This deficient approach was foreshadowed by a journalistic arrogance, noted 
by Coleman et al., (2011): 
‘News serves to connect the present to the future—and those entrusted 
with making that connection have a duty to carry the public with them… 
people in our focus groups often felt that the news delivered to them on 
a daily basis failed to explain the world as they recognised it, often 
leaving them feeling like outsiders looking on at a drama that even the 
leading performers did not expect them to understand… journalists were 
perceived as being compromised by their proximity to social power’. 
(Coleman, et al., 2011, pp.38-39)  
Social networking is the next step beyond social media, when media 
professionals risk becoming virtually insignificant; the audience begins to speak 
to itself. While news providers can provide the initial substance of the 
conversation, quickly they can become irrelevant to what the audience does 
with it. This is difficult for any creative person to contemplate. Journalists, 
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writers and producers are used to originating ideas, discerning facts, crafting 
prose and sculpting news into an art form for onward dissemination. But social 
media and social networking give creative power to the audience. To some, this 
is a dangerous travesty; to others, it is an opportunity to transform from being 
storytellers into ‘storymakers’ (Berkowitz, 2015, slides 6-60); to light the touch 
paper and let the audience shape the charge of the ensuing explosion. 
On 27 June 2006, Professor Jay Rosen of New York University wrote in his 
blog:  
‘The people formerly known as the audience wish to inform media 
people of our existence, and of a shift in power that goes with the 
platform shift you’ve all heard about. Think of passengers on your ship 
who got a boat of their own. The writing readers. The viewers who 
picked up a camera. The formerly atomised listeners who, with modest 
effort, can connect with each other and gain the means to speak— to the 
world, as it were. Now we understand that, met with ringing statements 
like these, many media people want to cry out in the name of reason 
herself: If all would speak, who shall be left to listen? Can you at least 
tell us that? The people formerly known as the audience do not believe 
this problem—too many speakers!—is our problem’ (Rosen, 2006). 
And herein lay the root of the problem facing old media as the audience shifts 
onto social media and social networking sites. Many in the media leadership 
like things just the way they are — or more accurately, the way they were. The 
status quo ante is in their professional and commercial interest. They do not 
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want to cede editorial control to the wider populace, who are less educated and 
less sophisticated than them (Coleman et al., 2011, p.50). 
For audiences aged 16-34, whose entire adult lives have been lived in an age 
of digital technology, their increasing abstention from broadcast news is 
evidence they are demanding something different from those who determine 
the style, content and definition of news. 
3.2 Which social media platform? 
The biggest social media platforms in the United Kingdom, defined by the 
number of self reported active users, are Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, 
YouTube, Snapchat and Twitter, in that order (Table 3.1).  
Ofcom’s Media Literacy Tracker 2018 ranks the same Big Six in the same order 
for the general population, and for audiences aged 16-34. Whilst Facebook is 
the highest ranked for all ages, its audience is getting older and its overall 
numbers are in decline.  
In 2013, 96 per cent of social media users told Ofcom they used their 
Facebook accounts, whereas by 2018, this number had dropped to 88 per 
cent. In the same period, the number of social media users who said they only 
used Facebook dropped from 43 per cent to 20 per cent (Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1. Ofcom: Social media sites used, by age group, 2018 
So, Facebook is experiencing relative decline due to increasing use of other 
platforms by younger people. Taking the Ofcom data from Table 3.1, we can 
index the numbers to show the relative popularity of each platform, by age 
group. An index number greater than 100 shows a disproportionate percentage 

















Facebook 88% 92% 90% 86% 86% 85% 89%
WhatsApp 61% 64% 68% 66% 62% 49% 33%
Instagram 38% 62% 50% 31% 31% 22% 9%
YouTube 35% 54% 43% 29% 27% 25% 14%
Snapchat 25% 59% 42% 13% 12% 4% 0%
Twitter 25% 35% 24% 25% 25% 21% 13%
LinkedIn 16% 13% 18% 19% 20% 11% 6%
Pinterest 12% 16% 16% 11% 12% 8% 5%
Google+ 11% 18% 10% 10% 8% 8% 8%
Twitch 3% 9% 2% 4% 0% 1% 0%
Tumblr 3% 6% 4% 3% 1% 0% 0%
Facebook only 20% 8% 14% 20% 25% 30% 43%
Source: Ofcom Adult Media Literacy Tracker 2018  
IN22. Which social media or messaging sites or apps do you have a profile or account on, 
that you still use? (prompted responses, multi-coded) – showing responses of 3% or more 
of adults in 2018 aged 16+ with a social media profile / account.  
Base: All adults aged 16+ with a profile or account on a social media or messaging site/app 
(1247 in 2018, varies by demography). 
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of an age group with a preference for a platform, compared to the general 
population. An index number below 100 shows the opposite. Figure 3.3 shows 
the Ofcom data from Table 3.1 indexed for those aged 16-24 and those aged 
25-34.  
Figure 3.3. Ofcom: Social media sites used, 2018 (indexed by age group) 
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Twitch had the highest Index Number (300) for 16-24s. Twitch is a live video 
streaming service, favoured by online gamers. Its high index number means 
Twitch’s user base contained the highest proportion — three times pro rata — 
of users aged 16-24.  
Among 16-24s, Twitch is followed by Snapchat (Index Number: 236) and 
Tumblr (Index Number: 200). 
The tallest (light / pink) bars in Figure 3.3 show Snapchat, Pinterest and Tumblr 
were the three platforms with the highest proportion of users aged 25-34. 
Interestingly, Twitch is at the bottom of this list for 25-34s, indicating its 
popularity was sharply limited to the very youngest age group 
Overall, Facebook remains the most important social media platform for all age 
groups, but it is going out of fashion. The Ofcom data heralds a growing divide 
between younger adults and the rest of the population, in terms of which social 
media platforms they choose to use.  
3.3 Social media use of children aged 5-16 years old 
The generational differences are amplified when one looks at the social media 
choices of those aged 5-16. In a few years, these children will join their elder 
siblings in the 16-24 cohort, and their behaviour likely is already similar to the 
youngest members of this latter group. 
In ‘The Monitor Report 2020’, research agency Childwise examined the media 
consumption habits of 2,167 UK children aged 5-16 years old. For these 
children, it found the mobile phone was the most important communications 
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device, surpassing usage of tablets, personal computers, games consoles and 
televisions. It found most children own a mobile phone by the age of 7, and 
they spent an average 3.4 hours per day online (Childwise, 2020).  
Among those aged 7-16 years old, YouTube was the most popular website. 61 
per cent of children used it every day, spending a daily average of 2.4 hours. 29 
per cent of children — unprompted — said YouTube was their favourite site; 
followed by Snapchat (17 per cent); Instagram (17 per cent) and TikTok (10 per 
cent) (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2. Childwise: What is your favourite website or app? 
What is your favourite website or app?  
(Open response question to all 7-16 year olds)
        2020 2019 2018 2017
YouTube 29% 31% 29% 27%
Snapchat 17% 17% 20% 14%
Instagram 17% 13% 12% 8%
TikTok  10% 3% 2% 2%
Fortnite 5% 7% n/a n/a
Roblox  4% 6% 7% 2%
Minecraft 4% 3% 5% 4%
Netflix 4% 6% 2% n/a
Source: Childwise Monitor Report(s), 2017-2020
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While YouTube was pre-eminent, the Childwise data in Table 3.2 points to a 
looming challenge from the video-sharing app, TikTok, which tripled its 
favourability between 2019 and 2020. 43 per cent of children surveyed said 
they used it. One in ten said it was their favourite site/app. 
TikTok, owned by the Chinese company, ByteDance, launched as a mobile 
application in 2017. It is a video sharing social network, allowing users to 
create and share short-form, looping videos, mostly 15 seconds in duration. 
Prominent genres include users lip-syncing to pop songs, dancing and 
performing funny stunts. The most popular video in 2019 — with 9.2 million 
views — featured an Indian man, Abheesh P. Dominic, winning the Guinness 
World Record for breaking the highest number of coconuts (122), inside one 
minute, with his bare hands (TikTok, 2019). 
The interesting thing about TikTok for this research is it is sharply focussed on 
getting young people to film and edit hugely creative, often technically complex, 
videos. It is an exemplar of McNealy’s ‘age of participation’ (CNET, 2005) and 
Berkowitz’s ‘storymaking’ (Berkowitz, 2015) practised by ‘the people formerly 
known as the audience’ (Rosen, 2006). 
TikTok’s mission statement is: ‘to inspire creativity and bring joy’ (TikTok, n.d.). 
Its website claims its most popular users can go:  
‘…from performing in their bedrooms to hanging out with A-listers, these 
creators are the trailblazers that keep TikTok ticking’. (TikTok, 2019). 
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Young people, whose fledgling video production talents are honed first on 
TikTok, have the future capacity to turn their creative skills into producing what 
they might define as news. Likely, this would not be on TikTok, because the 
platform presently is focussed on fun and music, but it could be on other 
platforms, including those owned by news broadcasters. 
3.4 Which social media platforms are used for news? 
‘The Ofcom News Consumption in the UK Report 2019’ (Ofcom, 2019a) is the 
UK broadcast regulator’s annual comprehensive dataset for news consumption 
across all major media sources and platforms. When social media users were 
asked which platforms they used for consuming news, the picture was different 
to that for general content. In 2019, Facebook was the most popular social 
media platform for news content, with 73 per cent of ‘All adults’, and 65 per 
cent of 16-24s claiming they used it for news (Table 3.3). 
Usage of Facebook for news was down, and its relative position among 
younger audiences was also declining. Instagram, Snapchat, Twitter and 
WhatsApp were the next most popular social media platforms for news among 
16-24s. The same five platforms topped the charts for the general population, 
but in a markedly different order. Snapchat and Instagram were notable for the 
comparative difference in usage; almost double and triple the rates — 
respectively — among 16-24s, compared to the general adult population.  
45
Table 3.3. Ofcom: Which social media do you use for news? 








Google+ * 14% 9%
Tumblr 2% 4%
Viber 2% 2%
Other social media platform 2% 2%
Source: Ofcom News Consumption Survey 2019 
Question: D7a. Thinking specifically about social media (on any device), 
which of the following do you use for news nowadays? 
Base: All using social media for news – Total=2331, 16-24=620, 
* NB: Ofcom thinks some respondents misinterpreted what Google+ is.
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3.5 How do users access news on social media? 
Notably, when people access news on social media, increasingly they were not 
getting news directly from news organisations (Table 3.4). Only 30 per cent of 
adults got their news in this way, and the trend away from news organisations 
was greatest among 16-24s, among whom, just 22 per cent said they ‘mostly 
get news directly from news organisations' websites/apps’. The majority of this 
age group (56 per cent) said they ‘mostly get news from social media posts’. 
This included stories that were ‘trending’ on social media, and stories posted or 
shared by friends, family and other people users followed. 
Table 3.4. Ofcom: Routes to news stories on social media/online 
All adults Ages 16-24
Mostly get news from social media posts 41% 56%
Get news equally from social media posts and 
from news organisations' websites/apps
25% 18%
Mostly get news directly from news 
organisations' websites/apps
30% 22%
Don’t know 5% 4%
Source: Ofcom News Consumption Survey 2019 
Question: D15. And if you had to choose, which ONE of the following would you say is 
closest to the way you find out about news when you’re online? 
Base: All using social media for news – Total=2331, Male=966, Female=1361, 16-24=620, 
65+=142, ABC1=1435, C2DE=887, Minority ethnic=496, White=1825 Green shading 
indicates significant differences between groups.
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3.6 Other online sources of news 
The divergence in news consumption habits between the young and the old 
was less stark on websites and mobile apps than it was on social media. While 
‘all adults’ were most likely to use websites and apps belonging to TV channels 
and radio companies (24 per cent), the most common route for 16-24s was to 
go to a search engine to look for news (21 per cent) (Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5. Ofcom: Which of the following do you use for news? 
All adults Ages 16-24
Search engines 19% 21%
Websites/apps of TV and radio companies 24% 21%
Websites/apps of newspapers 19% 17%
Websites/apps of online news organisations 12% 16%
Websites/apps of news aggregation sites 12% 13%
Websites/apps of news magazines 6% 9%
Blogs 2% 2%
Source: Ofcom News Consumption Survey 2019 
Question: C2. Which of the following do you use to get news? 
Base: All adults 16+ 2019 - Total=4691, Male=2146, Female=2538, 16-24=805, 65+=903, 
ABC1=2743, C2DE=1939, Minority ethnic=680, White=3998 Green shading indicates 
significant differences between groups
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3.7 Specific news websites and apps used 
Ofcom found the most popular website/app for news among 16-24s was the 
Google search engine, used by 65 per cent of them (Table 3.6), beating into 
second place the BBC website/app (64 per cent), which was top for ‘all adults’. 
In third place was YouTube (36 per cent).  Significantly, younger people used 
YouTube, BuzzFeed and LADbible for news, at more than double the rate of 
the general population. 
Table 3.6. Ofcom: Which websites/apps do you use for news? 
All adults Ages 16-24
Google (search engine) 51% 65%
BBC website/app 65% 64%
YouTube website/app 15% 36%
Guardian/Observer website/app 18% 24%
BuzzFeed website/app 9% 22%
Sky News website/app 20% 20%
The Daily Mail website/app 17% 20%
LADbible website/app 6% 19%
Google News (news aggregator) 13% 12%
The Independent website/app 8% 12%
Source: Ofcom News Consumption Survey 2019 
Question: D8a. Thinking specifically about the internet, which of the following do 
you use for news nowadays? 
Base: All using other internet for news 2019 - Total=1773, Male=882, Female=889, 
16-24=307, 65+=271, ABC1=1241, C2DE=527, Minority ethnic=310, White=1455 
Green shading indicates significant differences between groups. Only sources with 
an incidence of 5%+ in 2019 are shown. 
**ITV/ITN – only includes mentions of ITV/ITN specifically, does not include 
mentions of STV or UTV
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3.8 Gateways to news 
When asked which gateway to news was used ‘often or most times’, the 
majority of ‘all adults’ (58 per cent) said they ‘go directly to a website/app of a 
news provider’ (Table 3.7). Only a minority — but still a plurality — of 16-24s 
said they do this (46 per cent). Others in this age group said they ‘go to a 
search engine and search for a news story’ (38 per cent), or to a news 
aggregator (27 per cent). 
Table 3.7. Ofcom: Gateways to online news and frequency of use 
Percentage using ‘often or most’ times All Adults Ages 16-24
Go directly to a website/app of a news 
provider
58% 46%
Go to a search engine and search for a 
news story
32% 38%
Go directly to a website/app that brings 
together news from different news 
providers
27% 32%
Source: Ofcom News Consumption Survey 2019 
Question: D14. How often, if at all, you do each of the following when you want to get 
news? 
Base: All using other internet for news - Total=1773, Male=882, Female=889, 16-24=307, 
65+=271, ABC1=1241, C2DE=527, Minority ethnic=310, White=1455 Green shading 
indicates significant differences between groups
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3.9 Single most important media for news 
When asked which was their single most important media platform for news 
(Table 3.8), the top choice for ‘all adults’ was ‘Any TV’ (47 per cent); whereas 
only 23 per cent of 16-24s chose this; fewer than half the rate for the general 
population. Instead, 16-24s chose ‘social media’ (43 per cent) as their most 
important platform for news, whereas only 16 per cent of ‘all adults’ made the 
same choice. ‘Any TV’ came in second place for 16-24s followed by ‘any other 
Internet’. 
When asked about their single most important media brand for news, rather 
than platform, the top choice for ‘all adults’ was BBC One (24 per cent); for 
16-24s, it was Facebook (17 per cent), with BBC One in a distant second place 
(10 per cent), and Twitter in third place (8 per cent). However, all BBC channel 
brands collectively — BBC One, BBC website / app, BBC News Channel and 
BBC Radio 4 — comprised the single most important news source for ‘all 
adults’ (37 per cent) and for 16-24s (20 per cent); still with a significant disparity 
revealed between age-groups.  
Across all platforms and sub-brands, the BBC was approximately half as 
important a news source to 16-24s as it was for ‘all adults’; the gap was due 
largely to declining use of television as a platform among young people, and 
the increased use of social media. 
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Table 3.8. Ofcom: Single most important source of news 
Which is your single most important source for news?
All Adults Ages 16-24
Media platform:
Any social media 16% 43%
Any TV 47% 23%
Any other Internet 13% 14%
Any radio 8% 5%
Any newspaper 7% 3%
Any magazine 0% 0%
Media brand:
Facebook 8% 17%
BBC One 24% 10%
Twitter 3% 8%
BBC website / app 6% 6%
ITV/ITV WALES/UTV/STV 11% 5%
Sky News Channel 5% 3%
BBC News Channel 5% 3%
BBC Radio 4 2% 1%
Daily Mail / Mail on Sunday (print or website/ app) 2% 1%
The Guardian / Observer (print or website / app) 2% 1%
Source: Ofcom News Consumption Survey 2019 
Question: E1a. Looking at all the sources of news you have just said that you use, which 
one is most important to you? 
Base: All adults 16+ specifying at least one source for news 2019 - Total=4492, Male=2057, 
Female=2428, 16-24=748, 65+=883, ABC1=2659, C2DE=1824, Minority ethnic=659, 
White=3820 
Green shading indicates significant differences between groups. Only sources with an 
incidence of 2%+ in 2019 are shown.
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3.10 News consumption by children aged 11-16 years old 
Again, news consumption by children just below 16 years old likely is indicative 
of patterns among younger members of the 16-24 cohort. Among those aged 
11-16, Childwise (2017) found 19 per cent of boys claimed to be ‘very 
interested’ in current affairs, and 33 per cent were ‘quite interested’; it was 11 
per cent and 37 per cent, respectively, for girls (Figure 3.4). These numbers are 
slightly lower than those found by Ofcom in its survey of 12-15 year olds, where 
19 per cent of both sexes were ‘very interested’ and 40 per cent were ‘quite 
interested’ (Ofcom 2019a, p. 103). The Childwise data shows an unexplained, 
yet significant disparity among those ‘very interested’ in current affairs between 
boys and girls (11-16); boys representing 173 per cent the number of girls. 
Figure 3.4. Childwise: Interest in current affairs 
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Among children with a lack of interest in current affairs, some reasons given to 
Childwise are selectively quoted in Text Box 3.2. Common complaints included 
how negative most news is, and how little relevance it has to their lives. 
Prominent words included ‘depressing’, ‘bad’, ‘sad’, ‘blown out of proportion’, ‘it 
scares me’ and ‘it’s all about war’. Ofcom found similar expressions of 
discomfiture among 12-15 year olds who were disinterested in news, including 
the words ‘too boring’ (41 per cent), ‘not relevant to people my age’ (19 per 
cent), and ‘too upsetting’ (15 per cent) (Ofcom, 2019a, p.103). 
Text Box 3.2. Childwise: Selective quotes from children disinterested in 
news and current affairs 
‘I don’t really care and it doesn’t affect my life’. [Girl aged 12] 
‘The news is boring the way they talk and act is not exciting or appealing’.  
[Girl aged 14] 
’90% of it is blown out of proportion and depressing’. [Boy aged 14] 
‘It’s always bad and sad’. [Girl aged 15]  
‘It's very negative, if something ‘big’ happens then I hear it from my 
teachers, friends, family or other means through the social media’.  
[Girl aged 16] 
‘It is all about war, so I don't really follow it’. [Boy, 16 years old]  
Source: Childwise Monitor Report, 2017.
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3.11 Summary 
Beginning with an attempt to define news, I offer a new visual taxonomy of 
news using the RGB spectrum of light — with red representing the ‘new’; 
green representing things that are ‘interesting to the public’, and blue for 
matters ‘in the public interest’ (Figure 3.2). The seven resulting colours show: 
‘tabloid news’, ‘serious news’, ‘trivial information’, ‘a splash’, ‘old serious news’, 
‘old tabloid news’, and ‘history’. 
The definition of news is fiercely debated, with some denying tabloid news falls 
within a definition of worthwhile news. Younger consumers are estranged from 
the journalistic and political classes, and leave the role of defining news to 
these older, elite actors, while deferentially they attribute their own content 
choices as ‘not real news’ (Sveningsson, 2015; Coleman et al., 2011). 
The difference between social media and social networks is defined, where the 
key difference is the former offers a means for media companies to interact 
with consumers, whereas the latter offers a platform for consumer to consumer 
conversations. 
The increased potential within social media for co-creation, storymaking 
(Berkowitz, 2011) and participation from ‘the people formerly known as the 
audience’ (Rosen, 2006) is explored; all of which threaten to disrupt the role of 
traditional news storytellers. 
3.12 Brief conclusions arising from industry data 
Overall, there is a significant divergence in news consumption behaviour 
between the young and the old. 16-34s are abandoning television especially, 
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and shifting to the Internet and social media, at a much greater rate than the 
general population. Also, they are using different media channels, brands and 
pathways to news. Whilst Facebook remains the main social media platform for 
news, its age profile is rising and Instagram, Snapchat, Twitter and YouTube 
are becoming more appealing to younger adults (Table 3.3). 
Increasingly, young adults do not get their news directly from news 
organisations; they get it vicariously through search engines, news 
aggregators, and social media postings. When they cite Facebook, Google, or 
a friend as their source of news, more often than not, the ultimate source is a 
traditional mainstream news organisation (Domingo, Masip and Costera Meijer, 
2015, p.53).  
Only 54-59 per cent of social media users, who viewed news posted by family 
and friends, knew the source of the stories ‘most’ or ‘all of the time’ (Figure 3.5); 
meaning almost half the time, people likely cannot gauge the trustworthiness of 
the news provider.  
Worse still, when news came from ‘other people you follow’, a minority of 
Facebook users claimed to know the source ‘most of the time’ (37 per cent) or 
‘all of the time’ (10 per cent) (Figure 3.5) (Ofcom 2019a, p.52). 
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Figure 3.5. Ofcom: Awareness of the source of news stories posted on 
social media by family and friends 
 
From the news suppliers’ perspective, this picture poses a serious threat to the 
value of their brands, if not their very existence. Access to their content is being 
mediated by third parties — technology platforms directly, and human conduits 
— and approximately half the audience did not know, or maybe care, who or 
what was the ultimate news source. 
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Chapter 4  
Incidental News Exposure 
4.0 Incidental news exposure 
The term ‘incidental news exposure’ — alternatively, ‘incidental news 
consumption’ — describes how social media users stumble across news 
stories while planning events, catching up with friends, or browsing other, 
usually entertainment-related, content (Fletcher and Nielsen, 2017, p.2451). 
Ofcom defined ‘incidental consumption’ as:  
‘…accidentally coming across news while doing something else, usually 
through social media, word of mouth or notification… At these times, 
people generally… were on these platforms to be entertained or to catch 
up with friends, rather than actively to seek news’. (Figure 2.1) (Ofcom, 
2019b, p.26). 
Because 43 per cent of 16-24s say social media is their single most important 
source for news (Table 3.8) (Ofcom, 2019a, p.71), the issue of incidental news 
exposure is most marked among young adults. Ofcom found the trait also was 
associated with lower socio-economic groups, and accessing news through a 
news aggregator, such as Apple News, Google News or Yahoo News, rather 
than directly via a news producer. This also meant the news tended to be 
personalised, as this is a common feature of news aggregators; less so for 
news broadcasters’ sites and mobile apps. (Ofcom, 2019b, pp.27-28). 
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In other words, news stories will appear in a newsfeed, triggered by the 
algorithm of the social media platform. Or a user might see their name is 
‘tagged’ by a friend in a post, or a story is ‘shared’ directly with them. The 
resulting news content, to which users are exposed is highly dependent on the 
people in their personal social network, as well as their interests and online 
activity (Karlsen, 2015, p.302). 
Ofcom wrote:  
‘When people consumed news incidentally, however, they did it in a 
more passive way. On social media, people would rarely look beyond 
the headline. When they did click on articles accessed through news 
aggregators or social media, we saw a similar pattern, with people 
reading only the first few paragraphs before returning to their social 
feed’. (Ofcom 2019b, p.27) 
And in 2018, a market research company, Revealing Reality concluded:  
‘The design and functionality of content delivered via smartphones 
seemed to encourage passive news consumption, encouraging 
scrolling, swiping and watching behaviours rather than proactive 
searching and exploration’. (Revealing Reality, 2018, p.5). 
For Boczkowski, Mitchelstein and Matassi (2018) and Siles and Boczkowski 
(2012), incidental news consumption occurs at the intersection of content and 
technology, for which the authors adopt a ‘texto-material’ perspective, 
influenced by ‘practice theory’, based on the works of Giddens (1979). Instead 
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of looking at people through theories of ‘homo economicus’, where people are 
said to act rationally according to their needs, or ‘homo sociologicus’, where 
they act according to social norms, practice theory attributes mixed motives 
and assumes a dialogue between the social and the individualistic. 
Consequently, when looking at news consumption on social media, the authors 
concluded:  
‘Incidental news consumption is not necessarily—and not primarily—
about the news, but about exercising sociability and passing time’. 
(Boczkowski, Mitchelstein & Matassi, 2018, p.3533). 
They argued incidental exposure was neither new nor unique to social media; it 
existed with conventional media:  
‘From perusing the headlines of a publication while waiting in line to pay 
at the supermarket, to briefly watching a story on display at an 
electronics store while walking down the street’. (Ibid., 3524). 
The key difference between the past and the present was how:  
‘…consuming news incidentally on social media has moved from the 
periphery to the centre of the contemporary repertoire of online 
information practices, in particular among young people’. (Ibid., 3524). 
4.1 Intentionality 
The word ‘incidental’ describes both the accidental — rather than intentional — 
nature of the encounter; also the superficial way the information might skate 
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across the surface of the user’s consciousness, rather than penetrating deeply 
into it.  
Some researchers argue incidental news exposure is pushing many users into 
a passive role, where they do not feel a need to take active steps to look for 
news, such as going out to buy a newspaper, or going to a news website, or 
making an appointment to view a television news bulletin. Instead, they rely on 
the social media platform to do all the work.  This is called: ‘the news finds me 
perception’ (Gil de Zúnīga, Weeks & Ardèvol-Abreu, 2017).  
From my own taxonomy (Table 2.2), this implies a move towards Promiscuous 
behaviour and away from Customary and Diligent. Put another way:  
‘In an age of smart phones and social media, young people don’t follow 
the news, as much as it follows them’. (Madden, Lenhart & Fontaine, 
2017, p.4).  
Meanwhile, Fletcher and Nielsen (2017) found people could not be categorised 
simply into two camps of either incidental or intentional news consumers. 
Instead, they found social media users engage in both forms, often on the 
same day. Others dispute whether this kind of news exposure, albeit 
unstructured, really can be classed as unintentional: 
‘There seems to be a deliberate choice to keep up with current affairs via 
SNSs [social networking sites], though this is not always conducted in a 
systematic way’. (Bergström & Belfrage, 2018, p.591) 
61
The argument is: young users know they will be exposed to news on social 
media; in fact, they cite social media as their primary platform for news. So, it is 
probable they have an expectation ‘the news will find me’ and this is a 
deliberate action, rather than an unintentional side effect. 
In their study of 44 Swedish high school students aged 16-19, Bergström and 
Belfrage (2018) noted young people were aware if they clicked stories, the 
social media algorithms were designed to feed more stories on the same topic. 
This fore-knowledge diminished the claim the resultant news exposure was 
incidental, because it resulted from conscious choices. One student told the 
Swedish researchers:  
‘In one way it’s planned, on Facebook, for example, if you have clicked 
on a news article, then it’s like they know you want that kind of news, 
and… [more news like that] will keep appearing’. (Bergström & Belfrage, 
2018, p.591). 
4.2 Information overload 
One theory explaining the emergence of incidental exposure is it is due to the 
sheer volume of news information to which users are exposed on social media. 
Hermida (2010) introduced the term ‘ambient journalism’ to refer to a pervasive 
system, in which, we are always connected to a constant barrage of 
information.  
Lee, Kim and Koh (2016) used the term ‘information overload’ to refer to the 
negative psychological effect of too much information being available for people 
efficiently to navigate. They split information overload into two genres: ‘general 
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information overload' (GIO) and ‘news information overload’ (NIO). NIO is 
associated with the Internet and the rise of social media. Before these, the 
quantity of news to which the public likely were exposed was limited to a few 
broadcasts on television and radio, and the purchase of a daily newspaper. But 
now, social media floods our mobile phones with information from every 
television station, radio station and newspaper in the world. 
The authors wrote:  
‘This change in news media environment brought information surplus, 
namely a glut of information facilitated by expansion of the Internet’s 
distribution capacity. People often experience inconvenience during the 
process of selecting news information that overflows in their daily lives’. 
(Lee, Kim & Koh, 2016, p.1). 
They found the more interested a person was in the news, the greater was the 
likelihood of periodic feelings of NIO. This group had a variety of responses; the 
most common was psychologically to switch off.  
‘The perception of information overload leads to a higher level of fatigue 
felt by news consumers. As consumers experience fatigue, they tend to 
avoid news materials both intentionally and unintentionally’. (Lee, Kim & 
Koh, 2016, p.3). 
Boczkowski et al., (2018) observed similar, but paradoxical, responses in a 
study on young Argentines, implying incidental consumption did not always 
mean less news was being consumed:  
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‘Incidental news consumption on social media sometimes can deter 
consumers from visiting news websites, but on other occasions, it acts 
as an incentive to do this’. (Ibid., 3532). 
4.3 Digital Divide 
The main concern voiced about incidental news exposure was it may be 
contributing to a gulf in news consumption between the ‘information rich’ and 
the ‘information poor’ — what Norris (2001) referred to as the Digital Divide.  
It is not just that there are some people more interested in news than others; 
that is to be expected. It is a belief incidental exposure on social media 
prevents actively those with less interest in the news from consuming it 
elsewhere, resulting in lower news-intake than there otherwise would be. This 
is the theory of ‘displacement’, as opposed to the rival theory of media 
‘complementarity’, in which exposure on one platform encourages yet more 
exposure on another (Dutta-Bergman, 2004).  
Tewksbury, Weaver and Maddex (2001, pp.542-543) found evidence incidental 
exposure was high for those already with a high level of interest in news, and 
for those who actively seek news. This implies a circular relationship between 
Promiscuous and Diligent behaviour (Table 2.2). This finding was echoed by 
Bode (2015, pp.19-20).  
In his study of social media use in Latvia, Bucholtz (2015) concluded the 
picture was more nuanced than a simple binary choice. He found some 
displacement among the most prolific social media users, but if they used 
social media for work, the outcome leant towards complementarity.  
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Meanwhile, Ofcom expressed concern incidental news consumption was 
leading to sections of society — that rely on social media for their news — not 
being adequately informed about social issues (Ofcom 2019b, pp.26-29). 
Kümpel (2018) referred to this mixture of displacement and complementarity as 
the ‘Matthew Effect’, a term coined by the American sociologist, Robert K. 
Merton (Merton, 1974). This is where people, already with a high degree of 
interest in news, increase their engagement with news via social media, 
because they are being fed more and more stories. Whereas those with a low 
degree of interest in news increasingly have passive and superficial encounters 
with news, because social media actively reduces their (otherwise more 
engaged) consumption of news via traditional channels. 
The Matthew Effect is so called because it refers to the Parable of the Talents 
in the Gospel of Matthew, Chapter 25, verse 29, which reads:  
‘For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have 
abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that 
which he hath’.  
Kümpel (2018) found the Matthew Effect could be counteracted through the 
process by which news stories arrive in users’ social media feeds. She wrote:  
‘A New York Times post linking to an article about climate change might 
not instantly captivate a Facebook user, while the same post shared by 
her best friend can easily motivate her to read the full story’. (Kümpel, 
2018, p.2). 
65
This stunningly simple observation identifies both the problem and solution for 
news providers. Merely doing more of the same —  pumping out content in an 
endless monologue — is futile. Instead, as I conclude later in this chapter, new 
strategies are needed to utilise personal networks to attract young audiences. 
4.4 Engagement  
Engagement often is defined as the sum of actions taken, on encountering a 
social media post. This includes clicks to play video, clicks to read stories, to 
like, share and comment. Also, it can include time spent watching videos, both 
absolute time, and time as a percentage of overall video duration.  
Ofcom’s findings on engagement with news posted on social media support 
Kümpel’s thesis (Table 4.1). It found stories referred by family and friends led to 
the greatest level of comments, shares and clicks. ‘Trending' news stories were 
the second most likely route leading to high engagement. Stories posted 
directly by news organisations were in third place; whereas the lowest level of 
engagement was for stories shared by ‘other people you follow’. The findings 
differed slightly for each social media platform, but the pattern was the same. 
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Table 4.1. Ofcom: Engagement with news content on social media 














Facebook Comment 23% 16% 14% 16%
Share 15% 16% 14% 11%
Click 61% 62% 66% 49%
Total 99% 94% 94% 76%
Twitter Comment 26% 24% 20% 24%
Share 23% 25% 22% 23%
Click 55% 63% 69% 59%
Total 104% 112% 111% 106%
Instagram Comment 24% 19% 18% 20%
Share 18% 15% 15% 14%
Click 57% 53% 62% 48%
Total 99% 87% 95% 82%
Snapchat Comment 28% 15% 10% 18%
Share 19% 12% 11% 16%
Click 56% 56% 71% 45%
Total 103% 83% 92% 79%
Source: Ofcom News Consumption Survey 2019  
Question: D11 [actions taken on each social media platform] 
(Selective Ofcom data extracted by Leon Hawthorne) 
Base: All accessing news from each source, 2019
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When social media users encountered news stories incidentally, Ofcom found 
the engagement was momentary and superficial.  
‘This meant they typically spent less than a minute on each item of news 
content consumed on their device if they came to it from social media. 
Importantly, when people consumed news in this way, they were much 
less aware of the source of the story they were reading or watching’. 
(Ofcom, 2019b, p.27). 
Boczkowski, Mitchelstein and Matassi (2018) noted one reason incidental news 
consumption was so fleeting was because the news content is consumed at 
times when the user is doing something else. For them, the issue of spatio-
temporality (time and place) is a significant factor in understanding incidental 
consumption, along with routine and habit. One interviewee told them:  
‘I’m always checking on my cellphone, but I can’t look at anything in 
depth because I’m working or at school, so I can’t sit down and read 
something’. (Ibid., 3532). 
Another interviewee, when asked how much time she spent reading her last 
news story, replied:  
‘Well, it had 150 characters, so it was quick [laughs]!’ (Ibid., 3532). 
Boczkowski, Mitchelstein and Matassi (2018, p.3532) added:  
‘The reading practices tied to incidental news consumption tend to be 
partial and brief. They are partial because most of our interviewees say 
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they tend to focus mostly on headlines, accompanying images, and 
leads. Lucila…commented that: ‘I mostly do a headline scan. And later 
on, if something interests me a lot, I visit [the respective website]’’. 
Costera Meijer and Groot Kormelink (2014) called this behaviour ‘news 
snacking’, which serves primarily to give users a brief overview of what is 
happening in the world, while eating up little of their time.  
‘Snacking is not about pursuing in-depth knowledge or developed 
opinions, but about diversion: users consume bits and pieces of 
information in a relaxed, easy-going fashion to gain a sense of what is 
going on’. (Ibid., 670). 
4.5 Engagement decisions of social media users and Kümpel 
In her 2018 study of German Facebook users, Kümpel (2018) explored what 
facilitates the transition from incidental exposure to greater engagement with 
news stories. She referred to ‘engagement decisions’ i.e. the ‘decision to 
attentively read an encountered news article’, for which she identified five 
characteristics:   
(1) the perceived characteristics of the news provider; 
(2) personal characteristics and traits of the exposed user (‘news receiver’); 
(3) characteristics of the news recommendation;  
(4) characteristics of the news content; 
(5) characteristics of the news curator (i.e., the recommending friend). 
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4.5.1 Perceived characteristics of the news provider  
Kümpel’s ‘characteristics of the news provider’ relate principally to the news 
brand’s perceived quality and credibility. This includes whether the brand is 
considered political biassed. Although relevant, Kümpel found social media 
users’ perceptions of the news provider were the least important of all factors in 
deciding whether to engage with a story.  
Williams (2012) found people pay more attention to stories if they have a high 
level of trust in the reporter and the media organisation for which the reporter 
works. However, Ofcom found trust in social media itself is very low (Table 4.2). 
Only 38 per cent of users agreed with the statement: ‘information received on 
social media is trustworthy’. All other media scored higher — magazines (82 
per cent), television (71 per cent), radio (67 per cent), newspapers (66 per 
cent) and other Internet (58 per cent) (Ofcom, 2019a, p.72). 
Facebook users gave the platform — the one they use most for news — the 
lowest score for trustworthiness (35 per cent) of the four main social media 
platforms. This compared with scores ranging from 62 to 76 per cent for the 
mainstream broadcasters. The main appeal of social media was: ‘it is important 
to me personally’ (58 per cent), and ‘it offers a range of opinions’ (56 per cent). 
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Table 4.2. Ofcom: Trustworthiness and other attributes of different 




Is important to 
me personally
Offers a range 
of opinions
BBC 71% 76% 76%
ITV 74% 70% 70%
Channel 4 71% 60% 60%
Sky News 76% 73% 73%
Channel 5 62% 57% 57%
Magazines 82% 75% 79%
Television 71% 70% 71%
Radio 67% 63% 60%
Newspapers (print-only) 66% 65% 64%
Other Internet 58% 60% 56%
Social media 38% 58% 56%
Twitter 43% 63% 65%
Snapchat 42% 56% 43%
Instagram 39% 57% 52%
Facebook 35% 57% 55%
Source: Ofcom News Consumption Survey 2019 
Question: E2. How important is <BRAND> as a source of news to you personally? E3. 
And to what extent do you think the following statements apply to <BRAND> as news 
source? Answer using a scale of 1 to 10 
Base: All using each source for news at least weekly.
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4.5.2 Personal characteristics and traits of the news receiver 
Kümpel’s ‘characteristics of the news receiver’ relate primarily to personality 
traits of the social media user, independent of the source, or type of news. One 
characteristic is the degree to which the user felt a duty to stay informed. 
For people with low levels of interest in the news and high levels of interest in 
entertainment content — ‘Disconnected’ (Table 2.2) — there are contradictory 
findings on the impact of incidental exposure. News consumption generally was 
found to increase; however while Valeriani & Vaccari (2016) found also a 
resultant increase in political participation among this group, Kim, Chen and de 
Zúnīga (2013) found the opposite result. 
Another important characteristic is fear of missing out (‘FoMO’), the feeling 
everybody else might be talking about some story, about which you know 
nothing; therefore you risk being outside the information loop. 
‘Many individuals were so concerned at the idea of missing something 
they perceived as important that they took time-consuming measures to 
ensure they viewed all news that was presented to them. Some younger 
respondents opened their apps specifically to tap quickly through news 
and scroll through newsfeeds, in order to make ‘unread notification’ 
symbols disappear — described by one individual as ‘clearing’… ‘I do 
feel a pressure to keep up with the news… It’s a feeling of being out of 
the loop’. Patrick, 24’. (Revealing Reality, 2018, p.34). 
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4.5.3 Characteristics of the news recommendation 
Kümpel’s ‘characteristics of the news recommendation’ relate to how the user 
comes across the story; whether it is by way of a personal message or a 
publicly visible post. A direct and personal method of sharing leads recipients to 
feel highly motivated, even obligated to engage. And if a friend has ‘tagged’ the 
user in a Facebook comment, meaning their name appears in a public forum, 
Kümpel found young Germans felt it was rude not to read and comment on the 
post. Grinberg et al. (2017) reinforced this point, finding users felt social 
pressure to comment on posts if members of their social group were expecting 
a response. 
4.5.4 Characteristics of the news content 
Kümpel’s ‘characteristics of the news content’ relate to whether the user feels 
the story is interesting or relevant to them; both the substance of the story and 
the style in which it is presented. The latter is a reference to the emotional and 
rhetorical techniques of clickbait, which tease a story and breed a sense of 
anticipation and wonder. 
Kümpel concluded:  
‘While clickbait elements undoubtedly lead the participants to linger on a 
news post longer, actual engagement seems to be prompted by genuine 
interest (instead of the urge to satisfy curiosity). The generic motives 
‘interest’ or ‘relevance’ emerge, primarily, from a perceived personal 
relevance’. (Ibid., 12). 
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Kümpel found the better was the personalisation and targeting of stories to fit 
the interests of users, the higher was the engagement with stories, even if 
encountered incidentally.  
In January 2020, BBC News announced it was investing in greater 
personalisation of its digital services (BBC, 2020a); presumably, it was doing 
this for this very reason — to drive up engagement. 
It may come as no great surprise that ‘interest’ and ‘relevance’ are key factors 
for users choosing to engage with news content. This echoes Uses and 
Gratifications Theory, advocated by Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch (1973), in 
which the purpose of media consumption is to satisfy basic human 
psychological needs. This was simplified by Stafford, Stafford and Schkade 
(2004) into three categories:  
(i) content gratification — the need to be informed, educated and entertained, 
which tallies with Kümpel’s ‘interest’ and ‘relevance’; 
(ii) process gratification — the apparent joy of the physical process of browsing 
and navigating content; 
(iii) social gratification — interacting with others and bonding with group 
members. 
Whilst the first two forms of gratification existed in old media, social gratification 
was considered a new and Internet-specific form, made possible by social 
media and the digital age. This theory is consistent with the finding that 
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incidental consumption is not motivated primarily by the content itself, but by 
the act of socialising (Boczkowski, Mitchelstein & Matassi, 2018, p.3533). 
4.5.5 Characteristics of the news curator 
We have seen in the Ofcom data (Table 4.1) how ‘friends and family’ are the 
most powerful curators of news content, in terms of paths leading to the highest 
levels of engagement. Kümpel (2018, p.4) described this as ‘social curation’, 
the process of relying on one’s human social network to customise news 
stories for us. 
Turcotte et al., (2015, p.521) identified a: ‘peer-to-peer process of digital news 
exposure’ to describe how news first reaches one person, who shares it with 
another on social media. Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet (1948) called this a 
‘two-step flow of communication'. The first step is where the professional 
newsmakers and journalists publish the news. Initially, this reaches the most 
avid news consumers — mostly those displaying ‘Diligent’ behaviour (Table 
2.2). The second step is where these ‘opinion leaders' filter the news, add 
commentary and context, and relay it to others in their personal network, who 
are less engaged with news. They label this latter group ‘opinion followers’. 
4.6 Opinion leaders and opinion followers 
Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955, p.32) found ‘opinion followers’ were more likely to 
be influenced by interpersonal communications than by direct receipt of 
information from a news source, precisely because they trusted the 
interpretation given to the information, and the leadership provided by the 
‘opinion leaders’ in their immediate network. 
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Lazarsfeld’s original fieldwork examined why people voted the way they did 
during the US presidential election in 1940. The question arises whether this 
dichotomy between ‘opinion leaders’ and ‘opinion followers' is still relevant 
today, and whether it explains why engagement is so high for posts shared by 
friends and family on social media. 
There is much research (Choi, 2015; Hermida et al., 2012; Karlsen, 2015) to 
support the continued existence of ‘opinion leaders’. Bergström and Belfrage 
(2018) interviewed Swedish students aged 16-25, who agreed they had 
‘opinion leaders’ among their friends on social media. A selection of their 
respondents’ comments is in Text Box 4.1. 
Text Box 4.1. Bergström and Belfrage: Respondents’ comments on 
‘opinion leaders’ 
‘They [‘opinion leaders’] are very important to me, since I have many…who 
are interested in politics. I usually read what they think and say. What plans 
they have, what they want, what they are going to do, it’s important. I learn 
things’.  
‘It’s good; I get information I would have missed’.  
‘They have special knowledge, you can trust them’.  
‘If a friend has shared something I check it out, and then I continue to the 
original source to see that it is correct. It’s like, I get to know about it through 
a friend, and then I go further’.  
Source: Bergström & Belfrage (2018, pp.592-593). 
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Turcotte et al. (2015) also identified the importance of ‘opinion leaders’ to 
young social media users. They constructed an experiment with 364 
undergraduates, who agreed for their Facebook accounts to be manipulated. 
Half received a story, apparently from a local newspaper and apparently 
‘shared’ by one of their real friends, with a message reading: ‘People should 
pay more attention to this kind of thing’. The other half of the students received 
just a link in their newsfeed, with no sharer and no message. 
The result was: more people who received the share recommendation from a 
friend clicked on the story. If the sharer was perceived to be an ‘opinion leader’, 
the recipient also was more likely to trust the media outlet that was the 
apparent news source, and engage further with it. They trusted the news 
source more because the recommendation came from a trusted friend. The 
same story coming directly from the news source was not as trustworthy as 
when it came from a friend. However, if the friend was not considered an 
‘opinion leader’, the effect was the inverse, namely they trusted the news 
source less (Turcotte et al., 2015).  
Mutz and Young (2011) offered a simple, practical explanation for why young 
people engage more with stories recommended by friends and family, which 
squares with Lee, Kim and Koh’s (2016) notion of information overload: 
‘When news consumers confront the excessive choices of today’s media 
environment, one extremely important way they decide what to pay 
attention to is through recommendations that reach them through their 
online social networks’. (Mutz & Young, 2011, p.1038). 
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4.7 Summary of incidental exposure 
Incidental news exposure is exposure to news content while doing something 
else, such as browsing through a social media account, or looking at 
entertainment content. Access to news content is secondary, or even tertiary, to 
the original intent of the consumer. For this reason, engagement with the 
content tends to be fleeting and superficial (Ofcom, 2019b, p.29); albeit a diet 
of constant ‘news snacking’ (Costera Meijer & Groot Kormelink, 2014) likely 
results in users encountering more news from more diverse sources than they 
would otherwise: 
‘…we find that social media use is in fact significantly related to 
increased news use, even among those who come across news on 
social media while doing other things’. (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017, pp. 
2461-2462). 
Incidental news exposure is not a new phenomenon. It existed in the analog 
age, but the ubiquity of mobile phones and the efficiency of social media has 
increased its prevalence, especially among 16-34s (Boczkowski, Mitchelstein & 
Matassi, 2018). 
Consumers cannot be classified simply into two camps of incidental and 
intentional news consumers. Much incidental consumption is intentional, 
because young users know how social media platforms are programmed to 
feed them news content (Bergström and Belfrage, 2018). 
The prevalence of incidental news exposure has been aided by the perception 
there is too much news content available — ‘news information overload’ (Lee, 
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Kim & Koh, 2016) or ‘ambient journalism’ (Hermida et al., 2012) — where users 
feel always connected to news, thus they do not need to search for it; the news 
will find them (Gil de Zúnīga, Weeks & Ardèvol-Abreu, 2017).  
There is evidence both ways on whether incidental news exposure leads to 
‘complementarity’, where a brief exposure to a story on social media inspires 
additional engagement on other media platforms; or whether it leads to 
‘displacement’, where less news content on other platforms is consumed. 
(Boczkowski et al., 2018; Dutta-Bergman, 2004).  
Those who find evidence of displacement fear incidental exposure leads to a 
‘Digital Divide’ (Norris, 2001) between the ‘information rich’ and the ‘information 
poor’, where the ‘poor’ get ‘poorer’ via the ‘Matthew Effect’ (Merton, 1974). 
Kümpel (2018) listed a number of characteristics, offering a roadmap for 
converting incidental exposure into more engaged consumption. Among these, 
she found users’ perceptions of the trustworthiness and reliability of the news 
provider were the least important of all factors. Instead, the ‘characteristics of 
the news recommendation’, such as a friend or family member forwarding a link 
to a story — ‘social curation’ — had a stronger impact on users’ perceptions. 
Kümpel’s findings were consistent with the work of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), 
who found the existence of ‘opinion leaders’ and ‘opinion followers’ within peer 
groups. Mutz and Young (2011) argued the social media environment is 
cluttered with so many choices, users need help — from their friends — 
curating it. And Turcotte et al., (2015, p.521) referred to a ‘peer-to-peer process 
of digital news exposure’, where users rely on opinion leaders in their group. 
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Overall, incidental news exposure can lead to greater news engagement. 
However, it also brings about the diminution in the status of news brands, and 
the ascent of peer-to-peer social curation. Ultimately, substantive engagement 
with news content boils down to whether, in a crowded landscape, users 
encounter content that is of interest and relevance to them. One way of 
providing both these factors is through greater personalisation of content. 
4.8 Conclusion on incidental exposure 
In May 2020, the highest rated UK TV news broadcast was BBC News at Six, 
on BBC One, receiving 5.6 million viewers (BARB, 2020c). However, audiences 
aged 16-24, on average, consumed fewer than one in six of the minutes 
viewed by the rest of the population (Ofcom, 2019b, p.31). If a comedian or 
influencer had taken a clip from the news, added a comment and shared it on 
social media, that influencer-clip might well have reached more young people 
than the original story. Many of those young viewers would not know the story 
had come from the BBC, nor would they care (Figure 3.5). Yet the story had 
reached them, nonetheless. 
Thus, the traditional process by which news is spread has changed. Instead of 
a linear news cycle, controlled by professional journalists, we have a more 
complex ‘political information cycle’ (Chadwick, 2011), where online semi-
professional bloggers and other ‘non elite participants’ insert themselves into 
the production, dissemination and interpretation of news events. 
Boczkowski et al. (2018, p.3534) claimed this led to: ‘a loss of hierarchy and a 
re-contextualization of the news report’. On social media, news ceases to have 
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its own primetime show. Instead, it gets a cameo appearance on a never-
ending variety show, alongside jugglers and ventriloquists. Editors no longer 
dictate which story is the most important of the day. 
‘The notion that a newspaper or a television show is an authoritative 
rendition of the day’s main events loses significance in the social media 
maelstrom. Thus, the emergence of incidental news marks a significant 
discontinuity with the consumption of news in print and broadcast media, 
and, albeit to a lesser extent, with the consumption of news on the web 
using computers’. (Boczkowski, Mitchelstein & Matassi, 2017, p.1786). 
The problem for news organisations — and the politicians, policymakers and 
pressure groups who feed off each other — is they are losing their power to set 
the agenda for public discourse. Where news is filtered by friends and family, 
who are more trusted than the news professionals (Turcotte et al., 2015), and 
by algorithms that power the technology platforms, and where news is one of 
many content genres competing for attention, then the status of news 
broadcasters is downgraded significantly. 
In this new world order, broadcasters are demoted from super brands to white 
label manufacturers, churning out white boxes of content, onto which any 
commentator can add their own label. This set of facts matters to shareholders 
of news companies. It is a marketing problem for those who manage brand 
identities, but it is unclear why it should concern anyone interested in 
democracy. 
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The research shows traditional broadcast news is in rapid decline among 
16-34s, who have migrated to social media (Table 3.8). But the pessimism 
about the consequences of incidental news exposure, perhaps, has more to do 
with nostalgia and journalistic self-interest than it does with political 
engagement among young adults. Undoubtedly, there is superficial news 
consumption on social media among some young people with low levels of 
news interest, but the evidence from Channel 4 News (in Chapter 6) is there 
also is a significant volume of highly engaged, active, young news consumers.  
Clearly, if some social media users, some of the time, purposely avoid news, 
due to feelings of news information overload, their exposure to news will 
become superficial. However, social media users are exposed superficially to a 
large number of news stories (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017, pp. 2461-2462). It is 
impossible to calculate if news consumption overall is higher or lower, because 
there are so many variables and no calculus to compare one type of 
consumption with another. 
The research shows it is possible to learn techniques that turn incidental 
exposure into engaged consumption, ‘Promiscuous’ into ‘Diligent’. For 
example, we know social media users engage more when stories are shared 
by an ‘opinion leader’ (Bergström & Belfrage, 2018). The level of trust in a 
particular news brand is of relative low importance, compared to the weight 
social media users place on ‘opinion leaders’ in their peer group (Kümpel, 
2018). So, whilst news providers deservedly are proud of levels of trust in their 
brands, it is self indulgent to market this particular trait to 16-34s. Instead, they 
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could employ strategies that encourage their most ‘Diligent’ consumers — who 
likely are regarded as ‘opinion leaders’ — to spread stories to their friends.  
A marketing campaign — perhaps labelled something akin to ‘Pass it On’ — 
would have the double benefit of (a) being effective at reaching and engaging 
with more passive news consumers via their more engaged friends, and (b) 
creating an opportunity to devise storymaking techniques (Berkowitz, 2015), 
inviting young ‘opinion leaders’ into the news creation process. The latter is an 
area woefully neglected by broadcast news media, who cling jealously to their 
privileged status as storytellers, while the media landscape around them has 
changed dramatically.  
The ‘people formerly known as the audience’ (Rosen, 2006) is a phrase with a 
newly revealed double meaning. In the original sense of Rosen’s manifesto, the 
audience wishes to participate in the co-creation of content, and the new 
meaning is a threat 16-34s will become the ‘former audience’, i.e. they will 
abandon old news brands altogether. 
Practitioners concerned about incidental news exposure could focus more on 
the supply side, arguably which is to blame for problems on the demand side; 
namely journalists who are: ‘compromised by their proximity to social 
power’ (Coleman, et al., 2011, p.39); ‘mainly white, middle-class and London-
centric’ with a Westminster news agenda that has little to do with the lives of 
many young people (Ofcom, 2019b, p.21). Different journalists with different 
backgrounds and perspectives may well have spotted how to navigate 
incidental news exposure, rather than soldering on as if nothing had changed. 
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Chapter 5  
Personalisation, Filter Bubbles and Echo Chambers 
5.0 ‘The Daily Me’ 
In 1995, Nicholas Negroponte, Founder of Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology’s Media Lab predicted ‘The Daily Me’, a virtual daily newspaper, 
uniquely customised for every citizen. No longer would everyone receive the 
same general newspapers, the vast proportion of whose content they would 
never read. Instead, sports enthusiasts would receive more sports pages; arts 
lovers, more arts pages, and so on. All this, Negroponte conjectured, would be 
possible with algorithmic curation, born of the digital age — the process by 
which computers are programmed to learn or remember the type of content 
each user likes, then delivers only that type of content (Negroponte, 1995). 
Negroponte was remarkably prescient. Today, Apple News, Google News, 
Facebook and Twitter are, in effect, ‘The Daily Me’. Their platforms record our 
web browsing histories to discern the type of content most likely to appeal to 
us, then they pre-select the stories that appear in our newsfeeds.  
By definition, personalisation narrows the range of news stories a user will 
receive, to the genres in which they have displayed an interest. If a user 
regularly watches stories about US President Donald Trump, that is what a 
personalised news service will provide. The negative consequence is it will feed 
relatively fewer stories about other genres. 
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The major UK broadcast news outlets have virtually zero personalisation on 
their digital platforms. Mostly, they offer all users a shopping list of the same 
content produced for broadcast, with no intelligent algorithmic curation. It is a 
one-size-fits-all approach, where everyone sees the same list of stories and 
can decide for themselves what they wish to consume.  
Historically, the role of news curation has fallen to editors. The Editor of Sky 
News or the Editor of ITV News would decide which of the world’s events are of 
greatest importance, then they would fill their TV programmes with the best 
selection (in their opinion). However, more young people are not getting their 
news directly from broadcasters; instead they get it via social media and news 
aggregators, which employ filtering technologies (Table 3.8) (Ofcom 2019a, 
p.71). Consequently, the role of the journalist-editor-curator has — by stealth — 
been substituted for algorithmic curation. 
Inevitably, and by definition, algorithmic curation will lead to a disproportionate 
numbers of stories about a genre appearing in each individual’s newsfeed. 
Young people who are interested in climate change or human rights 
increasingly will see more of those stories, and fewer stories about issues in 
which they are disinterested. The question among scholars is the degree to 
which a narrower range of news stories and a possible concomitant narrower 
range of opinions expressed therein impact on how people think and act in the 
real world. 
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5.1 What is an algorithm? 
An algorithm is a series of steps that can be followed to produce an answer to 
a problem, often expressed as a mathematical formula, comprised of numerous 
variables. The ‘problem’ for social media sites is deciding which posts, among 
the millions, should appear high up in a user’s newsfeed, in order to show 
stories that matter most to them.  
Facebook’s algorithm is based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (‘VCG’) auction, a 
type of blind bidding process, originally designed in the 1960s by Nobel Prize 
winning economists, William Vickrey, Edward Clarke and Theodore Groves. 
The system prioritises giving users what they want by taking into consideration 
four key factors: Inventory, Signals, Predictions and Final Score (Swan, 2020). 
‘Inventory’ is all posts on the platform, including those posted by brands and 
individuals. The purpose of a change to the Facebook algorithm in 2018 
(Chapter 5.2) was to give greater weight to posts from friends and family, over 
posts from brands.  
‘Signals' are the metadata users — mostly advertisers — input to identify what 
type of content they are posting, and to whom it is targeted, e.g., information 
about the content genre and its target demographic.  
‘Predictions’ are Facebook’s calculation of the behaviour of individual users, 
which indicates their likely response to the content posted.  
And ‘Score’ is a final overall number given to a post, indicating whether a user 
will respond positively to it. 
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‘Predictions’ are perhaps the most interesting aspect of the overall algorithmic 
equation. Exactly how Facebook calculates the behaviour of users is shrouded 
in mystery. It requires collecting a mass of data about users’ past behaviours 
and those of other users, who have similar traits and have made similar 
customer journeys. One method used to aid this is the use of cookies. Cookies 
are small pieces of text, used to store information on web browsers. They track 
users’ web histories, record what they see and pass this data back to the social 
media site. For example, if a Facebook user searches a shopping website for a 
pram, a cookie will record this action. When the user next visits Facebook, their 
newsfeed likely will populate with stories echoing the retail search e.g. stories 
about having a baby. Facebook is reading the cookies from the shopping 
journey and comparing these to millions of other users’ past behaviours, before 
concluding the user likely is searching for a pram, because she is pregnant, in 
which case, it is likely she also would be interested in certain types of news.  
Facebook’s Cookie Policy states:  
‘Cookies enable Facebook to offer the Facebook Products to you and to 
understand the information we receive about you, including information 
about your use of other websites and apps, whether or not you are 
registered or logged in’. (Facebook, 2018). 
There is no intended malevolence in the use of cookies and associated 
algorithmic curation. No doubt, many people find them very helpful in providing 
relevant information when they need it. That is their raison d'être. 
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5.2 Facebook’s 2018 algorithm change 
On 19 January 2018, Facebook Founder, Mark Zuckerberg posted a statement 
on his Facebook page, commented on recent changes to the social media 
platform. He wrote:  
‘Last week, I announced a major change to encourage meaningful social 
interactions with family and friends over passive consumption. As a 
result, you’ll see less public content including news, video and posts 
from brands. After this change, we expect news to make up roughly 4% 
of News Feed, down from roughly 5% today. This is a big change, but 
news will always be a critical way for people to start conversations on 
important topics’. (Zuckerberg, 2018). 
Facebook had changed its algorithm, the rules that decide which stories appear 
in users’ social media feeds, to reduce the quantity of news stories. At the time, 
news stories comprised 5 per cent of all information seen on Facebook, and 
the algorithm change would, by design, reduce this to 4 per cent, representing 
an average 20 per cent drop in viewing for news content on the platform. 
Zuckerberg did not do this because he was trying to punish news publishers. 
His rationale was news had contributed to an increase in ‘passive consumption’ 
and he wanted to ‘encourage meaningful social interactions’. In other words, 
news is a tiny fraction of what Facebook is about, and too much of it leads to 
trivial and insignificant consumption on the platform. News would henceforth be 
relegated by the algorithm. News is not an end in itself for Facebook. It is a 
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means to an end. It can be used as a springboard ‘to start conversations’, but 
the end is ‘meaningful social interactions with family and friends’. (Ibid.). 
Cornia et al. (2018) found the immediate impact of the Facebook policy, for 
some news organisations, was profound. French broadcaster, LCI told the 
researchers: ‘We have lost 30% of our traffic from social networks, from 
Facebook. It’s a big deal’. (Ibid., 31).  
For others, the shock was less impactful; it depended on how they adjusted 
their social media strategies to cope with the change. The Times, and those 
whose business models were based on subscription, made few changes and 
seemed immune to the algorithmic change, presumably because subscribers 
were loyal to their content and visited their pages intentionally, rather than 
coming to them incidentally. Whereas, ITV News saw its daily interactions on 
Facebook drop by 13 per cent. At the same time, ITV News increased its 
average number of daily Facebook posts from 16 to 18, albeit it told the 
researchers this was not a direct response to the Facebook change (Ibid., 35). 
The revealing thing for many observers was the precision with which Facebook 
could program its algorithm to yield such specific and immediate results. 
5.3 Netflix's artwork personalisation 
Although Netflix exists in a different content genre than news — entertainment 
and drama — its method of personalising content is in the vanguard, and 
doubtless offers insights for news publishers. 
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Every customer of the subscription video on demand service sees a different 
version of Netflix, depending on their tastes. The Netflix corporate website 
states:  
‘Our goal is to help members discover great content that they will enjoy. 
Personalisation is one of the pillars of Netflix because it allows each 
member to have a different view of our content that adapts to their 
interests and can help expand their interests over time. It enables us to 
not have just one Netflix product but hundreds of millions of products: 
one for each member profile. Each experience is personalised across 
many dimensions: the suggested videos and their ranking, the way 
videos are organised into rows and pages, and even the artwork 
displayed. To do this deep personalisation, we combine a multitude of 
different algorithmic approaches to address each unique member’s 
needs. Personalisation starts on the homepage but also extends out 
across the product and beyond, such as deciding what messages to 
send our members to keep them informed and engaged’. (Netflix, n.d.). 
Netflix's process of algorithmic curation is designed to give customers what 
they want; to make life easier for them by feeding them content that will be of 
interest. The volume of potential content is so vast, only a technological 
solution could navigate all that is on offer. Anybody who has ever searched for 
something to watch on Netflix might question the efficacy of its personalisation, 
however presumably they spend less time searching than they would without 
the algorithmic pre-selection, narrowing down the list of choices. 
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Netflix knows which shows each customer has watched. It knows which shows 
they started to watch, but did not finish. It knows which day of the week, or time 
of the day, is best to target them with a drama or an action movie. Its algorithm 
discerns what kind of person they are and what future shows they would like.  
Because Netflix has this good understanding of each customer’s personality, 
behaviour and tastes, it uses customised images to promote the same shows 
to different users. They call this ‘artwork personalisation’. It means multiple 
promotional thumbnail images are created for each show, and each user sees 
only the artwork that matches his or her profile, and is most likely to persuade 
them to watch the show. 
A 7 December 2017 company blogpost stated:  
‘Let us consider trying to personalise the image we use to depict the 
movie Good Will Hunting. Here we might personalise this decision based 
on how much a member prefers different genres and themes. Someone 
who has watched many romantic movies may be interested in Good Will 
Hunting if we show the artwork containing Matt Damon and Minnie 
Driver, whereas, a member who has watched many comedies might be 
drawn to the movie if we use the artwork containing Robin Williams, a 
well-known comedian’. (Netflix, 2017). 
On 20 October 2018, The Guardian ran a story about Netflix’s customers 
complaining the artwork they received was based on their racial profile. It 
alleged African American customers would receive artwork featuring black 
actors, while Caucasian Americans would receive artwork featuring white 
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actors, for the same show. The TV series, ‘Like Father’ was featured as an 
example, with the different promotional images received by Netflix customers 
placed side by side (Figure 5.1) (The Guardian, 2018). 
Figure 5.1. Netflix: Example of Artwork Personalisation 
Netflix issued a statement, included in the Guardian report:  
‘We don’t ask members for their race, gender or ethnicity so we cannot 
use this information to personalise their individual Netflix experience. 
The only information we use is a member’s viewing history’. (Ibid.). 
Netflix’s cursory response and the company’s refusal to answer further 
questions (from me) on the topic, indicate extreme sensitivity about American 
racial politics, as much as it exposes secrecy over algorithmic curation. The 
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Netflix statement is not a direct denial of the gist of what was alleged. 
Politicians call this statement a ‘non-denial denial’, as it gives an impression of 
a denial, while not expressly refuting the main claim. Logically, it is not 
necessary to ‘ask members for their gender’ in order to discern their sex, with a 
high degree of accuracy — for example, from their name. So, for Netflix to say: 
‘we cannot use this information’ is somewhat misleading. Similarly, race and 
ethnicity could be discerned, albeit with less accuracy than sex, by cross-
referencing a member’s name with other data obtained from their viewing 
history, and from the cookies monitoring their web history. 
A separate entry on Netflix’s blogpost appears somewhat to concede this point:  
‘Of course, to properly learn how to personalise artwork we need to 
collect a lot of data to find signals that indicate when one piece of 
artwork is significantly better for a member’. (Netflix, n.d.). 
It is not known if Netflix’s algorithm discovered black audiences were more 
likely to watch shows promoted with artwork featuring black actors, or whether 
white audiences were less likely to watch shows promoted with the faces of 
black actors. It is possible the Netflix algorithm came across these phenomena, 
and programmed the artwork accordingly, by machine learning, without human 
intervention. In which case, it raises ethical and perhaps legal questions about 
whether it is acceptable for an algorithm to racially profile if it learns people 
behave differently, according to race, even if the human behaviour is 
subconscious. 
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Despite this glitch, news providers could adopt Netflix’s approach to artwork 
personalisation for the thumbnail images used to promote news stories; this 
would be in addition to algorithmic curation for the substantive content. For 
example, politically liberal users might be found more likely to click to watch a 
story about a demonstration if the thumbnail image showed police officers 
hitting demonstrators with batons, while — for the same story — conservative 
users might be more attracted by an image depicting demonstrators throwing 
Molotov cocktails, or vice versa. Thus, artwork personalisation within news has 
the potential to show audiences different images of the world, even when 
reporting the same stories.  
Already, readers of right-wing or left-wing newspapers experience this; they see 
different images because of choices made by human editors, with specific 
political agendas, with which presumably those readers concur — because 
they buy those newspapers voluntarily. The difference with artwork 
personalisation inside online news is it would impact readers of the same 
publication, and the decisions on which artwork they see would arise from 
machine learning about individual users’ predilections, rather than conscious 
decisions by human editors, or conscious choices by users. 
5.4 The filter bubble 
The filter bubble is the:  
‘…state that an individual would find themselves in if they relied heavily 
on services that use algorithmic selection to filter out news, ideas, and 
perspectives that differ from their own’ (EU, 2019, p.6). 
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The term ‘filter bubble’ was coined by Eli Pariser, an American entrepreneur 
and Internet activist, in his 2011 book, ‘The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is 
Hiding from You’ (Pariser, 2011). Pariser argued the 2009 decision by Google 
to customise search results heralded a new era for the World Wide Web, one in 
which information received was personalised by the algorithms that power the 
software platforms, used everyday. The artificially intelligent software would 
learn to filter content based on previous selections, in order to find new content 
that best matches users’ proclivities.  
Eric Schmidt, then Google Chief Executive Officer, told the Guardian:  
‘The technology will be so good, it will be very hard for people to watch 
or consume something that has not in some sense been tailored for 
them… we know roughly who you are, roughly what you care about, 
roughly who your friends are’. (The Guardian, 2010). 
The bubble created by the algorithmic filter is an environment wherein all the 
news content is of a kind, to which the user is predisposed. This could be a 
genre, like sports news, or celebrity news. It could also be news stories that 
reflect a set of political biases, such as crime caused by immigrants; corporate 
corruption, or Islamist extremism. While there are legitimate news stories about 
each of these aspects of life, if a user is interested in one of these, the 
algorithm potentially will feed him or her a non-stop diet of related stories. The 
more they read, the more it affirms the algorithmic selection, so more similar 
stories will be fed. The bubble is that space where the user gets a 
disproportionate number of stories, so it impacts their perception of the real 
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world. They might begin to think there is an Al Qaeda terrorist hiding around 
every corner, or an illegal immigrant about to murder them in their bed. 
Pariser was concerned about creating a world in which people only saw 
content for which they had expressed a pre-interest, as well as content 
expressing opinions with which they already agree. He believed also the 
‘invisible algorithmic editing of the web’ was a problem, because content was 
being curated without users’ knowledge or consent. We would only see what 
the algorithm showed us. It is as if there were a manuscript, from which not 
only are huge chunks of text redacted, we cannot see where the redactions 
have been made, nor do we understand the mechanism employed to reach 
these decisions.  
Microsoft Founder, Bill Gates concurred, lamenting the technology which:  
‘…lets you go off with like-minded people, so you're not mixing and 
sharing and understanding other points of view... It's turned out to be 
more of a problem than I, or many others, would have expected’. (Gates, 
2017). 
The key thing about the filter bubble is it is a state of existence created by 
machines, by artificial intelligence and algorithms. It is not caused directly by 
conscious human action, other than the fact it is humans who create the 
original algorithms before these are released to machine-learn by themselves.  
De Vries and Hildebrandt (2013) refer to the mechanism as ‘algorithmic pre-
selection’ because users’ choices are narrowed by the search engine, news 
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aggregator or social networking site, before users are presented with a 
personalised list of options. It is as if one asked the question: ‘Where should I 
go for dinner tonight?’ And the computer replied with a list of three Chinese 
restaurants, because it knows you love Chinese food. Those restaurants are 
undoubtedly good choices, but the algorithm is denying the user the option of 
an Italian or French restaurant. 
De Vries and Hildebrandt (2013) added:  
‘When information is sorted out or summarised, this requires rather a 
large amount of epistemic trust to whoever or whatever is in charge of 
the selection’. (Ibid., 1). 
But many are sceptical whether citizens should give their trust so readily to the 
computer scientists who create the algorithms. 
5.5 Trust in the algorithm 
Ted Striphas, author of ‘The Late Age of Print’, said in a radio interview:  
‘What I think we're beginning to see emerge in and around algorithmic 
culture is a tremendous amount of deference being afforded to 
engineers, mathematicians, computer scientists… When we go to 
search for something on Google, that tells us what we need to know, it 
gives us our bearings in the world, and that in a sense becomes 
productive of the stuff of culture. And you know that's a tremendous 
responsibility to fall on the shoulders of any one group, and to reduce 
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that to a mathematical formula, however complex, I think doesn't really 
do justice to the full richness of culture’. (Funnell, 2012). 
The issue for Striphas was the loss of humanity in the use of algorithms. 
Humans literally are being edited out of the process of curation of human 
culture and replaced with machines, with whom we cannot argue or even 
understand the mechanisms by which they act. It is not necessarily a question 
of whether the algorithm is doing a good job, i.e., accurately selecting stories 
users will want; let us assume that is a given. Striphas’ sentiments exhibit a 
sadness for the loss of human error and serendipity and arguments that spring 
from a human-centred curation process. 
Consider a single news bulletin; take Channel 4 News. As 16-34s desert the 
evening broadcast television show at 19:00, and instead watch it on Facebook 
or YouTube, a few things accompany that journey. First, they do not watch the 
full one hour broadcast, which might contain a dozen stories that were sculpted 
into a logical running order. Story #1 is the most important story, according to 
the Editor, and Story #3 is positioned there because of the context provided to 
it by Story #2. The digital viewer does not benefit from any of this sequencing. 
Instead, their Facebook newsfeed promotes an individual story — say Story #3 
— because it is about a subject in which they have previously expressed an 
interest. The user may well love Story #3 and really engage with it, but they are 
not offered any other story. The Editor is not completely redundant, because he 
commissioned all the stories, but a large part of his curation function has been 
replaced by the algorithm. 
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The logical next step for computer science is to ask: why even bother with a 
human editor? Instead, allow an algorithm to commission news stories based 
on the known consumption habits of target audiences. The algorithm could 
identify key words to use, people to interview, angles to cover, even duration of 
stories, colour of graphics, and the appropriate promotional artwork. News 
aggregators do a little bit of this; but not much (Associated Press, 2020). 
Mostly, they sift through news stories human editors have already 
commissioned and published, then present a unique selection of these for each 
individual user. There is a distinction — albeit in practical terms, not much — 
between this and getting rid of human editors altogether, using algorithms to 
commission the stories. 
5.6 Emotional contagion 
Fears about trusting algorithms with the fate of human culture were magnified 
in 2014 when the Guardian reported Facebook had been runing experiments to 
change the mood of unwitting users (Guardian, 2014). The social networking 
site manipulated the newsfeeds of 689,000 users in order to make them feel 
emotionally more positive, or more negative, about life. Facebook was working 
with a team of academic researchers from Cornell University. Kramer, Guillory 
and Hancock (2014) were testing whether ‘emotional contagion’ — a well-
known phenomenon in the physical world, where one person’s emotions affect 
others — could be present on social networking sites, where there is no 
physical contact between parties.  
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They concluded:  
‘When positive expressions were reduced, people produced fewer 
positive posts and more negative posts; when negative expressions 
were reduced, the opposite pattern occurred. These results indicate that 
emotions expressed by others on Facebook influence our own emotions, 
constituting experimental evidence for massive-scale contagion via 
social networks’. (Kramer, Guillory & Hancock, 2014, p.8788). 
Albert Einstein said: ‘God does not play dice with the universe’, but it seems 
Silicon Valley can, and does.  
The logic of the Kramer et al. (2014) finding is a social networking site could 
manipulate its algorithm to make citizens feel positive or negative about life in, 
for example, the run-up to a General Election. Perhaps it could increase 
incidents of suicide? Or equally troubling, without conscious human motivation, 
a computer intelligence that is designed only to maximise revenue might 
determine a heavy-weighting of positive news stories contributes to people 
feeling happy, and when people feel happy, they spend more money. So, the 
algorithm could depress negative stories about the world because, it 
determines, depressed people do not go shopping. All this seems plausible if 
the Kramer et al. (2014) finding is accurate and replicable. 
The algorithms that control the newsfeeds are capable also of influencing the 
political agenda in society (Feezell, 2017). For example, if one group of people 
is continually fed a certain genre of stories, whille another group is fed stories 
with an opposing viewpoint, effectively these two groups could be 
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‘programmed’ to come into conflict. This could happen by targeted advertising 
on social media or — wittingly or unwittingly — by the humans who write the 
algorithms, or it could be done independently by the artificial intelligence, which 
powers the algorithms to learn and grow.  
Ignoring the possible presence of human malevolence — such as fake news 
and political mischief-making — the algorithms of the social media platforms 
and news aggregators have been created to maximise views and engagement, 
by providing users with content they want. But one side effect, potentially, is 
this might lead to accelerating political polarisation, and perversely, political 
polarisation might be good for business.  
Subscriptions to both pro- and anti-Trump media in the US, and to pro- and 
anti-Brexit media in the UK, went up as the issues heated up (Forbes.com, 
2020). But what is good for business clearly is not good for social harmony. 
Sunstein (2009) identified a conflict of interest between news consumers as 
customers and as citizens. He emphasised the need to regulate social 
networks to downgrade some of their commercial interests, so their actions 
could be brought into line with the best interests of society. 
5.7 Issue salience 
Feezell (2017) investigated whether the agenda-setting capacity of news, when 
communicated via traditional media, continued to exist when news travelled a 
vicarious route to audiences on social media. She demonstrated stories in 
social media feeds increased issue salience, and reduced the likelihood of 
decay of salience in issues, especially among the politically disinterested.  
101
Feezell (2017) experimented with students in Facebook groups. She planted 
stories over a 75-day period and later asked students how important were 
those story-issues. A control group and the experimental group were tested and 
the results compared. They showed the experimental group attributed greater 
importance to issues they were being fed surreptitiously, compared to the 
control group, who were fed other stories. The conclusion was: despite social 
media coinciding with a decline in young persons’ direct use of traditional 
media, social media itself had the ability to impart issue salience, especially 
among those with low levels of political engagement.  
While Ofcom (2019b, p.27) found young people with low levels of interest in 
news were most likely to consume their news incidentally on social media — 
apparently proving the Matthew Effect, where the ‘information poor’ get poorer 
— Feezell (2017) found these same people with the least interest in the news 
were the ones getting the most salience from this method of consumption. 
The relevance of Feezell (2017) to filter bubbles is — it follows — the issues 
covered in stories received via algorithmic curation become more salient to 
recipients. Users begin with an interest in a topic; the related story-count is 
magnified by algorithmic curation, and the salience of that issue also is 
magnified, reflecting the frequency with which users are bombarded with like-
stories. This is a virtuous or vicious circle, depending on one’s perspective.  
5.8 The echo chamber 
The European Union’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology defined 
‘echo chamber’ as:  
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‘…an environment where individuals are over-exposed to news, ideas, 
and perspectives similar to their own, creating a false impression of how 
widely held they are by the rest of the population’. (European 
Parliament, 2019, p.6). 
The echo chamber can be a result of the filter bubble, but the two are not the 
same thing. Echo chambers pre-date the Internet and social media. Every club, 
association or political party, to some degree, is an echo chamber; by definition, 
they are a collection of like-minds who congregate to wrap themselves in a 
comfort blanket of self-rectitude. The readers of most British national 
newspapers inhabit echo chambers, as most of the papers are heavily aligned, 
either to a political party or to a set of political values, which pervade their 
headlines and story choices. And people can live in an echo chamber by 
surrounding themselves only with friends of a like-political mind.  
The ubiquity of the web, and increasing reliance on social media, have 
conspired to put rocket boosters under this ancient phenomenon. Technology 
makes it easier for people to coalesce into networks of like-minds and to find 
themselves cocooned from outside views.  
If you are concerned about climate change, you can join a Facebook group 
devoted to that topic; subscribe to an environmentalist newsletter, or sign an 
online petition. At this point, you are connected to a wider community of people 
who share a passion for climate change advocacy. This may be considered a 
positive effect of the Internet, namely a potential to boost political engagement. 
However, when a relevant news story breaks, members of the group likely start 
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to share the story, add commentary, magnify aspects that support their agenda 
and diminish other aspects. Quickly, activists can whip each other up into a 
frenzy; a form of confirmation bias, accelerated by super fast Internet 
connectivity. 
Personalisation of content, it is argued, contributes to the echo chamber. News 
providers and technology platforms are motivated to give customers what they 
want, because this leads to more frequent, voluminous and engaged 
consumption. Personalisation means narrowing the range of stories to which 
users are exposed; that is its intended consequence. The unintended 
consequence, allegedly, is this narrowing leads to an echo chamber that works 
to the detriment of civil discourse (Flaxman et al., 2016; Pariser, 2011). 
American legal scholar, Cass Sunstein was one of the first voices to warn of 
the potential threat to democracy caused by the echo chamber. He explained:  
‘A lot of people love reading things that fortify and confirm their own 
opinions — and, by definition, people like reading about topics that 
interest them. So, freedom of choice can produce self-sorting, in which 
people enter echo chambers or information cocoons’. (Sunstein, 2017). 
In an extract from his 2001 book, ‘Republic.com’, Sunstein wrote:  
‘…people should be exposed to materials that they would not have 
chosen in advance. Unanticipated encounters, involving topics and 
points of view that people have not sought out and perhaps find quite 
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irritating, are central to democracy and even to freedom itself’. 
(Sunstein, 2001, p.320). 
Sunstein argued: widely distributed newspapers, magazines and news 
broadcasts provided shared experiences, which were vital for building 
community in a heterogenous society. He deplored the fact intense 
personalisation allowed people to become insulated into narrow groups within 
an increasingly fragmented society; something he termed ‘cultural 
balkanisation’. 
Sunstein and Pariser’s pessimistic views about personalisation have been 
hugely influential. The terms ‘echo chamber’ and ‘filter bubble’ have entered the 
popular lexicon, and their negative connotations are assumed by many to be 
facts. But the overall picture is more complex than both these authors 
considered at the start of the twenty-first century, and much of the recent 
evidence shows those aged 16-34 are least impacted by some of the predicted 
negative outcomes, as shown in the following section (Chapter 5.9). 
5.9 Online users consuming contrary views 
According to Ofcom’s Media Use and Attitudes Report 2019:  
‘…social media users are increasingly shielding themselves from 
opinions which differ from their own’. (Ofcom, 2019d, p.9). 
Figure 5.2 shows, in 2016, 29 per cent of social media users surveyed agreed 
with the statement: ‘I often see views that I disagree with’. By 2018, this 
number had dropped sharply to 17 per cent.  
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Meanwhile, those who concurred with the statement: ‘I rarely see views that I 
disagree with’ doubled from 12 per cent in 2016 to 24 per cent in 2018. 
However, this pattern of sheltering from disagreeable views was less marked 
for those aged 16-34, who were more likely than older age groups to 
‘sometimes or often’ see content with which they disagreed. They were also 
significantly less likely to ‘rarely’ see disagreeable views. 
And the same data showed more people were seeing things on social media 
that ‘upset or offend’ them. Again, those aged 16-24 were most likely to ‘often’ 
see upsetting or offensive content (12 per cent). 
Figure 5.2. Ofcom: Disagreeable and offensive views on social media 
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Overall, there was a clear difference in experiences with social media content, 
dependent on age, with younger audiences more likely to see disagreeable, 
upsetting and offensive content.  
One explanation for this is young people consume more content on social 
media than older people, thus have more opportunities to be offended. For 
example, 79 per cent of 16-24s say they watch streaming video online, against 
only 43 per cent of those aged 55-64 (Ofcom, 2019d, p.3). 
Moreover, when young people use social media, they access more disparate 
sources of news than older people. Their consumption is driven by myriad links 
and shares sent by family and friends, whereas older people tend to make 
targeted decisions to visit specific news sites (Table 3.4), including newspaper 
sites that match their political affiliations (Garrett, 2009; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009).  
‘The explanation is clear in retrospect: when browsing directly, 
individuals typically visit only a handful of news sources, whereas social 
media sites expose users to more variety’. (Flaxman et al., 2016, p.313). 
So, while Ofcom found an increasing trend towards echo chambers, 16-34s 
were the least effected by this trend, as their consumption patterns lent towards 
more varied news sources than older social media users. 
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5.10 Ideological Segregation 
Flaxman et al. (2016) asked what was the effect of contemporary methods of 
disseminating news on population-level ‘ideological segregation’, which they 
defined as:  
‘…the expected difference in the conservative shares of news outlets 
visited by two randomly selected individuals’. (Ibid., 300). 
Essentially, segregation is a measure of the degree to which people of different 
political opinions are isolated from each other in the media they use. 
Flaxman et al. (2016) used machine-learning algorithms to examine the web 
search history of 1.2 million US online news consumers over a three-month 
period. They defined four channels, through which users could access news — 
direct to news site, aggregator sites, social media, and web search. And they 
split news into two types — ‘descriptive reporting’ and ‘opinion’.  
Significantly, they focussed on a subset of ‘active news consumers’, who read 
at least ten substantive news articles (excluding sport and entertainment 
news), and two opinion pieces; thereby reducing the studied population to 4 per 
cent of the potential universe, i.e., 50,000 people. 
They found just one in three hundred outbound clicks from Facebook were to 
news stories. While opinion stories accounted for 6 per cent of all hard news 
consumption; one-third of traffic to opinion stories came from social media or 
search. In other words, social media and search disproportionately serviced 
opinion journalism over descriptive reporting.  
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They found ideological segregation was substantially higher for opinion pieces, 
than it was for descriptive reporting; it was higher also for social media and 
search than it was for direct browsing, and lowest for aggregators, because — 
citing Das et al. (2007):  
‘…aggregators return personalised news results from a broad set of 
publications with disparate ideological leanings’. (Flaxman et al., 2016, 
p.312). 
Ideological segregation was less for less active news consumers; in other 
words, it effects disproportionately the most active news consumers. They 
found online behaviour was mirroring offline behaviour, with 75 per cent of all 
news consumption going to mainstream news outlets. So, the impact of 
technological change per se seemed marginal, at most. 
Flaxman et al. (2016, pp.313-317) concluded ‘nearly all users’ exist in echo 
chambers, and social media and search contributed to ideological segregation, 
but: ‘their overall effects at this time are somewhat limited’. 
And as their findings arose from an examination only of the most active 4 per 
cent of news consumers, by implication, they could not be applied to, what I 
termed, the ‘Promiscuous’ and ‘Disconnected’ (Table 2.2) behaviour of many 
16-34s:  
‘It is unclear what impact recent technological changes have on the 
majority of individuals who have little exposure to the news, but who may 
get that limited amount largely from social media’. (Ibid., 318). 
109
5.11 Cross-cutting exposure 
Cross-cutting exposure is:  
‘…the disagreement in viewpoints encountered by individuals in their 
communication environments’. (Matthes, Knoll, Valenzuela, Hopmann & 
Von Sikorski, 2019, p.523).  
It has been found encountering disagreement increases individuals’ tolerance 
(Pattie & Johnston, 2008); ability to argue (Price, Cappella & Nir, 2002), and 
facility to hold accurate beliefs (Garrett, Weeks & Neo, 2016).  
While cross-cutting exposure can be seen as the opposite of the echo 
chamber, its effects are not uniform. Paradoxically, some have found it can 
reinforce the effects of the echo chamber. Diana Mutz’s work (Mutz, 2002a; 
Mutz, 2002b) examined the relationship between cross-cutting exposure and 
political participation. She found when people encountered political differences 
in their social networks, it triggered ambivalence, threatened social harmony, 
and deterred citizens from active political involvement. Thus, she uncovered an 
ironic choice between a ‘deliberative versus participatory democracy’ (Mutz, 
2006). Society could choose to expose itself to contrary views, and debate the 
issues, but if it does so, likely this will lead to lower levels of participation 
(Moehler & Conroy-Krutz, 2016). 
Bail et al. (2018) reached similar conclusions. They conducted an experiment 
where left-wing and right-wing social media users received Twitter messages 
voicing opposing political views. Afterwards, they found both sets of users 
expressed more entrenched views.  
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There is other research that suggests cross-cutting exposure can lead to 
greater engagement. Flaxman et al. (2016) found:  
‘Interestingly, exposure to opposing perspectives is higher for the 
channels associated with the highest segregation, search, and social. 
Thus, counterintuitively, we find evidence that recent technological 
changes both increase and decrease various aspects of the partisan 
divide’. (Flaxman et al., 2016, p.300). 
In other words, while Flaxman et al. (2016) found more ideological segregation 
via social media, they also found users were more likely to be exposed to 
cross-cutting ideas. Exposure to conflicting views seemed to reinforce users’ 
original prejudices, at least among the 4 per cent of highly active news 
consumers analysed by Flaxman et al. (2016). 
5.12 Self-selection and polarisation 
DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson (1996, p.693) defined polarisation as:  
‘…the extent to which opinions on an issue are opposed in relation to 
some theoretical maximum’. 
As media choice expands, consumers likely experience a feeling of news 
information overload, and some respond to this by self-selecting news sources 
that echo their already established viewpoints (Lee, Kim & Koh, 2016). 
However, the tendency of young social media users not to go directly to news 
sites — and instead rely on family and friends to make news recommendations 
— acts as a counterweight to self-selected news (Messing & Westwood, 2014). 
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The existence of self-selected news does not negate the existence of cross-
cutting exposure. People with the most clearly defined political views have 
been found likely to seek out and consume media that conflicts with their views. 
Garrett (2009) found whilst people do have a stronger preference for opinion-
reinforcing stories, they consume — only marginally less — opinion-challenging 
stories. 
Heatherly, Lu and Lee (2017) found cross-cutting exposure was high for US 
social media users, but the more polarised users were to begin with — defined 
as the difference in how favourable they rated Democrats versus Republicans 
— the lesser was the ameliorating effect of the conflicting political opinions. So, 
for example, a climate change activist might read what climate change deniers 
were saying, perhaps in order to understand how the enemy thinks. The 
consequence of this cross-cutting exposure among already polarised people 
was it reinforced their existing polarisation. 
Beam, Hutchens and Hmielowski (2018) found the use of Facebook for news 
resulted in net de-polarisation, due largely to increased cross-cutting exposure. 
Whereas a study by Bail et al. (2018), conducted during the 2016 US 
presidential campaign, found cross-cutting exposure contributed to increased 
polarisation. Flaxman et al. (2016) found different media channels had different 
effects on cross-cutting exposure and polarisation; what was true of Facebook 
might not be true of Google News or Twitter. And the fact people use multiple 
channels for news — and consume other non-news content in far greater 
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volumes than news content — meant it was difficult to isolate the effect of any 
single channel, and extrapolate it to the wider population. 
Bakshy, Messing and Adamic (2015) provide the most comprehensive 
research, whose findings are a significant outlier. It found Facebook users were 
in an echo chamber due to self-selection. The platform’s algorithmic pre-
selection contributed also to the echo chamber, albeit to a lesser degree. They 
found three separate factors — self-selection, algorithmic pre-selection and 
friend selection — led to lower levels of cross-cutting exposure than for 
members of society with a random selection of friends. 
In 2019, the European Parliament Panel for the Future of Science and 
Technology published its review of the literature on ‘Polarisation and the News 
Media in Europe’. Its findings summarise best the prevailing wisdom:  
‘…as yet, little evidence to support the idea that increased exposure to 
news featuring like-minded or opposing views leads to the widespread 
polarisation of attitudes. Although some studies have found that both 
can strengthen the attitudes of a minority who already hold strong 
views… Most studies of news use on social media have failed to find 
evidence of echo chambers and/or ‘filter bubbles', where people are 
over-exposed to like-minded views. Some studies even find evidence 
that it increases the likelihood of exposure to opposing views’. 
(European Parliament, 2019, p.3). 
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5.13 Summary of personalisation 
Negroponte’s 1995 vision of ‘The Daily Me’ as a virtual daily newspaper, 
uniquely customised for every citizen, has come true, via the personalised 
news content offered by social media sites and news aggregators. 
By definition, personalisation narrows the range of stories users receive by 
selecting only material likely to interest them. Historically, the role of news 
curation fell to human editors, who decided what stories to offer consumers, but 
as more young people get their news from digital platforms, the role of the 
editor is being squeezed. 
Algorithmic curation is the process by which artificially intelligent computers use 
complex mathematical formulae to calculate the future behaviours and 
preferences of consumers.  
Facebook uses an algorithm based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (‘VCG’) 
auction, devised by a Nobel Prize winning economist, to help it predict user 
preferences. It employs electronic cookies to record on-site and off-site web 
histories; comparing this data with similar data from other users with similar 
customer journeys. 
In 2018, Facebook changed it algorithm to reduce the volume of news traffic 
from 5 per cent of all Facebook activity to 4 per cent. It did so because the 
company’s Founder Mark Zuckerberg claimed news was leading to ‘passive 
consumption’ (Zuckerberg, 2018). 
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The ‘filter bubble’ is a term, originated from Pariser (2011), describing an 
environment where users rely heavily on algorithmic selection for their news, 
thus are fed only ideas and viewpoints that match their own. The key word is 
‘filter’, as it describes a process that is not controlled directly by human hands; 
it is a sieve operated by computer software, programmed to find content the 
user is likely to consume. 
Scholars and practitioners have cautioned against humans putting high trust in 
engineers who devise these algorithms, which diminish the role of human 
creativity and serendipity in the choices we make (Funnell, 2012). 
The problem of trust was highlighted by a social experiment funded by 
Facebook, in which they found ‘emotional contagion' was possible on the social 
network (Kramer, Guillory and Hancock, 2014). Researchers were able to 
change the emotions expressed by users, by feeding them positive or negative 
stories. The experiment demonstrated society could be manipulated on a grand 
scale by using algorithmic curation to feed stories to create desired effects. 
The ‘echo chamber’ pre-dates the Internet, and is a bubble where people are 
surrounded by others who share their opinions: 
‘…creating a false impression of how widely held… are [those opinions] 
by the rest of the population’. (European Parliament, 2019, p.6). 
Sunstein (2001) was one of the first to warn of ‘echo chambers or information 
cocoons’, claiming democracy required ‘unplanned, unanticipated encounters’ 
with people with different sets of opinions to our own.  
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Whilst Ofcom (2019d) found social media led to people being isolated from 
views that did not conform to their own, they found younger adults were the 
group least effected by this. 16-34s were more likely than older people to 
encounter views online with which they disagreed. This was due partly to young 
people using more disparate news sources (Flaxman et al., 2016, p.313). 
‘Ideological segregation’ is:  
‘…the expected difference in the conservative shares of news outlets 
visited by two randomly selected individuals’. (Flaxman et al., 2016, 
p.300).  
Flaxman et al. (2016) concluded social media facilitates filter bubbles and echo 
chambers; these contribute to ideological segregation, but: ‘their overall effects 
at this time are somewhat limited’ (Ibid., 313), and it was lower still for people 
who were not avid news consumers. 
DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson (1996) defined polarisation as both a state and a 
process, a noun and a verb, where people's ideological beliefs are positioned 
apart. Beam, Hutchens and Hmielowski (2018) found the use of Facebook for 
news resulted in net de-polarisation, due largely to increased cross-cutting 
exposure, defined as:  
‘…the disagreement in viewpoints encountered by individuals in their 
communication environments’ (Matthes, Knoll, Valenzuela, Hopmann & 
Von Sikorski, 2019, p.523).  
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Paradoxically, and directly opposite to the views expressed by critics of the 
echo chamber theory, Mutz (2002b) found cross-cutting exposure reduced 
social harmony and deterred political engagement. Moehler & Conroy-Krutz 
(2016) confirmed it led to lower levels of political participation. And far from 
altering minds, Bail et al. (2018) found cross-cutting exposure merely 
entrenched views held at the outset.  
Flaxman et al. (2016) found the people most likely to be exposed to cross-
cutting ideas were the ones most politically divergent to begin with. However, 
Heatherly, Lu, and Lee (2017) found cross-cutting exposure had less impact on 
people with already entrenched political opinions. 
Overall, personalisation works as a tool for delivering users content in which 
they are interested. The fear that personalisation on social media, involving 
algorithmic curation, will lead to filter bubbles, which create echo chambers, 
which leads to political polarisation is largely refuted by the literature. In fact, 
many studies find social media use leads to greater exposure to a wide range 
of stories and sources, with greater cross-cutting exposure, especially among 
the young, and less avid news consumers.  
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5.14 Conclusion on personalisation 
There has always been some level of customisation of content in the analog 
world, but digital technology has made granular levels of personalisation more 
efficient and ubiquitous. Presently, search engines, social media sites and 
news aggregators are the primary platforms engaged in news personalisation 
because they are run by technology companies, not media companies, and it is 
their technology being employed to sift through the content produced by others. 
Media companies are at a structural disadvantage in the race towards 
personalisation delivered via algorithmic curation.   
Firstly, news producers are not favourably disposed to personalisation. Whilst 
BBC News has announced plans for this (BBC, 2020a), the details have not 
been disclosed, and several of the participants in this research expressed 
scepticism about the desirability of personalisation in their online services, 
albeit recognising its inevitability (Chapter 6.10).  
Culturally, everything about personalisation is a knife to the heart of a journalist-
editor. It substitutes human creativity and professional judgement for zeros and 
ones, spreadsheets and graphs, cookies and code. McLuhan (1964) said: ‘the 
medium is the message’, meaning the platform was more important than the 
content. In human terms, that makes the software engineers who create the 
platforms more important than the writer-artist-thinkers who ‘merely’ create the 
content. Personalisation is the mechanism by which to demonstrate who is on 
top in this relationship. While some, like Ted Striphas, warn of the cultural 
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power personalisation gives to software engineers (Funnell, 2012), the march 
towards it is inexorable. 
Secondly, personalisation disrupts the news media’s business model. Already, 
consumption of traditional media is in sharp decline among 16-34s; so too are 
revenues. Online advertising in 2018 made up 57 per cent of all UK advertising 
revenues (£13,439 million); while TV advertising revenues were down 4 per 
cent (£4,720 million), and print advertising in newspapers dropped 13.5 per 
cent (£1,273 million) (Table 5.1). 
Google and Facebook took an estimated 61 per cent of all UK online revenue. 
That is £8.2 billion in 2018; more than the combined revenues of the TV, radio, 
newspaper and magazine sectors (£7.1 billion). International estimates suggest 
13 per cent of all online revenue went to search engines (principally Google); 
17 per cent to social media platforms and 30 per cent to online video platforms 
(principally YouTube). News sites were estimated to take only 7 per cent of all 
online revenue (Ofcom, 2019f, p.5-6). 
Personalisation is one reason for the rapid commercial assent of Google and 
Facebook, because aside from personalising editorial content, they offer highly 
targeted, personalised advertising, for which advertisers pay a premium. 
Meantime, UK broadcast news companies presently are doing zero 
personalisation on their own platforms. The kind offered presently by the BBC 
News App is a low-tech form of self-selection, allowing users to pick categories 
of news to appear in a ‘My News’ section of the app.  
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Table 5.1. UK total advertising spend, 2018, by media 
Whilst it can be beneficial for news publishers to personalise content for users 
who are already on their sites/apps — giving them a better user experience 
and encouraging them to stay longer — this does not solve the publishers’ 
problem of competing with all the personalisation that takes place at the 
browser / social media platform level, which is capable of diverting customers 
away from the news sites. This was demonstrated by Facebook’s 2018 
algorithm change (Chapter 5.2), which was designed to, and resulted in, a 20 
per cent average drop in news traffic on the platform. 
UK Total Advertising Spend, 2018 (£millions)
Media 2018 % Total Year on Year change 2017
Online £13,439 57.0% 12.3% £11,965
TV £4,720 20.0% -4.1% £4,922
Direct mail £1,555 6.6% -10.7% £1,741
Newspaper (print) £1,273 5.4% -13.5% £1,471
Out of home £1,209 5.1% 3.2% £1,172
Radio £678 2.9% 2.7% £660
Magazines £447 1.9% -13.5% £517
Cinema £254 1.1% -4.2% £265
Total £23,570 100.0% 3.8% £22,710
Source: Ofcom Communications Market Report, 2019 / AA / Warc Expenditure Report. 
Figures are CPI adjusted to 2018 prices.
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On the demand side, personalisation — by definition — delivers content to 
customers that is of interest and relevance, and so should lead to greater 
engagement with news (Kümpel, 2018). Users no longer need to search for a 
needle in a haystack when the algorithm can ensure ‘the news finds me’ (Gil de 
Zúnīga, Weeks & Ardèvol-Abreu, 2017). Undoubtedly, personalisation makes 
for a better customer experience. 
A problem for news producers is what the public finds interesting and relevant 
might not be what they (the producers) want to give them; potentially when 
more news is personalised, this could lead to a decline in consumption of some 
types of news content.  
Channel 4 News, ITV News, Sky News and 5 News agree largely on the type 
of content they believe 16-34s want, and the style and tone in which they want 
it delivered (Chapter 6.7). Increased algorithm-led personalisation by the news 
brands would shine a bright light on these assumptions.  
As demonstrated by Netflix’s artwork personalisation (Chapter 5.3), if an 
artificial intelligence is programmed to grow by machine learning and 
automatically to curate content in order to maximise viewing, likely there would 
be unintended consequences. Netflix was accused of racial profiling in the way 
its personalisation promoted entertainment shows (The Guardian, 2018). If 
similar techniques were employed for news, the societal impact could be much 
more significant. Already, Facebook has demonstrated it can manipulate the 
moods of its users by feeding them ‘happy’ or ‘sad’ stories; a process known as 
‘emotional contagion’ (Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock, 2014).  
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One assumes Netflix’s artwork personalisation and Facebook’s ‘emotional 
contagion’ experiment began with benign motivations, but if one adds to either 
a malevolent actor, the potential societal consequences become incalculable. 
Other fears about personalisation have proven less valid. The charge was that 
increased personalisation would lead to a ‘filter bubble’ resulting in an ‘echo 
chamber’ and greater political polarisation, causing declining political 
participation and social disharmony. This idea has been propagated like a web 
virus, seemingly due to tabloid hysteria, intellectual snobbery and self-interest 
from old media (Chapter 1.0.1). 
The ‘filter bubble' defined by Pariser (2011) consists of two halves. The ‘bubble’ 
necessarily is linked to, and caused by, the ‘filter’ of algorithmic pre-selection. A 
‘bubble’ in itself — isolated from the causal filter — is virtually identical to 
Sunstein’s ‘echo chambers or information cocoons’ (Sunstein, 2001). 
Whereas social media provides ingredients for filter bubbles and echo 
chambers to come into existence, both are undermined by social curation 
(Messing & Westwood, 2014) and the fact social media users use multiple 
social media platforms and websites; each one with a different algorithm, 
applying a different filter, creating a different bubble.  
If users used one social media platform, or different media channels with a 
common algorithm, it is possible they would be in a ‘filter bubble’. But the 
minute they use different media with different algorithms, multiple bubbles are 
created, logically each one reducing the potency of the other. The net effect is 
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they can cancel each other out. You cannot be trapped inside an ‘information 
cocoon’, if each day you enter ten different ‘information cocoons’. 
Whilst Bakshy, Messing and Adamic (2015) found Facebook users were in an 
echo chamber, they concluded this was due to self-selection, and only to ‘a 
lesser degree’ due to algorithmic curation. Firstly; if they were in an echo 
chamber on Facebook, they would be in a different counteracting echo 
chamber when they open Twitter, or YouTube. Secondly; self-selection is an 
analog tool. It is the same as a person deciding to purchase the Daily Mail 
rather than the Guardian. In fact, the evidence shows the deleterious effects of 
social media fall largely on older, traditional media users transferring their 
existing offline behaviours online (Ofcom, 2019d; Flaxman et al., 2016).  
There are fewer problems arising from personalisation, if any, among 16-34s 
and those with low levels of political or news engagement, for whom social 
media use is associated with increased cross-cutting exposure and de-
polarisation (Beam, Hutchens and Hmielowski, 2018). 
Even if there were an effective filter bubble or echo chamber, it is questionable 
this would be a cause of political disharmony. Intuitively, many educated people 
believe more exposure to different ideas is a good thing (Sunstein, 2001, 
p.320), but there is plenty of evidence to suggest cross-cutting exposure can 
have negative consequences for political engagement and democracy. Bail et 
al. (2018) found Twitter users became more entrenched in their opinions when 
exposed to cross-cutting ideas. And Mutz (2002b) found when people 
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encountered political difference in their social networks, it threatened social 
harmony. 
If there is greater political polarisation in society, it is unproven the blame for 
this lay with personalisation on digital platforms, as opposed to other factors in 
wider society. News represents only 4 per cent of content consumed on 
Facebook (Zuckerberg, 2018), so news does not have a monopoly as a source 
of information about the world. It is just one of many factors that might 
contribute to the level of social harmony, or disharmony. 
Ironically, news junkies of different political complexions mirror each other’s 
news consumption behaviours. Those who consume the most news are the 
ones with the greatest cross-cutting exposure and the ones most likely to be 
ideologically segregated (Flaxman et al., 2016).  
By this logic, if nobody consumed any news at all, society would be less 
polarised, with people living in a blissful ignorance of all the things about which 
they should be polarised. Indeed, this is the rationale of every authoritarian 
regime for controlling its media, and it works. If the objective is less 




How have news providers responded to changing habits of 
young adults? 
6.0 Introduction 
I approached the United Kingdom's five largest television news broadcasters — 
BBC News, ITV News, Channel 4 News, 5 News and Sky News — to enquire 
into their experiences of news consumption among those aged 16-34 years old 
on digital and social media platforms.  
Four commercial broadcasters agreed to participate, with Editors-in-Chief or 
Heads of Digital agreeing to be interviewed personally by me on multiple 
occasions by email and telephone, also agreeing to complete a questionnaire, 
which involved disclosing internal audience research data. 
6.1 BBC News: non-participation 
Uniquely, BBC News declined to participate in this research. This declination 
came during the week Ofcom published its critical ‘Review of BBC News and 
Current Affairs, 2019 Report’ (Ofcom, 2019b). The report — summarised in 
Chapter 6.12 — painted a negative picture of BBC News’ efforts to appeal to 
younger audiences. BBC News referred me to this report and it prevented 
individual news programme editors from contributing to this research.  
The BBC is a public body which, in 2019, received £3,690 million in licence fee 
income (BBC, 2019, p.90). Clause 12 (1) of its Charter states:  
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‘The BBC must observe high standards of openness and seek to 
maximise transparency and accountability’. (Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport, 2016).  
In contrast, the four commercial broadcasters have no such public charter and 
receive no licence fee income, yet they engaged wholeheartedly with this 
research, while the BBC did not. 
6.1 Methodology 
The four participating news organisations (the ‘participants’) were each emailed 
the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 8.0); Consent Form (Appendix 8.1) 
and Questionnaire (Appendix 8.2). 
The Participant Information Sheet stated: ‘The company is the participant, not 
any individual’.  
The participants signed and returned the Consent Forms during October, 
November and December 2019, during which time I began a series of email 
and telephone conversations with the nominated Editors or Heads of Digital. 
Some participants wrote long emails with detailed answers to questions in the 
Questionnaire. These were followed up by me with ancillary questions, by 
telephone and email. For the telephone interviews, I typed notes 
contemporaneously of the respondents’ oral answers. I would then email the 
respondents my write-up and seek confirmation of accuracy. 
In January 2020, after I had analysed all the responses, I sent each participant 
draft sections of this Chapter 7, redacted to contain only references to the 
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individual participant; including all charts, statistics and quotations, seeking 
comments, corrections and approval for publication.  
The Participant Information Sheet had stated: ‘News organisations will be 
anonymised, unless you give permission for specific citations’. My write-up did 
make numerous citations of named news organisations. Consequently, the 
respondents might be identifiable from their job titles. I drew this to the attention 
of the respondents and gave them the option for me to remove references to 
named organisations or job titles. However, each participant emailed their 
approval for all sections of Chapter 7 referencing them, with only one or two 
minor corrections of facts. 
In January 2020, I approached the research agency, Childwise for use of some 
of its data on news consumption by children aged 9-16 (used in Chapter 3.10). 
Although it was not, strictly speaking, a participant in the same way as the 
news broadcasters, it too was sent all the above forms; it signed a Consent 
Form, and was sent relevant extracts of my write-up for approval, which it gave 
in February 2020. 
In February 2020, I approached Ofcom and sent it a copy of all the charts, 
tables and statistics of its, that I had included in this thesis, including specifying 
where I had done additional analysis and extrapolations from its figures. Ofcom 
emailed it was content with the use of data and the referencing. 
The Participant Information Sheet had given each participant the right to 
‘withdraw its consent to participate in the research’ up until a deadline of 30 
April 2020. The deadline passed with no withdrawals. 
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6.2 A brief overview of the Questionnaire 
There were nine questions in the Questionnaire (Appendix 8.2), asking about 
the participants’ experiences of news consumption behaviours of audiences 
aged 16-34. The questions were purposefully broad and open, allowing 
participants to be expansive with their responses, both by way of narrative and 
— optionally — by providing audience statistics. 
The questions could be broken down into three sections: Questions 1-4 sought 
an overview of the market, asking about the quantity of news consumption, 
how, when, where, and the styles and genres of news sought by 16-34s. 
Questions 5-6 dealt with audience engagement, such as sharing, commenting 
and participation. Questions 7-9 dealt with the participants’ organisational, 
strategic and commercial responses to the market conditions. 
The participants were told they needed only to answer the questions with which 
they felt comfortable or knowledgeable enough to answer. No participant 
answered all nine questions. In fact, Question 3 — ‘What, if any, difference is 
there in when and where… news is consumed by 16-34s, compared to older 
age groups?’ — proved redundant. And answers to Question 5 on engagement 
were subsumed into answers for Question 2 on consumption behaviours. 
6.3 A brief overview of the participants 
The four participating news organisations have somewhat different target 
audiences and — in some cases — distinct, legally defined broadcasting 
remits. Three of the four news services are produced by Independent 
Television News Limited (‘ITN’) for ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5. These three 
128
broadcasters — along with BBC and Welsh language channel, S4C — are 
known collectively as ‘public service broadcasters’,  or PSBs. This is because 
each publicly awarded licence to broadcast grants monopoly rights to transmit 
on certain television frequencies. In exchange, a common condition of these 
licences is broadcasters are obliged to deliver an amount of news and current 
affairs programming, as a public service. 
The fourth participant, Sky News, is not a PSB. However, all four news services 
are regulated to the same standards and rules by Ofcom, specifically by the 
Ofcom Broadcasting Code, which requires:  
‘…that news, in whatever form, is reported with due accuracy and 
presented with due impartiality’. (Ofcom, 2019c, p.28). 
It is important to note: Ofcom regulates the television channels and not the 
news producers. In practice, this distinction is not hugely significant, as the only 
external producer here — ITN — has been producing news for ITV since 1955, 
and it is likely an implicit, if not explicit, term in each of its commercial contracts 
for it to ensure programming is compliant with the Code. 
6.3.1 ITV 
ITV launched on 22 September 1955 as the UK’s first, commercial, terrestrial 
broadcaster, in competition with BBC1. Later operated by fifteen regional 
licensees and a national breakfast-time licensee; today ITV Plc is the owner of 
all but two ITV licences, namely those covering Scotland, held by STV Group 
Plc.   
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As a brand, ITV is known as a home for popular entertainment programmes 
aimed at mass audiences, like Coronation Street, X Factor and I’m a 
Celebrity… Get Me Out of Here! Consequently, ITV News — as a sub-brand — 
inherits an audience and brand reputation from the popular programming that 
surrounds it. 
6.3.2 Channel 4 
Channel 4 is the UK’s fourth national, free-to-air, terrestrial television network, 
operated by Channel Four Television Corporation. It was created by the 
Broadcasting Act 1981 with a specific remit to be distinctive from the three 
other terrestrial television channels (at the time, BBC1, BBC2 and ITV). It 
launched on 2 November 1982 and its remit was subsequently updated by the 
Communications Act 2003 to include a duty to provide:   
‘News and current affairs… that appeals to the tastes and interests of 
older children and young adults… [and] distribution of relevant media 
content by means of a range of different types of electronic 
communications networks’. (Communications Act 2003, c198A). 
As a consequence of this overt statutory remit, uniquely among the 
participants, it is core to Channel 4 News to target viewers aged 16-34, 
especially on digital platforms. Despite the news brand being positioned as 
more upmarket and esoteric than the other news brands, it has been very 
successful in engaging this age group. From data publicly available on the 
social media platforms, Channel 4 News has more than double the number of 
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Facebook followers (4.8 million) and YouTube subscribers (1,330,000) of ITV 
News (2.3 million and 531,000, respectively). (Table 6.2). 
6.3.3 Channel 5 
Channel 5 Broadcasting Limited operates the UK’s fifth national, free-to-air, 
terrestrial television network, providing general entertainment programming. 
Channel 5 was launched on 30 March 1997 and is owned by the US 
telecommunications company, ViacomCBS, the owner of MTV and CBS News. 
Measured by audience size, Channel 5 is the smallest of the terrestrial 
broadcasters, accounting for a 3.9 per cent share of UK television viewing 
(BARB, 2020a). Consequently, Channel 5’s news programming, styled as ‘5 
News’, has the smallest audience and — it claims — the smallest operating 
budget among the participants. 
6.3.4 Sky News 
Sky News was the UK's first 24-hour-a-day rolling news channel, launched on 5 
February 1989, eight years before the launch of BBC News Channel, on 9 
November 1997. Founded by Australian-born media tycoon, Rupert Murdoch, 
Sky News is now owned by Sky Group, part of US telecommunications 
company, Comcast, which also owns NBC News in the United States. As at 
December 2019, Sky News was available in 26 million UK TV homes, 
approximately 93 per cent of all UK TV homes (BARB, 2020b). 
Sky News differs from the other participants in three material ways: 
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1. Sky News is the only participant that is both the in-house producer and 
publisher of its own content. It does not outsource production of its news 
programming to an independent production company, like ITN. 
Consequently, Sky News’ management has the advantage of being able to 
make singular decisions, without any potential conflict of interest between it 
as a producer and it as a broadcaster. Whereas for ITV News, Channel 4 
News and 5 News, each has two layers of management — a production 
team and a broadcaster team — located in separate offices. Decisions 
about digital strategy ultimately belong to the broadcaster, who pays the 
bills and owns the news brand, not to the producer. However close the 
relationships are in practice — and I have no evidence to say they are not 
close — inevitably, the bifurcation of roles introduces hurdles for some 
players that Sky News does not have to navigate.  
2. Sky News does just one thing — news — whereas ITV, Channel 4 and 
Channel 5 primarily are entertainment channels, broadcasting multiple 
genres of programming, of which news is one small category. So, when 
formulating a digital strategy, Sky News only has to think about what is 
good for news, whereas the other participants must develop plans that fit 
into a broader channel strategy. Sky News told me:  
‘Sky News is editorially independent of the rest of Sky, so any news 
decisions don’t need alignment with other Sky channels’. 
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3. Sky News is a 24-hour-a-day rolling news channel. This has a different 
organisational structure and editorial way of thinking than the other 
participants, whose primary output consists of scripted bulletins, with a 
series of edited packages. A rolling news channel can re-edit the same 
story multiple times across the day, and come at it from numerous angles. It 
is unburdened by the clock. It can crash through commercial breaks and re-
structure its running order on the fly. Unpredictability is an everyday feature 
of rolling news, whereas it is a bug for scheduled news programmes. Most 
significantly, because Sky News is outputting programming all-day long, it 
has more airtime to fill than the other participants, so it must produce a 
greater quantity of content. 
6.4 Participants’ digital and social media presence 
Naturally, all the major news broadcasters have a digital presence. All have 
pages on the four main social media platforms — Facebook, Twitter, YouTube 
and Instagram. However, not all have websites or mobile applications (Table 
6.1). 5 News has neither. It has not yet decided to invest significantly in 
distribution on digital platforms. Channel 4 News does not have a dedicated 
mobile application; it has a news section on the general ‘All 4’ Channel 4 
mobile app. 
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Table 6.1 Major UK news broadcasters’ web & mobile presence 
Table 6.2 shows numbers for the social media presence of the major news 
broadcasters. As at May 2020, BBC News had a greater number of subscribers 
and followers — of all ages, globally — on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and 
Instagram than all other UK news broadcasters, put together.  
Table 6.2 Major UK news broadcasters’ social media users 
News 
Broadcaster Website Mobile App
BBC News bbc.com/news/uk Yes
Sky News news.sky.com Yes
Channel 4 News channel4.com/news No
ITV News itv.com/news Yes
5 News No No







BBC News 84,447,000 52,997,000 11,000,000 7,550,000 12,900,000
Sky News 18,100,000 8,700,000 6,100,000 2,350,000 950,000
Channel 4 News 8,558,000 4,800,000 2,300,000 1,330,000 128,000
ITV News 5,438,000 2,300,000 2,300,000 531,000 307,000
5 News 528,900 423,000 24,900 76,800 4,200
Total 117,071,900 69,220,000 21,724,900 11,837,800 14,289,200
Percentage 100% 59% 19% 10% 12%
Excluding BBC News
Total 32,624,900 16,223,000 10,724,900 4,287,800 1,389,200
Percentage 100% 50% 33% 13% 4%
Source: News brands’ public pages on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram - data accessed 19 May 2020
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If we exclude BBC News and look solely at the participants, Sky News had the 
biggest combined social media following (18.1 million), followed by Channel 4 
News (8.6 million), ITV News (5.4 million) and 5 News (0.5 million). 
Overall, Facebook was the most important social media platform for the news 
broadcasters, accounting for 50 per cent of participants’ social media followers. 
After Facebook, the next most popular platform was Twitter (33 per cent), then 
YouTube (13 per cent), then Instagram (4 per cent). 
The immediate observations from Table 6.2 are the relative over-achievement 
of Channel 4 News, given the size of its broadcast news audience, and the 
relative under-achievement of 5 News, due to its admitted lack of investment. 
This brief overview of the digital landscape for news broadcasters sets the 
framework for the participants’ responses to the Questionnaire (Chapter 8.2). 
6.5 Questionnaire #1 — Quantity of news 
What quantity of news do people aged 16-34 years old consume on your web, 
mobile app and social media platforms, compared to older age groups? 
Many of the participants had difficulties answering this question because they 
do not collect, or have access to, this level of granularity in the audience data 
across some of the digital platforms on which their content resides. They know 
overall audience numbers for reach, views, followers, subscribers and duration 
of visits, but in many instances they do not know much about who precisely is 
in the audience, by age group. Some expressed scepticism about the credibility 
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of audience data for users of websites because, it was argued: how do you 
know how many people are looking at a computer screen and who those 
people are? 
Broadcasters’ Audience Research Board (‘BARB’) is the UK broadcast 
industry’s research agency for audience data. However, BARB does not cover 
platforms like YouTube and Facebook, so its data cannot help news editors 
shape fully a digital strategy. For this, they have to rely on data from the social 
media platforms, their own web platforms, and any additional sample surveys 
they may commission. 
ITV News said it does not monitor age demographics of traffic to its website, 
www.itv.com/news. For Facebook, ITV News’ biggest audience is aged 25-34 
years old. ITV News said it has been actively targeting younger viewers on 
Instagram, a fact which is evidenced by the number of followers it has on that 
platform (307,000) (Table 6.2). 
In the year from 1 October 2018 to 30 September 2019, Channel 4 News 
reported its online content was watched for over a billion minutes 
(1,012,045,397) by viewers around the world. The majority (51 per cent) of this 
time was from viewers aged 13-34 years old. The age profile among UK 
viewers was virtually identical to that among viewers worldwide (Figure 6.1). 
Specifically, Channel 4 News’ single biggest age group of UK online viewers 
was between 25-34 years old (33 per cent). 
Online, Channel 4 News is disproportionately favoured by young adult viewers. 
Only 27 per cent of its ‘Watch Time' was from those aged over 45 years old. 
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This finding is consistent with Channel 4 News also reporting the highest 
proportion of 16-34s of any public service broadcaster, across all platforms. 
Figure 6.1. Channel 4 News: ‘Watch Time’ - online minutes viewed, by age 
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Sky News reported its November 2019 audience on digital platforms was 
significantly younger than that on broadcast television. Figure 6.2 shows the 
percentage of Sky News users, who are aged 13-34, by platform. The youngest 
audience was on Snapchat, with 90 per cent of users aged 13-34. YouTube 
had the second youngest audience, with 58 per cent of videos viewed by 
13-34s, followed by Instagram (53 per cent aged 13-34).  
The majority of Sky News’ Facebook users (55 per cent) were aged over 34 
years old; its oldest audiences were on the Sky News App (72 per cent aged 
over 34) and on the website — news.sky.com — where 81 per cent of users 
were aged over 34. 
  
Figure 6.2. Sky News:  Digital audience aged 13-34, by platform 
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Figure 6.3 shows a further breakdown of the Sky News audience on three of 
the social media platforms — Instagram, YouTube and Snapchat — in 
December 2019.  
On Instagram, its biggest audience was aged 25-34 (34 per cent of the total), 
followed by those aged 35-44 (24 per cent), and those aged 18-24 (17 per 
cent).  
There was a similar age profile for Sky News on YouTube, where 25-34s 
represented the single largest user group, accounting for 32 per cent of video 
views. They were followed by 18-24s, with 23 per cent of views, and 35-44s 
with 18 per cent of views. 
Snapchat, generally, is considered a platform for Generation Z (aged under 25), 
rather than millennials; this was reflected in the figures for Sky News, where 23 
per cent of its Snapchat users were aged 13-17; the largest group was aged 
18-24, comprising 49 per cent of all users. Only 10 per cent of Sky News’ 
Snapchat users were aged over 34 years. 
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Figure 6.3. Sky News: Social media audience breakdown by age 
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The main Channel 5 news programme on television — ‘5 News at 5’ — appeals 
to an older than average audience. 48 per cent of its broadcast viewers are 
aged over 64 years old. Only 9 per cent of broadcast viewers are aged 16-34, 
whereas this age group comprises 24.5 per cent of the UK population (Table 
2.1). So, when it comes to attracting young adult viewers on digital and social 
media platforms, 5 News starts from a low base (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3. 5 News:  Breakdown of TV audience by age and sex 
Target












Men 37% 36% 52% 45% 48%
Women 60% 58% 44% 52% 47%
Children 4% 6% 4% 4% 5%
16-34s 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%
35-44s 9% 12% 8% 10% 9%
45-54s 16% 22% 16% 16% 16%
55-64s 14% 17% 19% 19% 19%
65-74s 20% 17% 21% 21% 20%
75+ 28% 16% 24% 22% 22%
Source: 5 News. Average over past 13 weeks. [delivered Nov8 2019] 
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The picture was different for 5 News on Facebook and YouTube, where — in 
October/November 2019 — it reached three to four times the proportion of 
young adults aged 18-34 than it did on television. 45 per cent of its YouTube 
views and 37 per cent of its Facebook followers came from this age group. 
(Figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.4. 5 News: Consumption by users aged 18-34 years 
                                                            Source: 5 News. October/November 2019 
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6.6 Questionnaire #2 — Difference in consumption 
What, if any, difference is there in how news is consumed by 16-34s, compared 
to older age groups? 
One Head of Digital conceded:  
‘Traditional scheduled news is for older audiences, not young audiences. 
Young people want to consume when they like; on the way home from 
the pub, or on the way to school or college’. 
Channel 4 News reported significant differences in how age groups consume 
news, with older audiences having a preference for live newscasts. Table 6.4 
shows viewers over 34 years old had a preference for watching live streams, as 
opposed to video on demand (‘VOD’). Overall, 43 per cent of all of Channel 4 
News’ live minutes online were consumed by those aged 13-34, while this age 
group consumed 52 per cent of all VOD minutes. 
Table 6.4. Channel 4 News: Share of digital minutes viewed by age 
Age group Live stream YouTube
VOD 
Video on Demand
13–17 years 0% 1%
18–24 years 10% 18%
25–34 years 33% 33%
35–44 years 25% 21%
45–54 years 15% 13%
55–64 years 9% 8%
65+ years 8% 6%
Source: Channel 4 News, for period October 1 2018 to September 30 2019
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The nature of VOD is it tends to consists of standalone individual video stories, 
whereas live streams tend to consist of full-length programmes.  So, the figures 
from Channel 4 News point to younger audiences watching news in bite-size 
pieces, rather than programmes that contain multifarious stories. 
The temptation among television executives is to see this viewing pattern as a 
failure, or something about which they should be embarrassed and try to hide. 
An alternative is to embrace it as evolution; neither good nor bad, merely a new 
set of facts, to which producers and broadcasters have to adjust their 
commercial and editorial strategies. 
Another editor’s characterisation of the 16-34 audience informed my proposed 
taxonomy of news consumption (Table 2.2). He said: 16-34s can be dissected 
into two groups. The first group were those with an active intention to discover 
more about a story or issue; they will search for it on Google and, from the 
options presented, click on a reliable news brand for elucidation. They will 
spend a lot of time viewing content and will return frequently. This type of 
viewer is much sought after by news producers. In my taxonomy, I classify this 
behaviour as ‘Diligent’. 
The editor’s second group of viewers, I classify as exhibiting ‘Promiscuous’ 
behaviour. They will stumble casually across news stories, getting it where they 
can. They are brand agnostic, not loyal to any news service and will surf stories 
superficially and sporadically, not necessarily paying much attention. Likely, 
they might be swiping through Instagram pictures of a favourite celebrity when 
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a news story appears, adjacent. The story has found them, not the other way 
around. It might have arrived through a number of routes: —  
(i) because the news topic matches a topic they have previously searched for, 
or watched;  
(ii) because a friend shared it with them;  
(iii) because the news provider has paid money to Instagram to find a particular 
demographic and serve the story to it. 
Hitherto, the strategy for attracting audiences for television news has consisted 
of marketing a channel brand or an individual programme brand; also 
scheduling popular entertainment programmes before or after news bulletins. 
Among 16-34s, the customer journey for accessing news on mobile is 
completely different to the traditional pathway for broadcast TV. Instead of 
young people searching actively for news stories, it is the news story that 
searches for them (Gil de Zúnīga et al., 2017). Because of this passive 
consumer journey, awareness and trust in a news brand is less of a 
consideration, and do not translate automatically to viewership of content, at 
least not for the ‘Promiscuous’ type of consumption. 
6.7 Questionnaire #4 — Difference in genres and styles 
What, if any, difference is there in the genres and styles of news content 
chosen by 16-34s, compared to older age groups? 
‘Human stories do better on social media’, according to ITV News, which 
defined this genre as:  
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‘…feature pieces, not hard news, not miserable things. Stories that offer 
a solution or emotion that people can hook onto. Stories that make you 
feel something, other than negative’. 
This latter point about news being too often perceived as negative was echoed 
by other editors, who said younger audiences bemoan the fact news appears 
mostly to cover violence, death and disaster; all the worse aspects of human 
existence. The old journalistic adage of: ‘If it bleeds, it leads’ does not seem to 
resonate with younger audiences.  
Aside from covering actual wars, the language of news is littered with fighting 
talk that frames arguments as binary, with one side in confrontation with 
another. Words like: ‘showdown’, ‘clash’, ‘split’, ‘axe’ and ‘challenge' are 
peppered across news bulletins. Whilst journalists might argue they are merely 
covering the world as it is, actually they are choosing which elements of the 
world to cover, and then using an editorial style that amplifies the negative. 
That is not to say news has to edit out disharmony in order to appeal to young 
audiences. All participants were keen to say they try to tackle serious stories in 
a more rounded way; at times, referencing a positive angle. For example, ITV 
News has a strand called ‘The Rundown’, created for 14-17 year olds, available 
on Instagram Stories, Facebook Stories and the ITV News website.  When it 
covered a hurricane in the Caribbean, its editor said, it did so by telling the 
story of how some people were helping others caught up in the disaster. This 
style, it argued, resonates more with the show’s young audience. It still reports 
the awful truth of the storm, while showing an uplifting side of humanity. 
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5 News’ Editor told me:  
‘We like to cover positive news stories. Often, it’s ordinary people doing 
extraordinary things. We believe these editorial characteristics appeal to 
younger viewers’. 
5 News has its main weekday bulletin, ‘5 News at 5’, at 17:00. Almost two-
thirds of this audience (62 per cent) is older than 55 years old. 67 per cent 
belong to the (lower) C2DE socio-economic demographic, and 60 per cent are 
female. Overall, the typical viewer could be described as: a northern, working 
class, older woman. So, the style and tone of the stories covered on ‘5 News at 
5’ are reflective of this principal audience member.  
For the later bulletin, ‘5 News Tonight’ at 18:30, the audience is younger and, 
the Editor says, she tends to be more experimental. For example, they have 
carried many stories on identity and diversity issues. These stories are then 
placed onto 5 News’ social media accounts — on Facebook, Instagram and 
YouTube — where, as much as 45 per cent of the audience is aged 16-34. 
Whilst 5 News does not target expressly the 16-34 age group, it believes its 
tone of voice and overall style of coverage, which is to focus on people rather 
than process or policy, appeals to young adult viewers. For example, for a story 
about a rise in rough sleeping, instead of reporting this just as a problem, 
featuring interviews with politicians and think tank experts, 5 News’ style is to 
tell the story through the eyes — and mouth — of a homeless person, or an 
activist, who is actually doing something about it. 
147
5 News’ position appears to echo the sentiments of ITV News about younger 
audiences seeking positivity and activism, not doom and gloom. 5 News 
pointed also to campaigning issues as another ingredient. These are not 
necessarily campaigns by the news organisation itself, but coverage of 
campaigners on issues that are of particular interest to 16-34s, like identity 
politics, diversity and housing. 
One editor told me:  
‘For young people, famous people doing stuff is news’.  
They added: many young people see the world through the eyes of celebrities 
and influencers. So, if you can do a story with a celebrity hook, it will engage 
more young people than the same story without a celebrity. 
ITV News said this does not mean dumbing down the news or doing fluffy 
stories about trivia. It is more a reference to serious stories with an active 
celebrity element. Celebrity, in fact, opens a whole world of serious story 
possibilities. For example, ‘Kim Kardashian West on slimming pills’ is an 
opportunity to cover eating disorders, or quack medicines sold on the Internet. 
‘Footballer Mesit Ozil criticises China’ offers the chance to cover China’s 
treatment of its minority Muslim community of Uyghurs.  
There appears to be a sweet spot where celebrity, big issues and campaign-
activism combine to make news stories hugely popular with 16-34s. Climate 
change is an obvious example of this. It has countless celebrity campaigners 
like Swedish teenager, Greta Thunberg and actor, Leonardo DiCaprio, who are 
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admired by millions, and who often stage news events on the topic. ITV News 
produced a series on climate change called ‘Earth on the Edge’ which, it says, 
was hugely successful among 16-34s on its social media channels. 
There are some news genres that are difficult to sell to an audience of 16-34s. 
Stories about business and financial markets do not work very well, because 
they are often perceived as not relevant to the lives of young people. However, 
if it is a story about a large, local employer laying off staff in their town, or a 
story with consumer relevance, like Boeing grounding its fleet of 737 Max 
aircraft, then it can cut through.  
One editor said: 16-34s are not engaging with many long running hard news 
stories like Brexit, partly because the style of conventional news storytelling 
assumes wrongly the audience has pre-knowledge of key facts. So, viewers 
cannot understand a story unless they had been following the issue for a long 
time. One young viewer was quoted, telling a broadcaster:  
‘Brexit is like tuning into Episode 4 of Season 7 of a long-running series’.  
In other words, it does not make sense unless you have been watching for the 
past several years; you understand all the jargon, and know who are all the 
characters.  
The solution, according to ITV News, is stories need to be self-contained with a 
beginning, a middle and an end.  
For Channel 4 News, the problem also is one of the formal style of traditional 
news presentation being off-putting to younger viewers. It said: the stories it 
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puts on social media are: ‘more conversational, more approachable, less 
formalised’. It pays close attention to analysing audience data from the various 
digital platforms, seeing which stories perform well, and using this to inform 
decisions on how to choose and style future stories.  
What are those styles? The answer is abstract and intangible, summed up as 
the product of a hundred different innovations and methods. 
Channel 4 News said:  
‘The strategies are the collective knowledge of all of our producers about 
what works for YouTube — by being on YouTube, by watching lots of 
YouTube videos, by being platform natives, and by caring deeply about 
being a friendly neighbour on YouTube, not a drive-by organisation that 
looks out of place on a platform with so many voices’. 
6.7.1 Explainers 
A common format used by most news organisations is ‘explainers’. These are 
stories whose purpose is to elucidate complex matters of public policy, such as 
‘What is impeachment?' or ‘What is a customs union?’. They are usually short-
form videos (1-3 minutes in duration) and primarily for web and social media. 
Channel 4 News has several explainer strands, which are particularly 
successful on YouTube, but do not perform well on Twitter, where the 
broadcaster found shorter, impactful bites are more effective.  
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One strand is called ‘Brexit Explained’, of which, titles include ‘What happens 
when the UK leaves the EU?' and ‘How could a No Deal Brexit affect you?’.  
In total, all the videos in this strand amassed 27 million minutes of viewing from 
the year commencing 1 October 2018, with 63 per cent of viewers aged 18-34. 
The largest group was aged 25-34, accounting for 39 per cent of views (Figure 
6.5). 
Figure 6.5. Channel 4 News: ‘Brexit Explained’ views on YouTube, 
by age and sex 
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Another popular Channel 4 News explainer strand on YouTube — ‘FactCheck 
Explains’ — got 2.0 million views, and was watched for 12.1 million minutes in 
the same time period (as above). Viewers aged 18-34 accounted for 73 per 
cent of the views. Within this number, those aged 25-34 again were the largest 
group, 44 per cent  (Figure 6.6). 
Figure 6.6. Channel 4 News: ‘FactCheck Explains’ views on 
YouTube, by age and sex 
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Channel 4 News outlined a few common traits it found would boost 
performance of its explainer videos.  
1. Video title, headline 
‘It’s… about writing something that reads for humans, works for SEO 
[search engine optimisation], looks ‘YouTubey' in that it doesn't scream 
that it is a news story, or an explainer created by a news organisation, 
but seems approachable, human and not overly complex. This headline 
must give an honest and true, full account of the video, but also do 
justice to the drama and jeopardy of the news story, without screaming 
out for attention’. (Channel 4 News). 
This latter point is not an attempt to disguise the story is about news. Instead, it 
is a self-conscious effort not to use conventional news cliches — journalese — 
and all the oft-repeated phrases and styles that are common in newspapers 
and television news; words like ‘reveal', ‘exclusive', etc. Instead, they attempt a 
style that is more informal and casual. 
Channel 4 News has found each platform has a certain type of content that 
performs better than others. It aims to understand this and translate it into its 
own style, while not compromising the quality of the journalism; ensuring 
consistency of brand values across all platforms. 
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2. Thumbnail image 
‘It’s about the right picture, the right face, the right contrast, the right 
brightness, the right framing, the right words, the right editorial sense, 
the right level of insight, accessibility and provocation’. (Channel 4 
News).
Thumbnails are the still images that represent and promote the video stories on 
web and social platforms. Thumbnails are the gateway to the viewing 
experience, the front page of the newspaper, the cover of the book. They are 
the first — and most important — opportunity to attract interest from potential 
viewers. Channel 4 News added: 
‘The quality of these images is one of the primary determiners of 
whether someone will engage with your content on YouTube. So, we try 
to mirror certain strategies used by YouTubers and successful native 
YouTube channels in order to drive audiences to our content’. 
One of those styles is to write the video title in large, bold typography over the 
thumbnail image itself. This static image is what users see before deciding 
whether to click to watch the video. (Figure 6.7). 
Notably, neither Channel 4 News, nor any of the other broadcasters, spoke of 
adopting Netflix’s concept of artwork personalisation (Chapter 5.3), where 
different users receive different thumbnail images, depending on their persona. 
However, it is noted this is not technically possible on (third party) platforms, 
unless specific content is being served to individual users. 
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Figure 6.7. Channel 4 News: ‘FactCheck Explains’ thumbnails 
3. Vertical video 
Table 6.5 shows a breakdown of Channel 4 News’ online minutes viewed, by 
device. The single most important device was the mobile phone, accounting for 
41 per cent of all minutes viewed.  







Source: Channel 4 News, for period October 1 2018 to September 30 2019
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Given the importance of mobile phones, a question arises about the physical 
dimensions of the video images seen on those devices. Most broadcast 
television is filmed and transmitted in dimensions of 1920 pixels across the 
horizontal and 1080 pixels, vertically; referred to as ‘1920 x 1080’, ‘16:9’, ’high 
definition' or ‘HD’. In other words, television images are filmed in landscape 
mode, almost twice as wide as they are high. 
However, mobile telephones are designed to be used in portrait mode (held 
vertically). This means — by default — a standard 16:9 video fills only one-third 
of the vertical screen. Mobile phone users need to turn their phones through 
ninety degrees to see an 16:9 video in fullscreen mode.  
In 2017, Snapchat reported phone users held their phones vertically 94 per 
cent of the time. It was speculated this was because users like to have one 
hand free; generally two hands are required to hold and operate a phone held 
horizontally. Whatever the reason, Snapchat discovered: 
‘Our viewers prefer vertical… We’ve seen a nine-times-higher 
engagement rate with vertical rather than horizontal video’. (Jefferson, 
2015). 
Sky News also observed higher viewer engagement with vertical video than 
with conventional HD video. As a result, producers are starting to edit or 
encode their videos into vertical aspect ratios, so the picture — by default — 
occupies more of the vertical screen, and attracts more views. Figure 6.8 
shows the most popular aspect ratios, and how much of the vertical screen is 
filled automatically. 
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Figure 6.8. Video aspect ratios on a mobile phone 
The video Sky News produces for digital-only is in vertical format (1080 x 
1430); square format (1080 x 1080), and traditional 16:9 (1920 x 1080). ITV 
News publishes its youth strand ‘The Rundown’ in vertical format (1080 x 
1920); while Channel 4 News uses vertical for its ‘Uncovered' series on 
Facebook, and on Instagram’s video application (IGTV). 
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While news organisations are aware of the increasing trend for vertical video, it 
has been difficult for them to assess the precise benefit, as it is near impossible 
to do an A/B test, where they can publish the same video, at the same time, in 
two different aspect ratios and see which one is watched most.  
However, the bigger practical issue they face is it requires extra editing time  — 
and hence money — to take a video that has been produced for broadcast in 
1920 x 1080 and convert it into 1080 x 1920 for vertical display. Every shot in 
the video, individually, may need to be repositioned to prevent key areas of the 
widescreen picture being cropped from the much narrower vertical frame. Or 
sections of the video may need to be magnified to fill the vertical area, which 
means a loss of quality, unless the video was shot in a higher (‘4K’) resolution. 
Figure 6.9 shows how a traditional 1920 x 1080 horizontal video looks if it is 
viewed on a phone held vertically — only 32 per cent of the screen is utilised.  
If the same video is edited into a vertical 1080 x 1920 format, it is necessary to 
magnify it by 320 per cent in order to fill the screen. This loses image quality 
and prevents large parts of the original picture from being visible.  
The final image shows an alternative way of editing the same video — split-
screen — in order to reduce the magnification to 160 per cent, thereby saving 
picture quality, while showing most of the original image, albeit split into two 
halves. 
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Figure 6.9. Re-framing HD video for vertical video 
 
If camera operators and producers know their intended platform is vertical, they 
could choose to shoot, accordingly. This means positioning key visuals in the 
centre of the frame. This is not ideal, aesthetically, if the same footage is used 
on a traditional 16:9 TV screen. There is a trade-off to be made, involving 
images not being ideal for one platform or another; losing image quality or 
spending more time editing. 
159
6.8 Questionnaire #6 — Audience participation in production  
To what degree, if any, do 16-34s participate in the production of their own 
news content that they share/upload to you, e.g., video, photographs, citizen 
reporting, tipoffs, etc.? 
None of the major news broadcasters were developing user participation in the 
production of news content. The widespread feeling among them was they are 
professional journalists, who place strong emphasis on the bona fides of their 
work, and the reliability and trust viewers can place in it. The biggest concern 
with user generated content, or citizen journalism, was the provenance of 
stories filed by members of the public. Did they get consent from participants? 
Do they own the intellectual property rights in the material they file? Is the 
technical quality of the video and audio satisfactory for broadcast or streaming? 
However, when there is a news event, at which members of the public are 
present before professional camera crews arrive, news broadcasters said 
generally they would solicit raw footage from the public, such as mobile phone 
video of a train crash or a terrorist attack. This is footage, which news teams 
would edit into their stories to augment their reporting. It is not citizen 
journalism. 
The Sky News App has a section called ‘Your Report’, which asks:  
‘Seen or heard something newsworthy? Add your comments and send 
us a photo or a video’. 
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Sky News told me ‘Your Report’ is not used widely. Most user generated 
content it acquires is, in fact, procured proactively by its editorial team scouring 
social media in the immediate aftermath of relevant news events to find 
eyewitness video of incidents. They reach out to users who have posted video 
on social media, and seek to procure it for broadcast. 
6.9 Questionnaire #7 — Policies to attract 16-34s  
What, if anything, are you doing specifically to attract 16-34s to your news 
content? 
ITV News summed up the feedback from participants when asked what they do 
specifically to attract 16-34 year olds:  
‘We don’t really think about it like that’.  
Sky News echoed the sentiment saying it produces stories that have broad 
appeal, not ones that appeal to a specific demographic. The clue is in the word 
‘broadcaster’. That is not to say this age group is ignored.  
ITV News added:  
‘We're being more subtle, more tangential with our targeting’.  
It is more of a nuanced approach, where for example, within its general 
content, there are a few strands, for which knowingly there is a disproportionate 
number of young adult viewers.  
ITV News noted race and identity politics are issues that appeal to younger 
audiences. It has a strand called ‘Young British and Muslim’, presented by 
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International Affairs Editor, Rageh Omaar; this has a deliberately positive tone 
about Muslims, and was created partly to counter much of the negative 
publicity about Muslims and Islam, post 9/11. 
The broadcasters know their web and social media platforms skew towards 
younger people. This impacts the way in which these sites are designed and 
managed. Where there is content commissioned for digital-only, this too will 
skew towards the type of content preferred by younger audiences; content that 
is otherwise unlikely, or less likely, to be commissioned for broadcast.  
For example, Sky News has a YouTube explainer series called ‘Off Limits’, for 
which 58 per cent of the audience is aged 16-34. It produced a story entitled: 
‘Is CBD safe?’, which looked at issues surrounding the use of cannabidiol, or 
medical marijuana. Sky News said this story probably would not have been 
commissioned for the broadcast network. 
ITV News also has a bespoke strand, created for an audience of teenagers 
aged 14-17. The broadcaster did a lot of market research before launching ‘The 
Rundown’. It is made for social media platforms — Instagram Stories, 
Facebook Stories and Snapchat. The video is edited in vertical mode, on the 
expectation most viewers will be watching on their mobile phones. The style is 
punchy, fast-moving, visually dynamic and colourful. Its presenters are twenty-
something, which is older than the target demographic, but purposefully chosen 
to represent the ‘cool older cousins’ of the audience members. 
Channel 4 News was the single exception among participants for being 
unabashed in its targeting of 16-34s. Channel 4 has a requirement built into its 
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statutory remit, to reach young audiences, as a core priority. It is part of its 
obligation as a public service broadcaster. 
Channel 4 News’ Head of Digital said:  
‘Reaching as many 16-34s with in-depth and quality content is one of 
the key objectives of Channel 4 News. The key method of doing this is 
simply by being on the social platforms where they are. Reaching 
16-34s where they are, and where they consume other content, we have 
found, is the single best way to reach them, as a public service 
broadcaster. It sounds simple and straightforward but following a 
platform-centric approach in order to reach these audiences is a no 
brainer when we know that they are watching linear programming in 
slowly decreasing numbers; but also are less likely to come to our home 
page. We are reaching many more young people on social platforms 
than we are losing on television’. 
In addition to placing stories made for television onto the social platforms, 
Channel 4 News said it was stepping up its production of bespoke digital-first or 
digital-only content.  
‘Brexit Explained’ was:  
‘…commissioned and made with the explicit purpose of reaching 16-34 
audiences — which it did’.  
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‘FactCheck Explains’ is:  
‘…aimed at the same age group, tackling complex political and social 
issues in order to correct swaths of misinformation on the platforms’.  
And ‘Uncovered’ is a documentary series for young audiences, covering foreign 
affairs. It was commissioned and paid for by Facebook UK and is published in 
vertical aspect ratio. 
6.10 Questionnaire #8 — Customisation and personalisation 
To what degree do you change the substance or style of your news content — 
including customisation and personalisation — to appeal to 16-34s? 
Channel 4 News said it tries consciously not to talk down to younger adult 
audiences when making news stories specifically for them. It believes this is a 
common mistake made by news producers, who end up trying to produce 
content suitable for the youngest of the 16-34 age bracket, which will seem 
patronising for older members of this group. In contrast, its producers are told 
to apply the same standards across the board. 
It said:  
‘We attempt to keep the substance the same — the same high quality 
level of journalism that Channel 4 News is known for, the same depth 
and detail, but styled in a different way’. 
This ‘style’ relates primarily to presentational style of the videos on social 
media. The videos often are the exact same stories (packages and interviews) 
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that appear on the nightly 7 o’clock news bulletin on television, but these have 
to be presented on each social platform in a manner that observes best 
practice of each platform. Much effort is focussed on choosing images for 
thumbnails, and good headline writing (Figure 6.7). 
Channel 4 News said: the substance of the journalism remains consistent, 
even for digital strands that never appear on broadcast television, like 
‘Uncovered’. This strand covers complex and thought-provoking topics about 
international news, such as democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong and 
political uprisings in Sudan. 25-34s comprise a significant share of viewing for 
this strand; albeit it must be said, ‘Uncovered’ skews more to older age 
demographics (Figure 6.10). 
Figure 6.10. Channel 4 News: ‘Uncovered’ series, time consumed by age 
and sex during sample two-week window 
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There is a perceived wisdom videos need to be in very short, bitesize pieces in 
order to appeal to 16-34s. However, Channel 4 News found 16-34s can and do 
display a longer attention span if the content is good, and styled in the right 
way. This was evidenced in viewing data for its ‘Rated’ and ‘FactCheck 
Explains’ strands, where some episodes are as long as thirteen minutes. The 
average view of ‘FactCheck Explains’ on YouTube in the year to 30 September 
2019 was 6.1 minutes; 73 per cent of this coming from viewers aged 18-34. 
This willingness for young adult audiences to watch longer, short-form videos 
was echoed in Channel 4 News’ experience with (audio) podcasts. An average 
episode of ‘Politics: Where Next? with Gary Gibbon’ is 35 minutes. In the year 
to 30 September 2019, it attracted 2.7 million downloads; total listening time 
was 30.3 million minutes; an average session was 11.3 minutes. Figure 6.11 
shows 38 percent of these downloads came from users aged 18-34.  
Figure 6.11. Channel 4 News: ‘Politics: Where Next? With Gary Gibbon’ 
podcast downloads by age and sex 
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A second podcast, ‘Ways to Change the World with Krishnan Guru-Murthy’ is 
45 minutes long. In the same time period, this got 2.4 million downloads; total 
listening time was 31.2 million minutes; the average listening session was 13.1 
minutes. Figure 6.12 shows 45 percent of downloads came from users aged 
18-34 years old. 
Figure 6.12. Channel 4 News: ‘Ways to Change the World with Krishnan 
Guru-Murthy’ podcast downloads by age and sex 
Personalisation of content was seen as a double edged sword. It can make 
content more relevant to the individual viewer, but effectively it impedes that 
viewer from seeing content ordinarily they would not have selected. All news 
editors saw their job as that of a curator, selecting a variety of stories they 
judge as worth seeing. They consider themselves trusted by audiences to 
make those editorial decisions. Personalisation reduces the role of the editor; 
so the two functions are perhaps oxymoronic.  
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Certainly, personalisation is not done presently by any of the participants. It 
was seen as something pursued by technology platform-owners and news 
aggregators, not by publishers. 
However, this depends on a precise definition of personalisation. There are 
several distinct forms. One is computer-driven, artificial intelligence (AI), where 
the software tracks a user’s viewing habits, learns from this, and then feeds 
that user other similar stories. This is algorithmic curation, as done by YouTube 
and Facebook.  
Another kind of personalisation is where users actively ‘tick boxes’ to self-select 
the categories of news that interests them, such as sport, entertainment, 
politics, etc. Self-selection is low tech, and easily performed by any news 
organisation on its website or mobile app. Already, the BBC News App does 
self-selection, allowing users to pick their favourite news topics — USA, 
Business, Entertainment, Europe, Technology, Politics — and put these into a 
section called ‘My News’.  
Participants felt themselves moving inevitably towards greater degrees of 
personalisation because that appears to be what the market wants. 
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6.11 Questionnaire #9 — Impact of technology platforms 
What impact do the major technology platforms — Facebook, Twitter, Google, 
Apple , etc. — and news aggregators have on how you present news content 
to 16-34s? 
Participants appeared stoical about the fact they have to be on platforms where 
the audience is. This is true for all age demographics, but it is markedly so for 
younger adults, who rely on social media more than older adults.  
One broadcaster said:  
‘You need to be in someone else’s environment and not rely on [the 
audience] coming to a bespoke app’.  
Another lamented:  
‘It’s incredible how much influence they [the social media platforms] 
have’. 
Social media platforms provide a mechanism to reach hundreds of millions of 
people, on a global scale, in a matter of minutes; this is a much greater reach 
than any broadcaster on UK television. News publishers can tap into a share of 
this audience, indirectly — not always on their own pages — and tangentially, 
adjacent to non-news content. 
All the participants were eager to say they were not chasing raw viewing 
numbers for profit, by which they meant using clickbait to maximise views and 
reach. Channel 4 News said:  
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‘We could have reached even larger audiences by pursuing viral videos 
and imitating what other media organisations were doing, in terms of re-
uploading content that is performing well on rival pages. Instead, we 
chose to double down on high quality news content that we also felt 
could perform well’. 
The participants were focussed on getting the right editorial strategies for the 
platforms and audiences; distinct from getting the highest volume of media 
traffic. In other words, they believe the ‘correct’ approach for news is not merely 
measuring how many people are watching on digital platforms. Of course, 
producers can never divorce themselves from the reality of viewing figures, but 
success was not seen as a simplistic linear equation. In fact, it was said:  
‘…solely pursuing the ability to reach more people — rather than to get 
more people to engage deeply — is not a sustainable method. Instead 
we focus on ‘minutes viewed’, ‘average view duration', and ‘views’’.  
This comment refers back to the earlier concept in this chapter about pursuing 
Diligent consumption rather than the Promiscuous type (also Table 2.2). 
These issues were synthesised by one participant:  
‘Technology platforms have a substantial effect on the presentation of 
the content, but much less effect on the precise substance of the 
content’. 
This points to a risk felt by some editors that a push to get huge audiences 
might mean changing the news to something they would not recognise, like, or 
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agree with. The oft-quoted term was ‘dumbing down’ the news, referring both to 
the style of news presentation and the level of knowledge assumed of viewers. 
It was felt this threatened the substance of news, moving it towards more 
celebrities, gossip, pop culture and sensationalism; ‘tabloid news’ rather than 
‘serious news’, as defined in my visual taxonomy (Figure 3.2). 
News editors were conscious different social media platforms have different 
audience profiles. They observed: YouTube is more male; Snapchat is more 
female; Facebook increasingly is appealing to older adults. Also, the platforms 
are configured differently for video content, and have different ideal durations 
for video. YouTube was felt the most user friendly for video, whereas Snapchat 
was felt to be the least. Sky News claimed news aggregators were not 
particularly popular with younger adults, who rely primarily on social media. 
6.12 Summary of Ofcom’s BBC News Review 
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was established by Royal Charter 
in October 1922. Its current Charter, presented to the UK parliament in 
December 2016, states the BBC’s purpose includes: 
‘To provide impartial news and information to help people understand 
and engage with the world around them… so that all audiences can 
engage fully with major local, regional, national, United Kingdom and 
global issues and participate in the democratic process, at all levels, as 
active and informed citizens’. (Department of Culture, Media and Sport, 
2016). 
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BBC News is the world’s largest broadcast news operation, spending £175 
million in 2018-19 on 22,643 hours of news and current affairs programming 
across all platforms (Ofcom, 2019b, p.31). 
In Ofcom’s Review of BBC News and Current Affairs, published in October 
2019, Ofcom concluded:  
‘BBC News is perceived by some as representing a mainly white, 
middle-class and London-centric point of view. A lack of diversity in the 
stories that the BBC covered, and the reporters and presenters on 
screen, was a strong concern raised by some people we spoke to during 
our research. This was especially true of younger people and people 
from minority ethnic backgrounds. Some audiences also felt that the 
BBC’s news coverage represented a narrow view, with a 
disproportionate focus on south-east England and Westminster in 
particular’. (Ofcom, 2019b, p.21). 
Young people also questioned how far BBC news was ‘talking to me’. Typically 
they saw BBC News as ‘dry and boring’. Rather than reflecting their interests, 
the BBC was perceived by this group as being more relevant to their parents. 
Younger audiences typically wanted to understand news from a global 
perspective. They were interested in international news, and thought the BBC 
focused too much on the UK (Ibid., 22). 
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Ofcom found 16-24s had a strong preference for personal perspectives and 
opinion-led journalism, citing examples of presenters Reggie Yates and Stacey 
Dooley, writing:  
‘…this type of journalism helped them to make sense of the world and 
was presented in a more engaging way that they could relate to’. 
(Ofcom, 2019b, p.23). 
While ‘all individuals’ spent an average of 14.1 minutes per day watching 
national news on BBC TV channels, the average daily minutage for those aged 
16-24 was just 2.8 minutes. Only 23 per cent of 16-24s watch BBC News on 
television, a one-third drop in five years. (Ibid., 31). 
The BBC News website was the most popular news website in the UK among 
all age groups, reaching 64 per cent of the population. Ofcom wrote:  
‘The BBC is the UK’s most-used online news source. But it has long 
been aware of the challenge it faces in attracting and engaging younger 
people, who are increasingly consuming news via social media and 
news aggregator services… For some whom we spoke to, the BBC is 
just ‘one of many’ online news providers’. (Ibid., 4). 
Ofcom concluded:  
‘If these trends continue, they could pose a significant risk to the BBC 
fulfilling Public Purpose 1. This requires that the BBC engages all 
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audiences, so they can participate in the democratic process, at all 
levels, as active and informed citizens. There is a risk that if the BBC is 
able to reach certain audiences only fleetingly via social media, it will 
struggle over time to meet this obligation’. (Ibid., 29). 
In January 2020, BBC Director of News, Fran Unsworth responded:  
‘The BBC has to face up to the changing way audiences are using us. 
We have to adapt and ensure we continue to be the world’s most trusted 
news organisation, but crucially, one which is also relevant for the 
people we are not currently reaching. We need to reshape BBC News 
for the next decade in a way which saves substantial amounts of money. 
We are spending too much of our resources on traditional linear 
broadcasting and not enough on digital. Our duty as a publicly funded 
broadcaster is to inform, educate, and entertain every citizen. But there 
are many people in this country that we are not serving well enough’. 
(BBC, 2020a). 
The new BBC strategy included shifting to a ‘story-led’ approach, where 
resources are focussed away from programmes and platforms and towards 
producing stories that appeal to audiences, irrespective of the media platform. 
It means a reduction in the number of BBC journalists and the number of 
stories covered. The BBC also announced increased investment in the BBC 
News app with unspecified plans for greater personalisation. 
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6.13 Summary of participant responses 
There was significant concern, even embarrassment, within the television news 
industry at its failure to attract 16-34s to broadcast news. In the case of BBC 
News, its unwillingness to participate in this research implied a degree of 
apprehension about the potential political consequences it faces, if this failure 
continues. Among some, there was acceptance digital and social media is the 
‘new normal’ for reaching the 16-34 age demographic; they seemed relatively 
relaxed about the inevitable decline in broadcast viewing among this audience. 
Channel 4 News stood out for its enthusiastic and multi-headed targeting of 
young audiences. Unlike the other broadcasters, the requirement to target 
young people and to embrace new distribution platforms is written expressly 
into Channel 4’s founding statute (Communications Act 2003, c198A). 51 per 
cent of its online news minutes were consumed by people aged 13-34. While 
other participants also had higher proportions of young people on digital 
platforms than they had on broadcast, this was not to the same degree as 
Channel 4 News. 
A dilemma shared by all news broadcasters was the degree to which they 
move away from their duty to serve the general audience in an attempt to reach 
one subset of that audience. They emphasised they are ‘broad’-casters, and 
not narrowcasters. Unlike digital-born news brands, they could not choose to 
target only one age group; instead they had to take a nuanced approach. 
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It was apparent news brands were responding to the fact different social media 
platforms attracted different age and sex demographics. Whilst Facebook and 
Twitter accounted for 83 per cent of the participants’ followers (of all ages), 
Facebook was perceived as ‘getting old’; consequently some participants had 
shifted their focus to developing Instagram, which is disproportionately 
favoured by 16-34s. 
YouTube — as the pre-eminent video platform — was seen as a necessity, 
although the platform is not as ‘social’ as the other social media platforms, 
which lend themselves more to sharing and commenting. 
The participants reported the key difference in behaviour between younger and 
older audiences was the former’s propensity for watching individual stories as 
video on demand, whereas the latter preferred to watch live, linear or 
scheduled news programmes at specific times. Even when older audiences 
use digital devices, they tend to watch live newscasts.  
Participants reported a sharp dichotomy between — what I have labelled — 
Diligent consumption and Promiscuous consumption (Table 2.2); those 
expressing the latter trait had very little brand loyalty or brand recognition. 
News broadcasters feared this trait was on the rise, and they have not 
successfully figured out how to deal with it. 
There was virtual unanimity between the participants on what 16-34s want, by 
way of content sub-genres and editorial styles, namely: ‘human stories’ about 
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real people; stories with an emotional hook; ‘good news’ stories reporting 
something positive about humanity and the world; stories about diversity, 
identity and the environment, and stories featuring celebrities from show 
business and sport. Also, they want ‘explainers’ to decipher complicated issues 
and jargon; faster paced edits; use of graphics; all this, without the reportage 
being patronising or appearing overly keen to ‘look cool’.  
There was some disagreement over story duration — whether everything 
should be kept short (1-3 minutes), or whether the audience's attention span is 
longer than this. Channel 4 News cited several examples of long-form content 
that was successful with younger audiences. 
The issue of vertical video was vexatious. Most realised the benefits of 
engaging audiences in portrait-style video on mobile phones, but they were all 
struggling with the extra investment of time and money to deliver this. However, 
they were moving towards this, where they had dedicated digital-only content 
and specific budgets. 
Audience participation in news production was virtually non-existent. The 
prevailing mindset among producers was: we create content and the audience 
consumes it. The model is narrative storytelling, rather than storymaking or co-
creation. 
Other than Channel 4 News, none of the broadcasters said they target 
specifically 16-34s. While they skew the style of content on their social 
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platforms towards viewers on those platforms — who are younger — the 
targeting of age, per se, was incidental.  
The style of thumbnail images used on social platforms was both a part of the 
editorial storytelling and an overt marketing tool. Here, the techniques used for 
thumbnail images were designed to maximise appeal. This, again, had the 
incidental benefit of targeting younger audiences. 
None of the participants reported using personalisation on their platforms. They 
felt algorithmic curation is a platform level technology, so it could only be 
applied by participants who have their own mobile apps and websites. Not all 
participants do. In any case, the vast majority of their traffic does not go to them 
directly. It arrives via Facebook, Google, YouTube, Apple, etc., each of which 
have their own algorithmic personalisation, which users would encounter first.  
All expressed stoicism about the technology platforms, who have huge 
influence over the future of the news industry. Participants were resigned to the 






The main title of this thesis — ‘Old News: Young Views' — is a play on words 
that implies a dichotomy between news which is out of date, or for old people, 
in contrast with differing attitudes or consumption patterns among young 
people. 
While young adult audiences (aged 16-34) increasingly are moving away from 
news on broadcast television, the industry is structurally and culturally 
hampered from making an effective response. As ‘broad’-casters, their role is to 
appeal to audiences of all ages; this means a one-size-fits-all approach to 
editorial strategy, in which the settled style and substance of news content 
increasingly is of little interest or relevance to young adults (Ofcom, 2019b, 
p.21; Coleman, et al., 2011, pp.38-39) . 
Digital and social media platforms are treated as the poor cousins of the 
broadcast platform, in terms of resources made available to them; yet that is 
where 16-34s get most of their news. While the broadcasters recognise the 
younger age profile on these platforms, their digital strategies — for the most 
part — are not devised specifically to target that demographic. 
Channel 4 News is a notable exception. Channel 4’s statutory remit gives it a 
duty to target young adults and to develop new technology platforms 
(Communications Act 2003, c198A), and its news brand has succeeded in 
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doing so. Channel 4 News’ approach and performance with 16-34s on digital 
platforms represents best practice in the industry. 
However, none of the major news broadcasters — BBC News, ITV News, 
Channel 4 News, 5 News and Sky News — have made in-roads into audience 
participation, co-creation and the ‘storymaking’ techniques that differentiate 
social media as a platform from the traditional monologue approach of the 
broadcast platforms (Berkowitz, 2011; Rosen, 2005). 
Much of the broadcast industry, including regulators and politicians, are 
preoccupied with the issue of incidental news exposure, echo chambers and 
polarisation. Whereas the overwhelming finding in the literature is none of 
these is a significant problem for 16-34s. These issues are more problematic in 
older adults; those continuing their ‘old media’ habits online, and those who are 
already politically polarised (Heatherly, Lu & Lee, 2017; Flaxman et al., 2016; 
European Parliament, 2019). 
It is uncontested young people on social media engage in ‘news 
snacking’ (Costera Meijer & Groot Kormelink, 2014), wherein they skim 
headlines while doing other things, but it is not proven this is a form of 
consumption that is detrimental to democracy. In fact, a lot of the evidence 
suggests it may be beneficial, because social media users are exposed to a 
wider variety of stories (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017), and experience more cross-
cutting exposure than others (Flaxman et al., 2016). 
I propose a new taxonomy of news consumption (Table 2.2), which melds 
together others’ descriptions into four behavioural characteristics, ranging from 
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the least to the most engaged forms of consumption: Disconnected, 
Promiscuous, Customary and Diligent. Concerns about incidental news 
exposure can be re-framed as a perception of a reduction in Diligent and 
Customary behaviour, and an increase in Promiscuous and Disconnected 
behaviour. The evidence implies there has been a generational shift away from 
Customary toward Promiscuous, but there is no evidence to say there has 
been an overall decline in the volume of news consumed across all available 
platforms. 
Notwithstanding the quantity of news consumed, there is a problem with the 
content of news itself for 16-34s. The broadcast model means there can only 
be one news agenda for all, and that agenda is designed by and for older 
adults. Younger audiences report the news is ‘boring’, ‘depressing’ and ‘all 
about war’. Many deplore the constant diet of negativity relayed by a cast of 
journalists, who do not seem to represent them (Ofcom, 2019b; Childwise, 
2017; Coleman et al., 2011).  
In Figure 3.2, I offer a new visual taxonomy of news using the RGB (red, green, 
blue) spectrum of light. Too often, what broadcasters define as ‘serious news in 
the public interest’ overlaps with the negative characteristics described by 
younger viewers. While broadcasters fear the label of ‘dumbing down’ if they do 
more ‘tabloid news’, few have managed to walk the tightrope of covering 
‘serious news’, while employing editorial styles and techniques that humanise 
stories and make them interesting and relevant to young adults. 
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Greater personalisation of news content seems inevitable. UK news 
broadcasters presently are doing virtually zero personalisation, and that which 
they do is limited to the relatively insignificant area of self-selection, where 
users identify genres of stories that appeal to them. Meanwhile, social media 
users experience two additional types of personalisation, both of which 
downgrade the role of editors and news brands. Firstly, young people rely on 
social curation — using family and friends to refer them to news stories — 
rather than going directly to news sites. Secondly, technology platforms use 
algorithmic curation, powered by artificial intelligence, to feed users relevant 
stories, thereby reducing users’ needs to search for themselves. 
I conclude news broadcasters’ storytelling editorial culture and their commercial 
business structures render them not fit for the purpose of engaging 16-34s. 
However, there is evidence for a new approach revealed by a synthesis of the 
literature, best practice and lessons learned from other industries. 
In the early 2000s, Coca Cola discovered men perceived the Diet Coke brand 
as female, consequently few men would purchase the drink. Harvard Business 
School’s Jill Avery labelled this phenomenon ‘gender contamination’ (Avery, 
2012). She told Forbes Magazine:  
‘Gender contamination occurs when one gender is using a brand as a 
symbol of their masculinity or femininity, and the incursion of the other 
gender into the brand threatens that’. (Forbes.com, 2013).  
After spending millions of dollars on failed advertising, the beverage company 
acknowledged defeat and, in 2005, launched Coke Zero, specifically for men. 
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Promoted by macho-looking sports men, the new drink was a success. Avery 
explained:  
‘[Coke Zero] was a way to tell men, it's OK, here's your brand. Drinking 
this brand won't affiliate you with women’. (Ibid.). 
Borrowing from Avery, I deduce the UK’s broadcast news brands have a 
problem of ‘age contamination’. Their image, their product, their style are 
perceived as for old people. 16-34s cannot be targeted adequately while their 
interests are subsumed into an amorphous blob with all other age groups. The 
solution is for broadcasters to create new brands, or brand extensions, 
specifically to target young adults with news and current affairs. These would 
need to be autonomous business divisions, with different managements, 
budgets and editorial staff from the main news brands. The point would be to 
create a separate culture and identity. 
The BBC already has a ready-made sub-brand that could be expanded for this 
purpose. ‘BBC Newsbeat’ is the flagship news programme of BBC Radio 1, 
BBC1 Xtra and BBC Asian Network. It offers:  
‘…a range of stories from original journalism to entertainment, politics 
and lifestyle news that are of interest to 16-29 year olds’. (BBC, 2020b).  
The way forward is for BBC News to cede all responsibility for reaching 16-34s 
to an enlarged and autonomous BBC Newsbeat, whose remit should stretch 
across audio, video and textual media forms, and across radio, television and 
digital platforms. If other news broadcasters employed a similar strategy of 
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brand differentiation and specialisation — in other words ‘narrowcasting’ — 
those new brands would better serve the audience of 16-34s, to which they 
would singularly be devoted. 
7.1 Discussion 
There is a public perception young people are not consuming ‘enough’ news, or 
are not consuming it in the ‘correct’ manner. It is true young people are 
consuming it differently than older adults. Undoubtedly, there is incidental 
exposure to news and this appears disproportionately to affect 16-34s. But how 
best can we measure the quantity and quality of this new consumption? 
Is sixty-seconds of exposure to ten brief headlines equivalent to one minute 
reading a single article? Or looking across media forms, how do we compare 
one minute of reading a written article with one minute watching a video report? 
Is a picture worth a thousand words? 
One prejudice may be fewer news stories consumed in-depth is ‘better’ than 
many stories skimmed fleetingly. That would be purely subjective and not 
justified by any rationale, but it does appear to be the prejudice pervading 
much of the reporting of incidental exposure. 
If young people are engaging in more incidental news exposure than older 
generations, the only certain thing we can say is: this is a difference, catalysed 
by social media. Beyond that, we venture into personal cultural bias in claiming 
this is a good or bad thing. 
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7.2 Recommendations for further research 
Van Zoonen (1998) and Everbach and Flournoy (2007) alleged what is defined 
as ‘news’ is what male journalists think is important, which is different to what 
female journalists think is important. This focuses on the supply side; whilst on 
the demand side, Childwise (2017) found a difference in attitudes to news 
consumption by male and female teenagers (Figure 3.4). Additionally, I have 
found (Hawthorne, 2017) the female readership of the UK’s leading news 
magazines is substantially lower than the male readership — New Statesman 
(30 per cent); Economist (25 per cent); The Spectator (20 per cent).  
So, an area for further research is: to what degree is there a gender gap in 
news consumption online? And what are the factors of style and substance 
within news that appeal to each sex? 
Others (European Parliament, 2019) have pointed to gaps in the research on 
the relationship between social media and polarisation. A related area that 
overlaps computer science, media and psychology is research on customer 
journeys on news platforms, to better understand the variables in prediction 
models to be used in algorithms.  
On 29 May 2020, it was announced:  
‘Microsoft is cutting dozens of MSN news production workers and 
replacing them with artificial intelligence’ (Seattle Times, 2020).  
Human journalists had been curating third party news stories for the MSN 
platform, and soon would be replaced by algorithmic curation.  
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This action cries out for research on the comparative performance of humans 
verses machines, and the resultant impact on viewing figures and audience 
engagement. Already, artificial intelligence is not limited to mere pre-selection 
of news content (Associated Press, 2000), further research is needed on how it 
might affect commissioning, writing and presenting of news. 
The Press Association launched the character Ananova as a simulated 
newscaster in 2000. Ahead of her times, she was retired just four years later. 
Today, however, a million customisable Ananovas could be resurrected. 
Already, we have Amazon Alexa, Apple’s Siri and Google Assistant as talking, 
virtual personal assistants. It is a small leap to use these AIs to create visual, 
talking heads — customisable, animated newsreaders delivering ‘The Daily Me’ 
(Negroponte, 1995), with personalised news content for every individual.  
With more artificial intelligence-driven personalisation of content, further 
research is needed on the forms of human computer interaction that best 
engage viewers and consumers. How do people respond to different media 





8.0 Participant Information Sheet 
Participant Information Sheet
Title of research study: ‘Old News, Young Views: How UK news providers 
engage young adult audiences (aged 16-34) on 
digital and social media platforms.’
Summary of research: Exploring how people aged 16-34 consume, 
interact with and possibly co-create news 
content on web, app and social media 
platforms; and how news organisations - 
rather than platforms and aggregators - are 
responding to this behaviour.
Participant: [News corporation i.e. limited company] 
(The company is the participant, not any 
individual).
Overview of your requested 
participation:
You are invited to complete the attached 
questionnaire. 
You may answer only the questions you feel 
able to answer. 
The questions are purposely broad, so you 
may answer by a combination of: 
(i) a written reply; and/or 
(ii) an oral response during a face-to-face or 
Skype conversation between the 
Researcher and a relevant executive; 
and/or 
(iii) supplying Researcher with extracts of 
your own anonymous audience research 
and viewing/traffic data.
Why you have been invited to 
participate:
We are approaching all the principal UK 
broadcast news organisations.
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Possible benefits/ advantages 
from your participation:
- Increase knowledge of how 16-34 year olds 
consume news content. 
- Increase understanding of impact of digital 
platforms on news consumption. 
- Increase understanding of editorial/
technological techniques that successfully 
engage 16-34s in the consumption of news 
content.
Possible risks / 
disadvantages from your 
participation:
None. 
* No individuals will be named or identifiable 
in the research.  
* News organisations will be anonymised, 
unless you give permission for specific 
citations. 
* No comparisons will be made between 
named news organisations.
Confidentiality, anonymity & 
data security:
Your details will be held in complete 
confidence and we will follow ethical and legal 
practice in relation to all study procedures. 
Personal data (name, contact details, - audio/
video recordings) will be handled in 
accordance with the (UK) General Data 
Protection Regulation so that unauthorised 
individuals do not have access to them.
Who is organising and 
funding the research?:
The research is part of a Masters by 
Research degree, which is likely to be the 
basis of a PhD at the University of 
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You may answer only the questions you feel able to answer.
Overview:
1
What quantity of news do people aged 16-34 years old consume 
on your web, app and social media platforms, compared to older 
age groups?
2
What, if any, difference is there in how news is consumed by 
16-34s, compared to older age groups?
3
What, if any, difference is there in when and where - i.e. at what 
times of day, and location - news is consumed by 16-34s, 
compared to older age groups?
4
What, if any, difference is there in the genres and styles of news 
content chosen by 16-34s, compared to older age groups?
Audience Engagement:
5
How do 16-34s engage with your news content that is different to 
older users? (e.g. Share, Comment, Like etc.)
6
To what degree, if any, do 16-34s participate in the production 
of their own news content that they share/upload to you, e.g. 
video, photographs, citizen reporting, tipoffs etc.
Your Editorial / Organisational Response:
7
What, if anything, are you doing specifically to attract 16-34s to 
your news content?
8
To what degree do you change the substance or style of your 
news content - including customisation and personalisation - to 
appeal to 16-34s?
9
What impact do the major technology platforms - Facebook, 
Twitter, Google, Apple etc. - and news aggregators have on how 
you present news content to 16-34s?
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8.3 Extrapolation from Office for National Statistics data 
1. This is an attempt to calculate the number of people in the UK’s 16-34 age 
cohort who are themselves the grown-up children of other members of the 
same cohort, e.g., an 18-year old child of a 34-year old mother. The ONS 
does not produce the exact figure, so it must be extrapolated from its other 
published data. From the workings below, I estimate the number is 
approximately 66,000. 
2. I begin by looking at the ONS data on live births, by age of mother. The 
below extract shows the number of babies born in 2018 to girls aged 18 
years and younger. NB: there is an 18-year age gap between the youngest 
and oldest members of the 16-34 cohort. 
Maternities: UK live births by age of mother, 2018
Mother’s age at birth of child Number of live births







Source: Office for Na9onal Sta9s9cs, 2019. Table 3
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3. Assuming — a generation ago — the same number of young mothers gave 
birth, by age, as they did in 2018, I can calculate the number of grown-up 
children, now aged 16-21, whose mothers today (2018) are aged 34 or 
younger. From the calculation below, this comes to 15,777. 
Calculation #1 for number of grown-up children aged ≥16 
whose mothers are aged ≤34
Child’s age today Mother’s age at birth of child Mother’s age today
# children born based on 
2018 ONS data
16 <14 ≤29 5
16 14 30 61
16 15 31 282
16 16 32 1,033
16 17 33 2,847
16 18 34 5,465
17 <14 ≤30 5
17 14 31 61
17 15 32 282
17 16 33 1,033
17 17 34 2,847
18 <14 ≤31 5
18 14 32 61
18 15 33 282
18 16 34 1,033
19 <14 ≤32 5
19 14 33 61
19 15 34 282
20 <14 ≤33 5
20 14 34 61
21 <14 ≤34 61
TOTAL 15,777
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4. However, the assumption that the same number of teenage girls were 
giving birth a generation ago — compared to 2018 — is incorrect. Eurostat / 
ONS data (below) show the number of teenage mothers aged 15, 16 and 
17 years was much higher in the past. In 2004, there were 13.6 such births 
per 1,000 female population, whereas in 2014 it was 6.8 per 1,000 female 
population of the same age. So, the 15,777 calculation above must be a 
significant under-estimate. 
5. So, working with the (above) Eurostat / ONS figure — for 2004 — of 13.6 
average live births per 1,000 girls aged 15, 16 and 17; combining this with 
the 26.9 average live births per 1,000 women aged under 20; we can do the 
following, Calculation #2. This gives a total of 66,303. 
Live births women aged ‘Under 18',  (per 1,000  women aged  15 to 17) in EU28 
countries, 2004, 2013 and 2014 
2004 2014
EU28 7.7 6.0
United Kingdom 13.6 6.8
Live births women aged ‘Under 20',  (per 1,000 women aged 15 to 19)  in EU28 
countries, 2004, 2013 and 2014 
EU28 15.4 11.4
United Kingdom 26.9 15.5
Source: Eurostat data, compiled by the Office for National Statistics (extract)
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6. My conclusion is: the number of people in the UK aged 16-34, who are the 
offspring of parents, who are also in the UK 16-34 cohort is: from 
Calculation #1 — 15,777 and from Calculation #2 — 66,303. Calculation #1 
is an underestimate, because it is based on the teenage birth rate in 2018, 
which is dramatically lower than previously. Calculation #2 is more 
accurate, as it is based on the 2004 birth rates. So, whilst noting this 
number is based on births, and does not account for deaths, nor inward and 
outward migration, I deduce the number is ‘approximately 66,000’. 
Calculation #2 for number of grown-up children aged ≥16 




















16 15 31 448,522 13.6 6,100
16 16 32 447,555 13.6 6,087
16 17 33 447,937 13.6 6,092
16 18 34 439,493 26.9 11,822
17 15 32 447,555 13.6 6,087
17 16 33 447,937 13.6 6,092
17 17 34 439,493 13.6 5,977
18 15 33 447,937 13.6 6,092
18 16 34 439,493 13.6 5,977
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